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Abstract
Over the past decades, calls for comprehensively managing and planning
ocean resources have emerged internationally and within the United States.
Central to these calls is a drive to expand coastal and marine spatial planning
with a particular focus on technologically mediated public involvement. These
new public involvement technologies aim, more quickly and thoroughly, to
solicit and analyze public values and existing uses of the coastal and marine
environments. One particular technological innovation is the use of participatory
geographic information systems (PGIS). These new tools allow for stakeholders,
members of the public, and planning entities to collect, visualize, and interact
with data across many interests and user groups. These technologies also
represent a shift in how interests are represented and assembled in planning
decisions. Questions remain as to how well these tools capture or fail to include
certain interests or users, and if the technology itself alters the substance of these
representations.
This research explores the deployment of PGIS along the Oregon Coast
during a comprehensive planning effort to set aside portions of the ocean for
ocean renewable energy use. This case study presents a unique opportunity to
explore the dynamics of PGIS in action. The research used mixed methods to
understand the social and political dynamics of PGIS. First, the planning process
was video recorded by the state planning agency. These recordings were
i

transcribed and coded using qualitative data analysis software to identify the
argumentation and interpretation among community and planning stakeholders.
The research also included semi-structured in-depth interviews with key
decision-makers to triangulate the analysis of the meetings and further
understand the issues and politics of PGIS implementation in this planning
context.
Three key research findings emerge from this research. The first is a
science and technology studies engagement with the use of PGIS as a unit of
measurement and quantification in the planning process. The use of PGIS echoes
classic planning dilemmas of rationalized analysis versus political debates. In
seeking to quantify and record the human users and natural environment, PGIS
creates units of human experience and use of the ocean, but these units do not
fully contain the meanings and values intended by the designers of the tools.
This results in a system of units that become “leaky,” requiring ad hoc solutions
in the analysis to capture the intended meanings. The second set of research
findings follow from these measurement challenges or “leaks.” Underpinning
the PGIS spatial measurements is the presumption that a technical-rational
planning model will be able to generate shared agreement. However, breakdown
in the measurement units results in a shift to rhetorical tools or arguments about
how to assemble the data. Groups begin to employ stories about the use of the
ocean and the interpretation of data to create narratives about how ocean
resources should be managed. Here, it is found that a series of coalitions form
ii

using narratives to align actors, and these augment the data and their meanings
in storylines. The final research finding engages a theoretical question based on
these two empirical findings: does the use of PGIS represent a new form of social
or human engagement on the ocean? It is argued here that PGIS in this planning
context represents a unique opportunity to understand the expansion of state
authority over informal social resource management systems. Here, the state is
understood not only in terms of territory and power but, more importantly, as a
social and cognitive category that stakeholders and participants in the planning
process jointly create as a way to muster public involvement values in debates
over who should or should not have rights to the ocean. In this use of the state,
actors seek to find a type of reasoning or meaning-making that only the state as a
convenor and manager can provide. In this, the use of public involvement
technologies allows for the extension of the state into the ocean in a new and
expansive way. This research provides new tools for thinking about the
substance and impact of technologies used in public involvement and
governance.
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Chapter 1: Mapping out the Course of Research
Since the 1980’s new digital tools for collecting, visualizing, and analyzing
spatial data have opened up new avenues for public involvement and
engagement in natural resource management. These tools have grown from
expert driven technical tools to ones that engage the broader public. But this shift
is not without problems, and questions remain as to what degree this expert
driven process has truly shifted to a public driven set of tools (Duncan 2006;
Lejano 2008; Pickles 1995). This dissertation explores this question using an indepth case study from the Oregon coast where participatory geographical
information systems (PGIS) were deployed to support a planning process for the
Oregon territorial sea. In particular, I argue that the use of PGIS creates new
challenges for planning and policy development where the data products created
by PGIS obscure and alter the meaning of public input. These tools create black
boxes that temporarily bound meaning or values, but over the planning process
become less stable and begin to “leak” meaning. In the Oregon context, once
these black boxes become more unstable, participants fall back on narratives
constructed to argue for the right to use the ocean. Through these two processes,
this research contributed to the theorization on the role of science and technology
in policy and planning processes.
A final component of this research is the exploration of how these
technologies also create new communities or ways of thinking about the control
1

and management of the ocean. In particular, I argue the case presented here is a
unique opportunity to understand the emergence of new state authority over
natural resources. Further, this case illustrates a broader conceptualization of the
state that focuses on how participants in a political community share the idea of
the “state” as opposed to a more organizational or material conception of the
state. The PGIS and narratives allow for an exploration of how the public and
interests work to construct the state as a shared category to manage and order
the ocean. Before detailing these theoretical efforts, a brief introduction to the
case study is helpful. What follows in an introduction to the events the spurred
the Oregon Territorial Sea Plan Part 5 Amendment process this research
examines. Following this introduction is an overview of the dissertation chapters,
and how they build through the case study.
The early 2000s witnessed a unique combination of forces that ultimately
drew international investors, investors, and energy advocates to Oregon to
promote a new power technology that had not been deployed in the US yet. The
forces that led to this include broader energy policy shifts, a historic economic
moment in global finance, and a series of emerging power technologies. In the
US, renewable power goals had been expanding through the state-by-state
adoption of renewable portfolio standards. These standards created a new
demand for clean energy and intentionally spurred demand that power project
developers could meet through new projects. At the same time, global finance
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markets were churning with the rise of the American housing market as a
rapidly rising asset class. The housing market, and its impact on the broader
economy, encouraged investors to seek out new opportunities. These investors
increasingly sought new imaginative options to steer capital towards, seeking
opportunities to leverage investments in the next emerging asset or financial
opportunity.
Meanwhile, in Europe, engineers, inventors, and clean power advocates
started testing new ocean-based power generation devices: wave buoys. These
new devices promised to provide clean power but, more importantly, reliably
clean power. While hydroelectric power generation is a consistent and stable
renewable source, its effect on salmonids and other aquatic species has shifted
the focus on renewables to solar and wind. One issue that plagues solar and
wind renewable energies is unpredictable or variable power production
schedules. Solar resources rely on daily cycles for power generation but still must
be paired with “firm” power sources (such as fossil fuel generation) to cover
periods where solar production cannot meet power needs. Similarly, wind power
generation depends on wind forecasts which can shift within minutes, and
forecasting is largely limited to less than an hour in advance. Again, wind also
requires these firm power sources to support stable power provisioning. Here,
the ocean provides a new opportunity to redefine the reliability of renewable
energy. Ocean waves, notably on the Pacific Ocean, can be forecasted up to a
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week in advance. Thus, emerging renewable energy sources can be newly
designated not just as adjunct to traditionally fossil-fuel based firm power but
rather as a replacement for firm power itself.
This combination of shifting power policy, eager investments, and
improved models and tools for harnessing ocean energy suddenly snapped into
focus in 2005 off the coast of Southern Oregon. Flanked by a landscape of sand
dunes and federal forests, Reedsport became the epicenter of wave energy
development in the US. Reedsport sits along the Umpqua River on the Oregon
Coast. It is a community with a long history of utilizing forest and fishing
resources and has faced struggles navigating the new economy. These two
industries took a turn for the worse both in Reedsport and Oregon in the 1990s as
historic assumptions about harvest both on land and at sea were challenged by
new constraints from environmental laws regarding a number of protected and
commercial species. However, this natural resource legacy also created an
opportunity for a new industry. Forest products and fisheries required easy
access to transportation, power, and industrial lands for processing. Reedsport
enjoyed all of these, but by 2005 much of these resources were underutilized, if
used at all. An East Coast firm arrived with a proposal: repurpose some elements
of this industrial base to provide a new launchpad for ocean energy buoys in a
marine environment with phenomenal wave energy potential. With a
preliminary permit filing laying claim to a patch of water off Reedsport, a new
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industry staked a claim to what, at the time, seemed to be an empty ocean
landscape. But this characterization was far from true and suddenly ocean users
up and down the Oregon Coast took notice of a new player that could unsettle
years of regulated but primarily loosely coordinated ocean industries and uses.
The firm that filed this preliminary permit was Ocean Power Technologies
(OPT), a New Jersey-based firm¾a fact that colored the reception by users and
others on the Oregon Coast. The permit was filed with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), an independent federal body traditionally
known in the Pacific Northwest for overseeing hydroelectric power projects on
rivers. In this case, wave energy devices were considered to be similar, classified
as hydrokinetic power devices, and were thus placed under FERC jurisdiction.
This created an immediate challenge for the state: would the proposed
development continue at a fevered pace under the FERC process or was there a
way for the state to intervene and assert some control over the process? Under
the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), coastal states do have a seat at the
table as federal managers to make decisions about ocean resources. However,
traditionally the FERC has not been obliged to consider the CZMA and
consistency reviews, a role usually reserved for the federal Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management (formerly the Minerals Management Service). This element
of review along with the uncertainties of roles and authorities allowed for a
pause in the process.
5

What followed from this moment was a series of steps taken by the State
of Oregon to take control of the planning process or, at least, to ensure that
broader Oregon interests were considered. Then, Governor Kulongoski directed
the state planning agency to begin an update to the planning document that
governs the three-mile strip of ocean under state control¾the Territorial Sea. At
the same time, federal agencies paused so that planning could proceed with the
intent that any future federal reviews would then have a newly updated state
planning document to consider.
The state agency responsible for this process was the Department of Land
Conservation and Development (DLCD). The DLCD is charged with overseeing
and carrying out Oregon’s comprehensive land-use goal program, which
includes ocean and coastal environments. The DLCD as an agency is more
commonly known for assisting local governments and reviewing local land use
planning efforts such as comprehensive planning. However, for the Territorial
Sea, DLCD’s relatively smaller Coastal Program was selected as the planner.
DLCD’s planning process did not begin in a vacuum but rather built on over
twenty years of planning tools that and, prior to this event, had been developed
around protecting marine natural resources primarily from coastal development
impacts and proposed off-shore mineral extraction including oil and gas
exploration. At this time, internationally and across the US, calls had grown for a
more comprehensive coastal and marine spatial planning program to address the
6

challenge of the growing impacts on marine environments. Key among these
planning efforts around the world was a call for extensive public involvement
and data-driven ocean user and conservation planning.
For the DLCD, these forces resulted in a planning approach that
introduced a set of tools novel to the Oregon planning process: participatory
geographical information systems (PGIS). PGIS is a suite of public involvement
tools employed to collect spatial data from user groups and the public that also
allows for the visualization and analysis of data products. The goal of PGIS, in
general, is to open up the traditionally expert-driven geographical information
system planning tools and make them transparent and participatory to facilitate
new modes of exploration, learning, and sharing. These goals were paramount
for Oregon in its planning model, where public involvement is captured in Goal
1 of the statewide planning goals.
However, these new technologies also presented new challenges as the
planning process unfolded. Data sources represented a complex patchwork quilt
of past, current, and proposed data collection processes, each with its own
starting research questions, policy requirements, and networks of users or
experts. In this planning process, human uses were sought to be represented by
spatially explicit data. User groups were engaged to collect data about areas of
importance and generate spatial data for analysis. Some ocean uses were easily
and immediately translatable into spatial units; shipping traffic lanes, subsea
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cables, and federal conservation zones were readily available for mapping and
analysis. Other uses had spatial elements that the process was hopeful about
capturing¾namely commercial fishing and sport fishing efforts¾but
recreational and other human visit-based uses were also seen as mapping,
capturing, and analyzing opportunities. The stakeholders involved in the
planning process quickly learned that these users were not as easily subjected to
mapping data and coordinates on the ocean.
Users became wary of sharing personal data; seasonal and temporal
dimensions resisted being captured in two-dimensional representations. Some
users were unable to fall neatly into a grid cell on the ocean. These users and
communities struggled to find and exercise their voice in a newly spatialized
policy system that shifted between traditional modes of argumentation into new
pixelated representations. These dynamics of technologically-driven planning
processes are not a new problem for environmental planning and public resource
management. Planning has long recognized that it can never be contained to a
solely technical exercise and that the politics of the process will always emerge
(Hoch 1994). Yet, in this example from Oregon, the drive to plan as an apolitical
technical exercise still dominated the process. Three dynamics emerge in this
story. The remainder of this introduction frames these three dynamics and maps
out the pathways through these stories.
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The first dynamic centers on PGIS and the materiality of these
technologies and how they reshape and re-orient interests and politics in policy
debates. Materiality in this context captures the “relational context” of
technologies (Law 2012). These technologies are shaped by society and, in turn,
shape society. Their materiality is important in the sense that the nature of the
material makes a difference. This perspective is meant to resist the view that
holds technology as a purely instrumental tool; rather, technologies and their
design make substantive differences, they “matter” (Law 2012). The key question
here is: How do these technologies engage users, groups, values, and interests,
and are they instrumental, or do they, themselves, generate new configurations?
As this research shows, these technologies create an impartial reconfiguration of
values and interests in the planning products, such as maps, visualizations, and
planning analyses. When these products no longer provide a simple transition
from the technical exercise of mapping into a re-engaged series of storylines that
seek to address the political, they become obscured in the technical exercise.
With this, the second dynamic in this research reveals how groups and
coalitions form around narratives that structure the nature of the policy problem
contained in the planning process. This concept of narratives as a key driver in
policy debates is based on Hajer’s (1993) conception of narrative coalitions to
understand the policy process. Hajer argues that policy-making (and, in this
context, planning) is a process not just of finding solutions but also of the
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construction of problems. Stories and narratives are used in policy debates to
“regulate” the policy process, these stories work to manage the fragmented
understanding different parties bring to the policy process and determine what is
in and out of the bounds of debate (Hajer 1993, 20-23). Narrative coalitions arise
from the technological elements of PGIS, striving to fill in the gaps these
technologies create when the data elements are assembled and no single or clear
policy solution emerges. These narratives become debates both over the nature of
the policy problem and the proper allocation of uses of the ocean.
Consequently, these narratives introduce the third dynamic in this study:
the emergence of a particular formulation of technology for, knowledge about,
and claims on the ocean. These technologies, knowledge, and competing claims
reveal a particular conceptualization of how society and the state negotiate
authority over territories¾in this context a marine territory. This final dynamic
captures an extension of the state within the politics of ocean and marine
resources. Here, the efforts to make sense of the public priorities for ocean
planning require new social and political arrangements to move from the
previous informal series of management tools, towards a more comprehensive
set of management tools.
This dissertation seeks to contribute to and integrate three research
domains. First, this research engages the science and technology studies
problems of measurement, quantification, and representation by exploring the
10

application of PGIS technologies. The Oregon coastal planning story begins with
the technology first embraced and with planners and communities seeing
promise in these new metrics. As the process unfolds, stakeholders and planners
find that values and interests are not as well contained by these tools as they
initially hoped. This leads to an examination of how the policy development
process unfolds in a coastal and marine spatial planning context.
In this setting, this research aims to contribute to the understanding of
policy process models that rely on narratives and storylines to explain how
coalitions form around problems and solutions (and are informed by the
technological challenges of PGIS.) Finally, this dissertation argues for a novel
model of interaction between governance and technology that contributes to new
models of states and state formation. In particular, it argues for a reformulation
and re-engagement of state theory in public administration and natural resource
governance. In this formulation, the concept of the “state” is argued to be a social
construction that participants in policy debates utilize to capture and represent
boundaries between private and public values. In particular, these boundaries
are centered on what should be included in the public interest. What follows is
an outline of this project, providing an overview of this dissertation’s structure
and the arguments contained in each chapter. To fully explore these dynamics,
this dissertation is organized to explore each dynamic in a chapter as stipulated
below.
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Before exploring these three chapters, some foundations are required.
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical bases for this research, outlining the
intellectual foundations and concepts for this research. This chapter also shares
previous research exploring GIS in policy settings, the use of various policy
process models, and an introduction to the previous conceptions of state theory.
These concepts are then further explored in detail in the subsequent chapters as
they apply to the particular empirical setting and application in chapters 5
through 7. Chapter 3 documents the methodological tools applied in this
research. This research relies on a mixed-method approach, using in-depth semistructured interviews, content analysis of public hearings and planning work
session recordings, and the review of historical and contemporary planning
materials.
The case study at the center of this dissertation is presented in Chapter 4.
This chapter details the history proceeding the effort to amend the Oregon
Territorial Sea Plan, as well as the process itself. Several respondents interviewed
for this research characterized the history and process as a series of three
theatrical acts. The chapter presents these three acts, providing the basis for
further interpretation in chapters 5 through 7.
People in the Pixels
Chapter 5 presents the story of the development of the PGIS in the
Territorial Sea Plan process. The Oregon story of mapping begins with an
12

international and national drive to use participatory tools for planning ocean
resources. These practices are supported by emergent networks of international
non-profit conservation groups and large philanthropic foundations. These
networks brought new resources to the planning process and built on Oregon’s
tradition of comprehensive land use planning to develop a new set of tools to
collect, analyze, and visualize spatial data on human and natural values
regarding the ocean. This chapter follows the development of the PGIS tools and
the debates over how to make sense of data as it entered the planning process.
Initial data products in this process focused on mapping and representing values
that are easy to capture in mapping. These included boundaries around existing
infrastructure or regulatory boundaries that represented important areas for
fishery efforts. The challenge in this story arises when the relatively static nature
of the spatial representation engages with the interpretation or implementation
efforts where the underlying human or natural processes are fluid in both time
and space. These create noise or misunderstandings in the representations that
have to be negotiated with during the stakeholder reviews. For example, fishing
effort maps became static maps of areas of importance; however, fishers quickly
noted that the importance of these areas was contingent on the time of year,
decadal ocean cycles, or even the point a given fisher was at in their career. As
the planning process develops, user groups or communities realize that to have a
role in the planning, their values must be captured as spatial representations.
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Simultaneously, some groups also became concerned that the strategic use
of mapping may work to organize groups toward steering outcomes of the
planning process. This emerged from a starting assumption that mapping data
would be a relatively simple representation of human uses, versus the potentially
dependent representations that contain responses to other uses, or even
coordination among other uses. These conflicts over which values can be
captured in the PGIS result in a problem where the data are no longer simply a
mirror to the natural or social worlds¾an idea embedded in the technooptimism of the initial planning effort (Brown 2009). When this assembly of data
products did not produce the expected solution, the process shifted gears to add
other forms of debate to work towards a final plan agreement. This case provides
a setting to understand the challenges of quantification and technologicallydriven calculations in policy debates and how data-driven policy analyses rely
on a set of assumptions about what technology can accomplish in resolving
differences in values. While these analysis processes were initially optimistic
about the technology, they could fail to build the agreement as hoped resulting
in the need for new ways to engage conflicts over values. However, the
dedication and buy-in on mapping and PGIS as a way to solve planning
problems became a common belief in the planning process despite these
shortcomings. This led to a situation where the planning process headed down
two paths: one with a dedication toward data-driven analysis that stumbles as it
14

tries to resolve value conflict; and a second following narrative-driven debates
about the proper use of the ocean. This transitions to the next dynamic in this
case study: the role of narratives within the PGIS process to build coalitions.
Coalitions: Narratives when Pixels Break
Chapter 6 explores the planning dynamics that emerge in the planning
process once the PGIS challenges shift the attention from solving the policy
debates with data to exploring the policy debates from a perspective of
hybridized technological and rhetorical representation. The story from Oregon
shows that as planners and stakeholders worked with the data collected in the
PGIS process, a single agreed-upon outcome was increasingly unlikely. The data
products and their assembly in GIS were not presenting solutions that addressed
all concerns. While the desire to find a single and optimized solution is not
common in planning efforts, this case shares a unique dedication to the data,
even once it starts to show its shortcomings to participants. Sometimes these
maps were simple handwritten maps¾at times, via outside experts generating
new mapping products to add to the planning debates. The process did not
result in a single state-managed representation that addressed all concerns;
instead, stakeholders and interest groups began generating their own maps. The
PGIS in this phase of the planning came to a pause when participants began
shifting to make sense of the data, process, and possible outcomes. Participants
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started to seek storylines or explanations to assemble a planning solution where
the data failed to present one on its own.
The concept of storylines in this analysis draws on theories of the policy
process from Maarten Hajer, in particular the narrative coalition model (Hajer
1993, 1995). Storylines in this policy model are common narratives or sets of
narratives that link different stakeholders and interests in new coalitions where
they share a common sense-making of policy debates. Under this model,
coalitions utilized narratives. As the technological tools failed to completely
capture the interests regarding the ocean, stories were used to help fill the gaps
left by these spatial technologies. A hybrid process emerged¾one where
participants still hoped that the data-driven model would provide an agreement
and a one that organized around narratives emerging from the struggles to find
clear messages from the PGIS process. In an effort to hold the technologically
driven planning process together, storylines of the appropriate use of the ocean
were deployed to hold together agreements and coalitions over the best possible
outcomes for planning and allocating space in the ocean.
Assembling the Pixels and Coalitions: Technogovernance
Chapter 7 argues that the dynamics of Chapters 5 and 6 show evidence
that the new technology has become a type of engine or automated set of tools
for creating state power over the ocean (Carroll 2006, 2012). Here, the tools of
knowing the ocean and the users that make claims on it become a product of
16

quickly proliferating technological tools. The planning agency itself focused this
process on expanding what can be measured and does so to include a broader set
of public interest values, which the state is charged with managing. This
technology becomes a tool that is looking for public interest, and generating
representations of public interest to allow the state to make claims over the
control of the ocean spaces. Simultaneously, stakeholders and groups involved in
the planning also share in the optimism of this technology, furthering claims of
public interest via these data tools (though often used as allies for their own
parochial interests.) This framing argues that state formation regarding the ocean
is driven by a form of “engine science” that seeks to represent the public and to
set boundaries for the initial push of private interests to industrially develop the
ocean for industrial renewable energy growth (Carroll 2006, 2012). This
expansion of power via PGIS presents a new model where the support for the
use of the data tools creates its own momentum to include applying the data
tools to broader and broader concerns. This, ultimately, results in a shared effort
between the planning agency and the affected interests which works to
distinguish public from private interests and jointly accept the new authority. In
this case, the state becomes less of a distinct entity per se and, rather, it becomes a
conceptual model of how to organize public and private interests by those
involved in the decision-making (Bratsis 2006).

17

A note before proceeding is necessary. The focus of chapter 7 is to develop
a model of ‘the state’ that be based on shared interpretations of what entities or
arrangements should govern the ocean. Throughout this dissertation, but in
particular in chapter 7, the state as a term is used in two primary senses. The first
definition is the more common understanding of the state as a political
subdivision in the United States. The second definition, and most applicable in
Chapter 7, is the state as a concept of social interactions that order the political
processes and control of the ocean. The state in this definition can be contrasted
with more classical definitions of states as organizations with legitimate claims
on authority or coercion. Chapter 7 argues for a socially constructed definition of
the state.
Here, the state as an entity works to manage the public and private divide,
requiring the values of each to be kept separately. Here, legitimacy over public
interest claims rests on whether these interests are purely public¾and private
interests can be seen as undermining this public-ness (Catlaw 2007). However,
the public does not exist without setting a distinction between it and what is not
public. Efforts to define the public often struggle to stay purely public and work
to aggregate different private interests to define the boundaries of the public.
These boundaries become porous at times, where the aggregation of private
interests may be agreed upon to be public, but they also allow private interests to
become part of the public definition. This tension mirrors the challenge PGIS
18

technology faces as described in Chapter 5 where representations become
“leaky,” or their internal consistency becomes conflicted. This chapter closes with
the observation that despite all of the initial fears over the expansion of state
control over the ocean, the state becomes a category of actors or management
that become shared across the stakeholders. The stakeholders and regulated
interests come to hold an idea of the state as that which structures their interests
vis a vis the public as it is constructed in the technology of PGIS.
The final chapter shares an epilogue of the planning process. The final
phase of the process resulted in the planning outcomes being challenged in court
with questions centering on the process as well as who and what groups have
the final authority over Oregon’s territorial sea, the portion of ocean under
Oregon jurisdictions. This dissertation partially tackles a classic planning
problem: the tendency within planning efforts to maintain a divide between the
technical and the political in resource planning (Tafon 2017). However, it also
presents a unique exploration of the dynamics of this divide. This divide itself is
an opportunity to understand how technological choices reflect the efforts to
create authority over resources through knowing and representing the
public¾and representing it with a particular form of technology.

19

Chapter 2: Foundations in Technology, Coalitions, and States
Oregon’s coastal and ocean policy has always been marked by a desire to
preserve the resources for Oregonians use and enjoyment. Since the first
declaration of the beaches as part of the public right-of-way, preserving their use
and access for all Oregonians, the state has sought to limit privatization and
respond to efforts from outside the state to exert control. This chapter provides a
brief policy history of Oregon’s ocean and coastal management. The goal here is
to understand how the challenges in marine spatial planning in Oregon do not
only have their roots in ocean management, locating it in a broader set of efforts
to expand regulatory control as new values and policy priorities have emerged
regarding both the land and ocean. At the same time, this history captures a
trend where there exists a tension of seeking to allow the common resource to
remain freely accessible but needing to increasingly impose state control to
assure this outcome.
An enduring symbol of Oregon’s protections for coastal resources is found
in the public nature of its beaches. This history starts with the early designation
of Oregon’s beaches as public rights of way. Governor Oswald West, early in his
career as the 14th governor of Oregon authored his own bill to declare the
beaches of Oregon part of the state’s transportation network, placing the
resource under public ownership (Marsh 2012, 130–32). As a candidate and
governor, West’s argument contributed to the Progressive reforms of the early
20

20th Century that sought to push back on the previous era’s entanglement of
corporate power and state governance. He thus reflected a dedication to the
public interest in coastal resources that would emerge again repeatedly in
Oregon’s political history. Shrewdly, the decision to place the beaches under the
state’s highway system connected the protections of the beaches with the
growing authority of the young highway commission seeking to expand its
powers (Walth 1998, 184-86). This first effort to oppose the privatization and
exploitation of coastal resources resonates in Oregon coastal management to this
day and is often causally cited by participants and stakeholders in debates about
the best use of coastal resources.
Later, in 1967, these dynamics of protecting the public interest regarding
Oregon’s coast were made more explicit in comments by Governor McCall
during debates over the expanding protections for public access on Oregon’s
beaches. In the 1960s, commercial development along the Oregon coast
accelerated, including some developments claiming private ownership over the
beach itself. In a review of the original designation of the beach as public rightsof-way, it was found that the bill authored by Governor West excluded the dry
sands or areas above the high water line (Walth 1998, 187). To address this, a
technical bill was introduced to clarify the definition to include the beach up to
the line created by vegetation. This proposal, Oregon’s Beach Bill, generated
opposition from developers and led to legislative maneuvering that weakened
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the bill. In response, Republican opposition to adopting the Beach Bill, Governor
McCall, famously noted, “We cannot afford to ignore our responsibilities to the
public of this state for protecting the dry sands from the encroachment of crass
commercialism” (Walth 1998, 188).
Federal ocean policy also witnessed tension between protecting the public
interest in the ocean for the whole of the nation and the local and state interests
in developing economic benefits from fisheries as well as oil and gas exploration.
This trend continued through the mid-20th Century as federal ocean policy
shifted to support growing off-shore petroleum industry revenues. The
generation of petroleum royalties created tension between the states and the
Federal government. Oil and gas exploration in the Gulf of Mexico and off the
California coast began exploring deeper and deeper waters, challenging the
jurisdictional claims over management past the traditional territorial sea
boundary. International law, at the same time, sought to resolve some of the
nations’ competing claims seeking to develop the oil and gas industry offshore
(Jones et al. 1979; Krueger 1970).
Prior to 1945, sovereignty claims outside the three-mile boundary offshore
were not formally organized or recognized. Technological innovation and access
to these regions had improved such that, in the Post-War period, new
governance structures were being clamored as they sought to move West from
the fields of the Gulf of Mexico. The 1945 Truman Proclamation exerted Federal
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control over the continental shelf, defined as the seabed past the three-mile limit
and out to sea that was seen as an extension of the continental plain until the
deep sea. This set off a series of lawsuits and challenges by the states over this
authority, leading to many legislative efforts to resolve these claims. The Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) of 1953 created a system for federal leasing
of the outer continental shelf (OCS) for oil and gas exploration. The OCSLA
catalyzed a new set of challenges including claims by Texas to extend its control
over the ocean. A piece of legislation seeking to consolidate the federal controls
on the OCS resulted in the 1954 record longest filibuster by Senator Wayne
Morse in an effort to prevent the transfer of ocean resource control from the
Federal government to the states. This was founded in a concern that the transfer
would leave states on uneven ground with private interests seeking to exploit
ocean resources (Clucas 2018, 11–12). The Oregon ocean story is one largely
informed by this concern about the expansion of oil and gas exploration along
the West Coast. With an eye on the expansion of oil and gas development in
California, Oregon was aware that someday there could be pressure to explore
the waters off its coast.
The Intertwined Nature of Oceans and States
The management of ocean resources represents a unique opportunity to
examine the extension and expression of state authority over new territory. Much
of the terrestrial landscape has become settled under some form of state regime.
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Some of these areas are more tenuous, such as post-colonial states with ongoing
struggles for control. Other territories are marginally controlled and have found
stable regimes that do not require formal state oversight such as the Antarctic.
Some places are now facing a spreading phenomenon of “failing” states¾though
many of these can be understood to be the sites of conflict between various statebased systems in a larger international relations dynamic. The ocean has not been
encompassed as aggressively in state formation projects until more recently.
Historically, much of this can be attributed to two competing forces: the
technological ability to manage the ocean as a territory and, alternatively, the
need to keep the oceans open for expanding the growth of European empires. In
the first case, the extent to which large areas of the ocean could be regulated from
land was limited by the vessels and arms of the era. The range of 17th-century
cannons is often cited as the basis for the original 3 nautical mile definition of the
territorial seas for nations (Kent 1954). The other competing explanation for how
the oceans were originally ordered stems from the need to manage transit from
the centers of empires to their colonies.
As Europe’s empires moved further out from the continent, the need for
order on the high seas arose from conflicts between growing navies. Hugo
Grotius, one of the originators of the modern law of the seas, provided the classic
response to the claims on the oceans placed by the kingdoms of Spain and
Portugal through the Catholic Church. Grotius advocated for an “international
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society” that would bind all states and individuals in a common set of laws
(Grotius 1972). This idea of an “international society” is one that is also
embedded in the Westphalian concept of territoriality¾and so we see the
extension of the state to the ocean via a logic of control via force. His doctrine of
Mare Liberum, or Freedom of the Seas, was based upon the assumptions that the
high seas are so plentiful that there is no need for states to impose their
sovereignty upon them. However, another reading is that, as a Dutch scholar,
Grotius was arguing more for protecting access to colonies that might be lost to
naval conflicts if the high seas were to be controlled as territory. This early 17th
century definitional of ocean sovereignty provided a limited area that could be
forcefully managed by states.
Modern territorial definitions of the ocean have seen an expansion out to
sea informed by graduated levels of control based on distance from shore. The
original limit was changed in the mid-20th century from 3 nautical miles to 12
nautical miles. This initial 12 miles represent full control by the state in
international law. Outside of the Gulf of Mexico, in the United States, the 3-mile
limit remains and is the territory of the individual states, while the remaining 9
nautical miles seaward are under federal control. Another 12 nautical miles out
past the initial territorial sea defines the Contiguous Zone, an area of limited
territorial control. The contiguous zone allows for the enforcement of
environmental, immigration, and customs laws; however, the area remains open
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to navigation and military activities by all nations. The final gradation of state
authority out to sea is the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ); this extends to 200
nautical miles from shore. The area within the EEZ of a nation may be regulated
for exploration and extractive uses by the nation claiming the zone. However,
these waters technically remain international, and debates continue to explore
the degree to which regulation of the EEZ includes more expansive claims such
as ecosystem management outside of harvest goals (Turnipseed et al. 2009). This
gradation of sovereignty is the case study for this research as it provides a new
territory where state authority and control are still emerging. While this
discussion of boundaries has focused on the international components of state
authority, the interest of this research is on the internal development and
functioning of the state. In this sense, the state is conceptualized as the entity that
is recognized as the legitimate arbiter to assign rights and access to various ocean
resources. As will be explored later, the perception of legitimacy, in this context,
is critical for understanding the state as both an organizational entity and a
category of control that ocean users share.
The ocean has resisted the formation of fixed property rights claims in a
system that resembles property rights in terrestrial settings. The ocean
technically remains open and commonly accessible to all. This has caused some
to become concerned that the ocean is a large “tragedy of the commons” in the
making as resource extraction industrializes and demand for marine products
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increases (Hardin 1968). The lack of formal rights systems at sea does not mean
that seas are unregulated. Both informal and formal social structures manage the
ocean today. Traditions and social conventions are found to regulate many
fishery areas in the US and around the world (McCay and Acheson 1987). There
are institutions that enforce the time and place of fisheries and other extractive
efforts and these act as informal managers of ocean resources. These institutions
reflect a distinction of models of management between a laissez-faire commons
and a highly regulated central planning system (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003).
These institutions include rules and practices that order human activity and have
been heralded as an example for structuring human and ecological system
governance (Ostrom 1990a). However, many of these cases have been found to
be products of long-term human interactions and the historical product of a
unique setting. The question that needs to be raised in this situation is what
happens to commons, no matter how institutionally ordered, when large new
economic or political forces seek to re-order the ocean? Often these larger forces
return to the central planning model¾as states extend control to resolve
conflicts. In recent history, new organizations have formed to represent
numerous interests at sea, including the interests of human and non-human
human actors including fishers, biodiversity, and broader claims to ocean health
(White et al. 2012; Ehler and Douvere 2009). Conservation organizations have
supported various forms of new regulatory schemes and encouraged states to
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take responsibility for ocean resources. These developments suggest that
approaching questions around ocean planning requires understanding the
interaction of institutions, organizations, and states in public processes.
The emergence of these conservation organizations as policy actors has
created a relationship where international conservation groups have brought
both funding and expertise to marine spatial planning efforts. These groups seek
to build capacity for planning efforts; here, in an environment of constrained
public funding, the organizations can insert themselves as powerful actors in
local debates over resource management. This illustrates how organizations coproduce power and authority with the state. As Durkheim observed, these
entities need both functional and social resources from the state (Durkheim
1992). Organizations such as the ones we see in ocean management are
dependent on the state to legitimate their use claims, sanction their existence as
political actors, and facilitate their statuses as entities. This dependence between
the organizations’ organizing interests and the state in Oregon presents an
environment that appears similar to a syndicalist form of corporatism that is not
often the focus of study in the United States (Schmitter 1974). This form of
corporatism is not as hierarchical as classic ideas of corporatism seen in Europe
where interests are more powerfully contained by sanctioned organizations.
Rather, this is an “aggregation of interests” as opposed to a formal representation
(Schmitter 1974, 98). These aggregations of interest and the state depend on each
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other to achieve their goals to serve the members of the organizations and the
stability of the state.
This research explores the establishment of the state at sea in this political
setting where interests are aggregated via organizations but with the new
addition of public involvement technology. This research is not based on the idea
that the state was not present but rather that, in this situation, we see a particular
expansion of the state. The state is the effort to find the public¾and, for the
ocean, this is an emergence of the state (cf Catlaw 2007). At this point, it is worth
noting that some might take issue with my concept that the public is being
realized via the state or might be concerned that I am conflating ideas. Here, I
need to be clear that this research does not start from a pessimistic view of the
state. Defining the state as a total social fact or a cognitive category means it does
not automatically have a given moral quality. While some have made compelling
arguments that we should be concerned about the state and its project to
concentrate control, it is not useful to reify the state into some unique creature.
The guiding proposition for this research is that the state is a shared social
construction toward achieving a certain project of collective work.
This research provides an opportunity to understand the state as a
category for constituting the political¾when multiple values intersect in a
setting, the state is a social entity used to construct a space for debates and
conflicts over the allocation of values and orders. What emerges in this
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conception of the state is then a series of institutions and actors and, not solely an
instrument or functional concept but a constitutive concept that creates (or can
fail to create) social relations. In ocean and coastal policy, the idea of public
interest has been a key principle for management as the public trust doctrine has
become codified in coastal management (Johnson et al. 1992; Sax 1970). Defining
what is in the public interest then becomes a task for both the state as a
regulatory entity but also a question open to debate in planning processes. What
the state can claim¾and should claim¾for the public becomes a source of
conflict and debate. As groups negotiate what the public and its interests are, the
process also defines how the state may function or play a role in ocean
management. It is through these efforts to construct “the public” in public
interest that the efforts to build the state are represented at the same time
(Catlaw 2007). This understanding of the state seeks to respond to criticisms of
scholarship that reify the state as a unique and distinct actor or entity (Passoth
and Rowland 2010). Rather, by working with contributions from science and
technology studies, the state is reframed as a complex network of ideas, objects,
and actors. It can be understood as a part of social collective life as “a highly
complex matrix of ideas and representations, government and bureaucratic
agencies, and land and people” (Carroll 2006, 15).
The following review expands on these concepts. The first section engages
research on public involvement. Public involvement can be difficult to define
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accurately and the current research shows a diverse set of definitions of different
practices, concepts, and technologies available to encompass different publics in
policy decisions. This review suggests that a deeper understanding of the
connections among public involvement, the public, and the state is required to
assess the outcomes of public involvement technologies. The review then shifts
to explore how ideas of the public and state have been approached in political
sociology, public administration, and science and technology studies. Following
this, it examines concepts of how the state, as an institution, should be studied as
a part of an emerging project around the social studies of politics. Here, the
questions surrounding the state and public involvement are not focused on
outcomes or program evaluation but rather on understanding how public
involvement efforts reveal institutional values around states and publics. The
literature review then goes on to explore these ideas of institutions and
technology outlining its use of methodological requirements to research them.
Theoretical Structure for Analysis
This research relies on three theoretical engagements to interpret the case
study presented in Chapter 4. The first theoretical engagement centers on public
involvement and technologies used to capture or understand public involvement
and public interest. The second engagement centers on how coalitions form
based on outcomes of public involvement tools. The final engagement is a social
constructivist definition of the state as a bridge between interests, the public, and
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the policy process. A representation of these three engagement and their
connection is presented in Figure 1. Each engagement is represented by the
circles in the diagram. The arrows between the circles are the processes of
concepts that I argue connect these three theoretical engagements. Coalitions and
state theories are connected via the policy process, and a narrative based model
presented below. Coalitions and participatory GIS tools are linked via interests
and their structing within public involvement. Finally, states and the GIS
technologies are linked through efforts to define the public interest. The
following sections detail these engagements.

Figure 1: Three Part Theory Model
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Public Involvement Theory and Practice
Public involvement is a key element constituting politics and the state in
resource management. It also provides several political resources in resource
management: It defines who has a stake in decisions, how their input should or
should not be used, and what forms of accountability should be utilized. Before
engaging the idea of exploring public involvement as a feature of states,
surveying public involvement is needed. Oregon’s long tradition of public
involvement in planning comes from a series of normative claims. To study
public involvement technology thus requires exploring the dimensions of these
claims about public involvement. The state’s use of public involvement can be
understood with several logics. These are explored in the literature in this section
to understand how ideas around public involvement can facilitate the legitimate
extension of state control over the ocean.
Public involvement is presented as an approach to improve the quality of
governance, particularly in decisions with multiple competing claims. Public
involvement has been defined and understood in several forms and can
alternatively be considered public engagement or public participation.
Differences can be identified among these terms based on the format of
involvement, but, for this review, these terms are not differentiated and public
involvement is used to include all of these terms. Public involvement here is
understood as an effort to expand the voices and perspectives included in a
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decision-making or policy process. Increasing public involvement has been
called for in decision-making regarding risk, the environment, and for
overseeing science and technology. These calls from decision-makers or
advocates often argue that there is a growing lack of trust among the general
public or that there are public concerns not being included in decision-making
(Fiorino 1990). In the US, these perspectives have been codified in federal law
and regulations through provisions for notice and comment, requirements of
hearings, or the establishment of citizen standing to challenge decisions.
Research on public involvement finds there is no single rationale for
public involvement. In reviewing both the theory and practice of public
involvement, three general arguments are made for public involvement:
substantive, normative, and instrumental (Fiorino 1990). Substantive arguments
for public involvement are based on expanding the types of information and
knowledge considered in decision-making. The perspectives of local
communities or affected groups are included to extend the analysis further and
to broaden both the knowledge and criteria considered. Normative arguments
for public involvement urge that democratic principles require broad
participation in decisions. This relies on an image of decision-making where all
have a say in a broad political process. Finally, the instrumental perspective on
public involvement argues that public involvement develops legitimacy for
decisions. This perspective can be framed in a more cynical perspective where

34

processes are designed to build support versus solicit new information.
Alternatively, instrumental public involvement can be understood as an effort to
develop social capital or cooperative capacity within contentious settings
(Abelson et al. 2003). These three arguments are not rigid; often, in practice, there
is an overlap as public involvement might try to solicit new viewpoints with the
intent to be democratic and the hope to build new support for decisions.
The structure of how to conduct public involvement builds from these
three perspectives. Depending on the purpose for engaging in public
involvement, the work of public involvement is structured differently. In a metaanalysis of public involvement research and talks, Delgado et al. (2011) explored
the challenges in understanding different components of public involvement
based on the starting perspective on public involvement. Which communities to
engage in public involvement immediately presents a challenge based on the
scale of the decision or policy at hand. Complete participation by a community is
impossible outside of the smallest of groups. A broad inclusion of public
involvement inevitably adds more values and politics to the process. Those that
seek to maintain a purer science model suggest limiting or structuring
involvement based on the public capacity to contribute (Collins and Evans 2002).
This increasingly noisy set of public inputs touches on a key tension in science
and technology studies: whether there is a purity of science or information that
must be protected from the public or if all science and information is value-
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laden. Critics of this perspective argue that values and culture already structure
the science and experts involved in decisions and to claim the public is more
problematic is to ignore this institutional structuring (Wynne 1992). This valueladen perspective on science and expertise urges public involvement toward
better understanding the public meaning-making processes and engaging the
public directly and more thoroughly.
A problem related to who should be included in public involvement is
timing or the point at which the public should be engaged. This question centers
on which model of social change is presumed in public involvement. For those
with a more social learning or collaborative perspective, they will seek to
structure participation by inviting participants and creating engagement across
groups. For those that see value in the conflict in political processes, they will
seek to open up public involvement to all allowing for ideas, values, and
knowledge to be thoroughly engaged with and placed in tension with each other.
These two perspectives mirror a distinction between a Habermasian approach
versus one more grounded in classical pragmatism such as Dewey or Dryzek
(Delgado, Kjølberg, and Wickson 2011). Where the Habermasian perspective
seeks to order the involvement towards an ideal form of communication to create
the best outcomes in a deliberative effort, Dewey recognized the diversity of
perspectives on issues and the need for these to be resolved in a public process
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(Dewey 1999). This observation is also a potentially fruitful area for philosophy
to engage with the empirical question of public involvement.
In addition to the rationale or basis for public involvement, the structure
of involvement and the timing of involvement also shape the outcome of
involvement efforts. Public involvement does not occur in a policy process
vacuum. Policies and decisions have histories and contexts that include
institutional forces. Engaging the public in a decision often requires unpacking
past decisions or developments that led to the current issue. At the same time,
policy processes or decisions may be on parallel tracks to other decisions that
have interactions or contingencies. These interactions can complicate how issues
are understood or how compromises are developed. This reveals a tension in the
search for an ideal decision process where contributions and considerations are
pure and not contaminated by other concerns or histories. This ideal process
never exists and creates surprises for those unaware of the history¾surprises
that can undermine involvement if some issues are kept off-limits. While this
dynamic has been documented over a long history of research on public
involvement, there can still be an underlying assumption that public
involvement in its more instrumental form will provide a clear and robust
solution to public questions (Fiorino 1990; Heberlein 1976).
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The Public, Public Interest, and the State
Public involvement seeks to better connect those governed with those who
make decisions. It is based on a combination of normative goals from
representation to deliberation to collaboration. However, before exploring the
particular assumptions of public involvement, the first part of this term, “the
public,” needs to be well defined. Who, where, and how we know the public is
critical to the research questions presented in this proposal because the decisions
being made in the research case are working to serve the public interest through
the management of the public commons. The proliferation of “public” suggests
care is needed to define public before we engage “involvement,” “interest,” and
“engagement.”
Concepts of the public and its contribution to the republic have deep
cultural and historical roots in American governance and administration.
Through political theory and thought there has been a drive in Western society
to understand the concept that defines the shared and collective purpose of a
group: res publica¾that public thing that is shared. Daniel Kemmis (1990)
captures, in his history of the concept of the public, the idea of public we inherit
from Thomas Jefferson. It is one grounded in the idea of a society able to engage
each other in face-to-face and informed discourse. This Jeffersonian view relies
on an assumption of human nature that is collaborative and one that seeks to
maintain that collaboration even over and above personal interests. However, the
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challenges of maintaining social order in the young nation also gave rise to
another perspective, one dubious of these republican ideals. Madison’s view of
managing society by taking advantage of its differences revealed that the ideal
structure for the nation was one that allowed factions to work in tension,
preventing the control of the whole by any one group. This division in thought
sided predominantly with Madison and the Federalists in the final Constitution;
however, Jefferson recognized he could act on his vision as the country
expanded West. There was an opportunity to work on this shared vision in the
agricultural settlements that followed the settling of new lands.
A particular focus on the public was prominent in the observations shared
by Tocqueville upon his visits to young American democracy. Key to his
observations of the American efforts to develop democracy is a shared set of
values that define democracy above any other element (Tocqueville 2003). These
“habits of the heart” are the customs that allow for the stability of democracy and
Tocqueville notes a dedication to public affairs by everyone he encounters. The
public or shared effort is an activity all engage in. A critique of Tocqueville’s
observations stems from the choices of communities in the early republic that he
visited; they represented some of the most communitarian-oriented parts of early
19th Century America. The success of the American effort at democracy is a
cultural one¾ based on how we make sense of living and working together in
various roles.
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As the country developed and moved into industrialization, these
concepts of the public seemed to meet challenges as divisions in labor proliferate.
This is a concern Tocqueville raises as he closes his observations and one that is
picked up again by John Dewey (Dewey 1999). For Dewey, industrialization
divided the community Tocqueville wrote about. Conceptions of the public
become amorphous, with public or collectives being disrupted by the
industrialization of American communities, creating more divisions and
obscuring relations among those in society. To make sense of the public, Dewey
turned the concept around to understand the public as problem-oriented. For
him, the public finds its existence through the indirect impacts of consequences
on people. Critical here is the idea of indirect versus direct consequences: Direct
consequences can be traced and negotiated between parties¾these are private or
individual concerns, but some larger problems are not so well-known and have
impacts that individuals are unable to cope with alone. As individuals realize
they are facing challenges they cannot quite understand, they realize the need to
learn about the consequences, and that this requires a social activity of both
learning and then jointly managing problems (Dewey 1999, 35). Groups work
together and come to realize this shared imperative and, through this
understanding, a public emerges. This conception of the public requires
action¾the public is not a passive being but rather a process where issues and
individuals combine to form the public. This conception of the public is more
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than an interest group but rather a broader more civic-oriented set of values that
encompass the community. Further, the public is a process of knowledge
production; it is created as groups come to understand the causes of effects and
the interactions of these effects.
These efforts to understand the public result in calls for action that define
the state (Dewey 1999, 28). Importantly, Dewey distinguishes the government
from the state. The government is the collection of officials and agents that seek
to manage the public. The state is the public and the government together and,
thus, a larger concept and a contingency. Here, the state is more than just the
government but the civic understanding of the public and the organization that
makes up the government. With historical accretion or institutions or even
simply chance, the government focuses on a particular set of public concerns.
Thus, Dewey defines the state as “the organization of the public effected through
officials for the protection of interests shared by its members” (1999, 33). He
immediately notes this definition hinges importantly on how we understand the
public and officials and how well these officials perform. This definition of the
public and the state provides a starting point, but also lacks certain elements. The
definition of the state as a limiting factor on the excess of impacts from others is a
classical formulation of government which could be read as revisiting the
problems of Hobbes’s brutes. For Dewey, the state is neutral in its value; it can
perform for good or bad. However, the concern is the development of the public
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or the emergence of a public that might provide some new opportunities. For
Dewey, the public emerges out of impacts from effects that can only be
understood as a group¾“conjoint impacts” in his words. The opportunity for
Dewey here is to locate a community that can find conjoint benefits. For Dewey,
these efforts to move towards a community are tied to modes of communication,
how symbols and meaning are shared, and how knowledge exists (1999, 157–
184). Importantly, knowledge for Dewey is explicitly institutional and social. He
writes:
[C]urrent philosophy [has] held that ideas and knowledge were
functions of a mind or consciousness which originated in
individuals by means of isolated contact with objects. But in fact,
knowledge is a function of association and communication; it
depends upon tradition upon tools and methods socially
transmitted, developed and sanctions. (Dewey 1999, 158)
Dewey’s ideas of the public and state center on understanding the state,
not as something external to society, but part and parcel of social life and
communities. This definition was not a dominant one in the decades after
Dewey. The state became a more challenging concept in research across
disciplines. Marxist theory struggled with ideas around the role of the state in
the political economy, at times seeing the state as simply an extension of the
ruling class or as an accommodating capacity to mitigate the contradictions in
capitalism (Offe 1974). Instrumental arguments from these lines of thought
suggested that the state serves the powerful class. This perspective was
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challenged to suggest that ruling classes may not be so easily found as
instrumentalist accounts suggest but that states are partially independent and
rely on managers working within a capitalist rationale to ameliorate social
conflict to maintain state authority (Block 1987). In this argument, states
composed of managers work to maintain social order to preserve both the state
and capital. This creates periods of uneasy truces between capitalists and the
state punctuated by crises that the state intervenes in. The state as a separate
entity thus becomes a new matter to explore, with questions focusing on whether
states are autonomous or independent from other social structures.
At the same time, flowing from the Weberian tradition, states were
primarily explored as sites not of understanding economic domination but as
concentrations of authority through bureaucracy and the extension of rational
management (Weber 1997b). Here, the primary question is understanding how
various claims for legitimacy are enacted, allowing for control to be concentrated
by a few, and seen as legitimate by most. Typically, legitimacy in the Weberian
sense is centered on probabilities of compliance¾the chances that those subject
to the power will choose to follow or accept it. From this, the basis for
concentration can then be explored. The state is thus a place for power to be
captured by various groups such as elites or interest groups (Nash 2010, 11–15).
These models tend to treat the state as an instrument as well¾an arena for
groups to compete for control. This is also revealed methodologically where the
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focus is on observable outcomes, something revealed in the basic model of
legitimacy centered on the probability that some will follow the command of
others in a simple model of power. This simple model of power has been
criticized for missing other more internalized or complex controls that society
places on and within individuals (Lukes 2004).
These traditions played out in state theory as it reemerged along with the
social and political theory in the later part of the 20th century. In a synthetic
approach, Skocopol combined several of these elements to craft a more nuanced
sense by presenting the state as an organization of organizations with particular
unique controls but also complex interdependencies (Skocpol 1979). Skocpol
writes:
These systems [states] also may contain institutions through which
social interests are repressed in state policymaking as well as
institutions through which non state actors are mobilized to
participate in policy implementations. Nevertheless, the
administrative and coercive organizations are the basis of state
power as such. (1979, 28–29).
Power remains a controlling measure of the state in this definition, building on
Weber’s classic claim that the state is the site of legitimated violence. Yet, this
reintroduces the challenges of understanding control, where the executive may
exist, and how power is to be measured.
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Getting to Know the State and Public: The Interactions of Institutions, Science, and
Policy
The role science and technology play in policy-making is part of a series of
interactions that have been categorized as co-productive of each other (Jasanoff
2005). This means that the legitimacy of science and technology is dependent on
the policy world, just as policies and policy-making are dependent on science
and technology for their own legitimacy. These two intertwining social orders
support each other, though not always harmoniously.
There is a diversity of institutional frameworks, many evolving from
different disciplinary starting points and assumptions. These starting points are
usually responses to shortcomings in the initial disciplinary model¾for example,
rationality is redefined in institutional economics to moderate the level of
assumed optimization and calculation performed by individual actors. It has
been argued that more contemporary institutional work is a response to Marxism
where materialist forces exert on society, versus the more idealist conceptions in
Durkheim where the social force is primary (Scott 2008, 13). The institutional
response, based on a more Weberian understanding of society, according to
Scott, bridges these two poles. It does so by taking the social and coercive
components from Durkheim and an appreciation for the economic and
materialist forces that humans enable. This starts the development of several
streams of institutional thought into the 20th century¾with a melding of
institutions more dedicated to the materialist, idealist, and combined Weberian
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form. For Scott, these provide the basis for understanding the three pillars of
institutionalism (2008, 50–9). These pillars are regulative, normative, and
cultural-cognitive. These are differentiated according to both how the
institutional models conceive of influencing individuals, groups, and
organizations and also how they are distributed differently across the levels of
analyses.
These three streams also provide a tool for better understanding how
science and technology policy, as well as technology studies, might be improved
upon. This is explored in more detail in the conclusions, but these theories are
deeply institutional even though they have tended to mix different levels and
types of institutions. Using a more rigorous model to untangle institutional
thought is explored here and then applied to those concepts to identify a path
forward for further research and refinement.
Economic and Political Science Institutionalism: Regulating, Managing, Structuring
Forces
The earlier institutional development can be traced to economics. Here,
the purely calculating economic person is redefined somewhat to allow for other
forces to be included. Scott (2008, 26–35) documents this development over time
from Veblen to North, noting how models of where values reside have changed.
This particular brand of institutionalism still holds on to the agency of the
individual in the system but tries to broaden the calculus or the forces that are at
play. This leads to the ideas of “bounded rationality” (Simon 1976) and the
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adaptation of the rational choice theories along with public choice (Olson 1971).
These economic adaptations of collective action are still modeling the world as
composed of individuals, with values, combining in a more complex form to
create the societal response. This family of models also includes transaction cost
theories around how organizations come to be formed to meet cost efficiencies
(Williamson 1981).
Another version of this conception of institutions suggests that institutions
are the rules of the game (North 1990). This perspective is particularly clear in
Ostrom’s extensive work on the rules present in resource management systems
(Ostrom 1990b). This work argues that there are rules present and some are
articulated and followed, while others are not articulated but are still followed
and can be deduced from observation. This perspective on institutions was also
part of an effort to understand how these rules can structure human society
without markets or states as the coordinators¾providing a more communal or
shared management regime. The cases in this research, though, often had very
deep histories and were not cases of change, but great stability. To some degree,
this limits the generalizability of the findings to other pressing research questions
where change, power, and conflict are more defining.
Another avenue that these forms of institutionalism take can be in explicit
or evolved political structures and practices. Political versions of institutionalism
are less wedded to the atomized individual as economics, and are more focused
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on the unseen forces. In this form, institutionalism is introduced to address
shortcomings in more realist approaches to politics based on values, interests,
and actors (Steinmo 1989). Institutionalism in political science recognizes that
values can be conflicted between the real and perceived, and that values are not a
simple sum of interests but a complex combination (Immergut 1998). Here, the
goal is to understand the political histories, traditions, and social elements that
set the path for policy development and implementation. This focus has then
argued to bring the state back into the research as it captures these institutional
elements. A final concern or awareness regarding practical applications is that
there are normative implications for the institutional approach. As any approach
that sees the individual as possibly alienated or disconnected from their “real”
interests, it suggests that forms of politics change interests and thus issues of
justice and fairness must be understood as forms that can impact the individual
in ways they are not aware (Immergut 1998).
Another aspect of this area of theory is regimes. In a review of
international cooperation on Mediterranean water pollution, Haas (1989)
expands on the more accepted regime model based on imposition or force
(Keohane and Nye 2011) and focuses more on professional and science networks
that function as institutions. For Haas, the difference in the regime seen in this
case is that there is an “epistemic community” that unifies bureaucratic actors
across multiple nations, allowing for an international regime that emerges from a
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shared administrative application of science. This community resulted in a
common set of “core beliefs about cause and effect relationships” (Haas 1989,
385). This research predates boundary organization theories but highlights its
political-institutional roots and also shows the role of change. These beliefs
manage what is considered legitimate knowledge.
Sociological Institutionalism: Norms, Values, and Obligations
Another thread of institutional thought that lands in the sociological camp
is centered on the normative processes at work in society. This form shows the
most direct lineage to Durkheim’s social fact and the coercive pressure of these
facts on individuals. This area of theory is defined by an interest in values,
norms, and obligations (Scott 2008, 54–6). In this field, the clearest example is
Selznick’s conception of institutions as being cases where organizations’ work
becomes “infuse[d] with value beyond the technical requirements of the task”
(Selznick 1984, 17). Further, this work of value infusion becomes “crystallized”
into a structure (Selznick 1984, 16). One other differentiation of this thread of
institutionalism from others, namely the cultural-cognitive, is its dedication to
finding the modern version of social facts¾that there are enduring structures
that can be discovered. A critic from this camp might suggest that the culturalcognitive approach may leave us with so much plurality in meaning and context
that there is not much learned in the end (Selznick 1996).
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Selznick’s conception of the institution is one rooted in the importance of
value and the test of whether an organization is institutionalized is the degree to
which it could be given up (Selznick 1996, 271). If an institution cannot be given
up, it is because it has created a greater network of dependence in social
relations, it is not simply an instrumental tool but itself now generates value for
those involved. In this sense, it has embedded itself and now is more structured
by social needs than its own technical aims (Selznick 1984, 7). This is a concept
also carried into the networked model of organizations from Powell (2003),
where networks create normative relationships for reciprocity and thus a
possible base for institutionalization.
Another sociological take that introduces a way to conceive of the
interplay of institutions comes from Friedland and Alford (1991). Instead of
Selznick’s group and organizational focus, this version jumps to society and
overlaps somewhat with the cultural-cognitive. The authors seek to explain
social outcomes but with a theory that relies on ethnomethodology and a submodel of individual meaning-making across logics in society. The contribution
they offer is the idea of contradictory institutional logics (Friedland and Alford
1991); these are multiple in society and help to explain contradictions in behavior
and choices. This approach is a response to more materialist versions of class
conflict and broadens the bases of conflict to include such things as the state,
family, religion, and democracy (Friedland and Alford 1991, 259). These versions
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of institutionalism are more focused on the stable and fixed features of society
and how they act on the organization or individual. These features do so by
structuring how meaning is made, how values are formed, and how obligations
to others are fixed.
Social Construction: Meaning, Symbols, and Discourse
The final part of the three-part classification comes to the cognitivecultural pillar in Scott’s model (Scott 2008, 56–9). In this, there is a disciplinary
connection to constructivist sociological traditions and anthropology. The key
concept in this pillar is that it is a social effort to make sense of the world with
representations and shared meanings created often with semiotic elements.
Critical to institutions for Douglas (1986, 102) is their structuring of meaning¾a
fixing of labels, categories, and order and a classification system that makes
“public memory” and limits individual action. This version of institutionalism
has the most direct ties to work in science and technology studies, with its
connection to classification efforts in society (Hacking 2000) and numbers as
social order (Porter 1994).
This thread is also the logical basis for the new institutional
approaches¾a focus on how plural meanings, interactionism, and symbols are
part of institutions (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). This has implications for how
institutional settings are to be studied; they become somewhat less stable in this
conception as there is room for conflict and competition as meaning and power
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play out (Perrow 1993, 169–172). This work also more openly discusses how
legitimacy is an outcome or measure of the success of the organizations (Scott
2008, 59–62). Isomorphism, namely mimetic, is a cultural mode where
organizations replicate what seems to be the best form because it exists as a
model to copy (DiMaggio 1983). It provides a case where the institutional force
that structures organizations or choices is the social existence of another, not a
rational pursuit of efficiency.
The methodological approach and choice of level of analysis are also
structured by this perspective at an international, inter-organizational, or
individual level. The methods rely on discourse or instances of interaction and
this drives the structure of the analysis. In the science and technology fields, this
can be seen in how groups are represented by an agent, how images of the group
are constructed, how agents represent themselves to each other, or how
interactions are mediated by objects ((Jasanoff 2005; Knorr-Cetina 1999; Miller
2005).
Integration of Science and Technology and Institutions
The three streams explored here also show up in the application of
institutionalism in the study of science and policy, an intersecting domain for the
research on ocean management. As noted in the introduction, the study of
technology in managing decisions and the study of the interface of science and
policy have relied heavily on institutional concepts but have not necessarily
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articulated them as completely as organizational institutionalism. This proposal
has focused on treating the state as a total social fact, a concept that focuses on
Durkheim’s conception of society as collectives that lead to action and
individuals. At the same time, this research also relies heavily on concepts from
science and technology studies, namely the integration of materiality into social
life. Social facts and science and technology studies are not often explicitly
linked, but there is a bridge between the underlying theory of institutions in
social facts and materiality. In his exploration of the role objects play in
understanding moral systems of religious life, Durkheim (1995, 266–267) noted
that these institutions are encountered through material objects. Objects become
centering devices in navigating sacred terrain. They can embody the sacred
values because it serves as a recognition of collective beliefs. As individuals
interact with the object, it is held in reverence that is imparted by the social
values around it. I argue here that these practices and tools of public
involvement come to act similarly; they provide a way to understand and
explore the institutional values that surround ideas of the state and politics. The
three key concepts that come from science and technology research are boundary
objects (Star and Griesemer 1989), boundary work (Gieryn 1999), and boundary
organizations (Guston 1997, 2001).
The boundary object concept is one based on an ecological view of
institutions where groups and organizations form a community with material
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objects that mediate their interactions (Star and Griesemer 1989, 388). Boundary
work is much more of a sociological perspective on science, one that focuses on
how legitimacy is created around competing images of science through a
“cultural cartography” (Gieryn 1999, 21). This model aligns in part with the
normative and cultural-cognitive conception of institutions as provided by Scott.
The last option, boundary organizations, leads more toward a rational-actor and
political science model. Rooted in regime theory and the principal-agent
problem, Guston (1999) provides a model for how actors come together from
science and policy circles to create new mediating organizations. These three
models capture the dominant types in the literature, though there are
refinements such as Miller’s (2001) hybrid management and Lejano and Ingram’s
(2009) “ways of knowing.” Both are attempts to resolve a perceived dualism in
the boundary concept between two clean social worlds in conflict¾and towards
a more complex and multilayered world.
This particular area of science and technology research is introduced
because it has been effective in understanding many aspects of decision making,
natural resource management, and knowledge production (Jasanoff 2005). It is a
strong social constructivist perspective. In a review of this literature, the
divisions in institutional theorization identified by Scott are present but not well
articulated by researchers. This is a critical area for further investigation. One of
the challenges in boundary organization and work research is that the levels of
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analysis are mixed at times or are not explicitly defined. For example, the
boundary object work, by focusing heavily on the material aspect of objects
between individuals, can mix small group, organizational, and interorganizational settings. These need to be carefully handled so as not to take
concepts mistakenly from one level and assume they map over to another level.
A second key contribution of science and technology studies that is
important to this research is the idea of social construction. Science and
technology studies researchers have contributed deep understandings to the
ways science, engineering, and technology which are both materially important
and also contingent on the ways humans craft meaning around them. Social
construction helps explore how technology adoption is not simply a rational
uptake of the most efficient device, but a social process of competition and
closure (Bijker 1995). The social construction of science itself is tied up in efforts
to make sense through inscriptions and socially mediated technologies that can
themselves become social actors depending on their compliance (or noncompliance) with human actors (Latour 1999). Even the process of understanding
reality is tied to a social construction process where social perspectives can
become fixed as facts (Berger and Luckmann 1991). This fixation as fact is a social
and linguistic process that provides the basis for knowledge in the model. In
particular this conception of the objects (including maps and data) as playing an
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active role is explored later through the idea of “leaky black boxes” (Callon and
Latour 1981).
Black boxes represent the process by which meaning and interpretation
become take for granted within a technology or practice. The meaning is no
longer as clear until one opens the black box. Callon and Latour go further to
suggest some technologies or practices become black boxes used to build
agreements. As these constructions become more complex, the black boxes can
“leak” – meaning begins to flow out and into the boxes undermining the stability
of the box. For example, a data analysis tool may be used over time by a resource
agency, with the assumption that it properly measures water quality or some
other parameter. Over time use of the tool might stack other meaning on top to
allow for applied decisions. The assumptions result in agency decisions for water
control technologies, but the black box may have focused attention on a singular
concern or a snapshot of that concern at a point in time. However, sometimes
these tools “leak” and we find that the assumptions used to bring the tool into
practice do not reflect the meanings other share with regard to the tool. This
framing allows for us to explore the use of data analysis technologies and
understand why they do not always accomplish the ends users have in mind for
the. These contributions from science and technology studies remind us to resist
the reification of objects, nature, or categories and to place them in the social and
historical setting that generated them.

56

These concepts from science and technology studies are connected to state
theory most directly through the work of Patrick Carroll (2006, 2012). Carroll’s
research on the role of objects in statecraft draws on some of these concepts, most
directly boundary objects. By better theorizing how objects and boundaries are
constructed in interactions, the deployment of maps and mapping technologies
can be better conceptualized for inclusion in the theory of technogovernance and
state formation in this research.
Narratives, Discourses, and Institutions
This research approaches conceptions of the state and planning process
understanding both the role of institutions at work on the ocean and the active
work of social construction emerging from the PGIS process. Institutional
research can be developed from several starting points. Understanding
institutions as “taken-for-granted” systems which facilitate the process of
meaning-making creates a challenge for research. Because these systems of
meaning-making are deeply embedded for individuals in the setting being
studied, simply asking about the institutions is unlikely to be a successful
strategy. These institutions’ efficacy is often rooted in the fact that institutions are
taken for granted¾they are givens and are the only reality conceived of. This
makes reflecting on institutions a challenge when there is no alternative set of
institutions or meanings to contrast with. In research on institutions in policy
contexts, two approaches can be taken. The first focuses on a series of measurable
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indicators for assessing the institutional forces through structures of narratives
(Jones and McBeth 2010; Jones, Shanahan, and McBeth 2014). This approach
relies on a model of discourse that follows a set of discourse structures that are
assumed to be common across settings. This structuralist approach thus assumes
a shared series of narrative constructions rules in different settings that can allow
for a “science of stories.” This approach assumes a durable and “autonomous
system” of structure (Stasch 1994). This autonomous system presumes that the
elements of the discourse are determined by the structure and that the structure
itself is not affected by the elements. This structure of studying institutions
through narratives then focuses on the immaterial components of the system;
events, bodies, and things do not impact the structure because the structure
imposes the narrative order. This approach can then become overly deterministic
and cannot account for change or shifts in structure.
The second approach for studying discourse and institutions focuses on
an interpretive approach that focuses on discourse to understand how policy
participants work to make sense of the world they engage (Dryzek 2005; Hajer
1995). This approach understands the deployment of narratives as more flexible
and active by participants. However, the discourses are tied to institutional
structures as they assemble the types of symbols, meanings, and stories that can
be used. Or, as Dryzek notes, “discourses can be the institutional software while
formal rules are the hardware” (2005, 20). This hardware can be expanded not
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just to formal rules but also informal rules. For Dryzek (2005), a key concern is to
track how the participants represent their particular discourse in relation to other
discourses; the adherents and critics of each discourse help to understand how
meaning is constructed. Hajer and Kesselring (1999) take this perspective further
through their formulation of an “institutional-constructivist” approach. In their
analysis of environmental governance, this approach is applied to understand
how sustainability politics are actively debated in the context of a postcorporatist political environment in Germany. This approach explores how new
issues are constructed in institutionalized pathways of communication and
assumptions about democratic governance. These discourses work to create new
coalitions as the sense-making process becomes the collective activity that creates
joint identities (Hajer 1995). The criterion for evaluating policies, making
decisions, or taking a position is then structured by these assumptions and
pathways, but individuals wrestle with the new material and immaterial forces
that emerge as they seek to make sense of them as a joint social project. This joint
project is an important component and differs from the more structural approach
reviewed above. Here, meaning-making is both a cooperative and competitive
exercise¾discourses about the right or best option are put in opposition with
other ideas to define themselves but also with the material world as claims are
tested against new information or the outcomes of natural or social systems.
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Studying meaning-making as a key component of knowledge relies
heavily on the idea of a social construction of reality. This model of knowledge
recognizes meaning as the process by which reality becomes fixed or reframed as
objective. Thus, institutions become habits based on reciprocal relationships
(Berger and Luckmann 1991, 70–72). Studying these institutions then requires
understanding how individuals experience these relationships, such that Berger
and Luckmann (1991, 82–84) focus on the biographical experience that reveals
these institutions. These observations have generated several deep threads of
further research and the refinement of specific models. In institutional research,
in particular around organizations, the sociology of knowledge has led to a threepart model of how meaning becomes fixed. Reality becomes constructed through
“externalization, objectivation, …. and internalizations” (Meyer 2013, 529).
In this way, initial meaning is found and loosely bound for a reality “out
there.” Then, through social interactions and dialogue, meaning is settled
on¾though with layers of meaning being put together. Then, finally, these are
internalized or made part of the individual. This is a language-based model as
well, as actors work around these dimensions. As a model, it has potential
pitfalls such as how the model of reality spreads. By revisiting the idea of
boundary objects and materiality in knowledge, this question of how social
constructions spread can be better understood. As objects become imbued with
meaning and meaning is settled, the objects allow for groups to reproduce
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reality. Boundary objects also help us to understand how this meaning can be
reopened as objects move to new settings. This combining of the sociology of
knowledge with a more material understanding of the practice of knowledge
created a more robust model for this research.
The interpretivist model of discourse coalitions and institutions informs
this research proposal. The Oregon TSP amendment process is a period of
change from a previous model where resource user groups and regulators were
in a dyadic relationship to a new model with many voices and many claims
working to determine what the new ways of making sense will be. This research
will thus use archival material and interviews to track these processes. As has
been introduced in the previous sections, the hypothesis for this research is that
groups involved in the planning process have sought to best represent the public
interest¾what is best for Oregon’s ocean. These claims struggle through
narratives that interact with the materiality of the mapping technology and
science from ocean managers. These narratives about the public interest are
required to flow through the state as it creates the forum for these debates and
the management of the information largely determined by the state. These
interactions through GIS and science represent the hypothesis that state
formation using GIS data and mapping becomes a part of the discourse coalition
development. It is hypothesized that these coalitions will follow a similar
dynamic as Hajer and Kesselring’s (1999) post-corporatist Germany. In their
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analysis, the increased participation of groups and flow of ideas does not allow
for a change in institutions when there is a requirement to fundamentally
reframe key issues. The Oregon ocean has a similar setting where adding
renewable energy developers was not a marginal change that could be
accomplished by simply accommodating them on the margins but rather the
planning effort represented a fundamental reframing of the ocean. However, a
question this research seeks to explore further is how the effort to reframe the
ocean itself became a new subtler project¾not about adding the new ocean user
to the ocean but adding legitimacy for the state to extend their control over time
and space on the ocean.
Based on this hypothesis, it is argued here that the key distinction is the
degree to which disagreement over the substantive issues of the best uses of the
ocean is separated from the legitimate claim to manage the ocean under a new
regime. The research questions here ask how well stakeholders and participants
in the planning processes accepted the new planning structure, public
involvement tools, and outcomes. Findings suggest that the public involvement
tools became a flexible set of symbols themselves for participants to frame and
reframe issues with the large amounts of data collected. But the fundamental
structure of managing public involvement through the state structure was not
directly challenged.
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The case study presented in Chapter 4 details a planning process for the
Oregon territorial sea. In the framing of this process much of the theory here
draws on the policy process. A question then arises: is this a study of planning
theory or policy process? I would argue this work is an engagement in the
theories of the policy process. The planning for the territorial sea shared the
multilevel as well as administrative and legislative dimensions that are
traditionally the focus of policy process theorists (Sabatier 1991). The Oregon
Territorial Sea Plan was also a unique document in terms of what it was
accomplishing. As a plan it focused on defining the objectives, goals, and best
possible areas for ocean renewable energy. While titled a plan, it was much more
a policy document outlining how future development might occur. The
implementation side, where more specific planning type activities might occur
were deferred to an administrative rule making process with a different agency
that was intended to begin after the adoption of the plan. My distinction between
policy and planning here is one between guidelines or goals versus a clear set of
actions. The Territorial Sea Plan set out the guidelines for potential energy
development, but did not define the permitting, approval, or review processes.
This approach also parallels other policy process investigations into similar
ocean planning efforts (Weible and Sabatier 2005, Weible 2008).
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Connecting Institutions, the State and Public Involvement
The emergence of big data and mapping applications are accompanied by
the argument that they represent a new opportunity to understand society better
and serve it better. These efforts include endless polling by brands, companies,
and governments. They include spatial data submitted knowingly or
unknowingly by mobile devices. These data are growing rapidly and the scope
of what is collected expands into new aspects of life. Champions of this new
data-driven world understandably include brands and corporations that seek to
find demand for products more quickly or to know what the consumer wants
before the consumer is even aware of it. Those that encourage the spread of this
technology argue that, as more of human life is captured by sensors, mapped
with mobile devices, or submitted through continuous polling, the more
efficiently and accurately we can manage society. This observation can lead to
the pessimistic conclusion that a new era of data rationality and discipline is
upon us.
Alternatively, these technologies also include the expansion of tools for
sharing data and information across society. A more optimistic observer might
note that the ability to generate citizen science, increase scientific transparency,
and create new opportunities for collective learning are emerging to improve the
quality of decisions and democracy. Community activists can now conduct
environmental tests for pollutants with hand-held mass spectrometers operated
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by an iPhone. Google Earth has allowed crowd-sourced data collection to create
compelling narratives on the impacts of environmental decision-making.
Between these two perspectives is a final one that is concerned that the
proliferation of public data is not meaningfully contributing to understandings
of the problems we face. Regarding big data, there are criticisms that it lacks
theoretical grounding and is ahistorical¾that it represents a naive positivism
reborn in information technology. On the other hand, citizens criticize science as
unstructured and highlight the potentials for mob science where competing data
and claims only exacerbate contentious debates.
These perspectives mirror past debates over the role of public
involvement in policy-making. At the same time, these new technologies are
emerging as options for public involvement. However, as they arise there has not
been an opportunity to examine the implications of these technologies on policy
development and how the public views these new technologically mediated
policy relationships. There are strong normative claims about public
involvement and democracy for these involvement tools, but these have not been
empirically tested and have only been partially engaged with theoretically. In
practice, these emerging technologies are implemented to facilitate planning.
These include geographical information systems for soliciting and organizing
stakeholder preferences and behaviors, optimization routines for ecological
conservation site design, and data visualization tools to address public concerns
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for transparency. These technologies form a series of what I term “governance
technologies” or technogovernance (to borrow somewhat from Carroll (2012)),
that represent a new set of technologies to manage the people who make claims
on public resources.
What follows next is a discussion of the research design and methodology
of this research. The ideas reviewed above will then be returned to in three
empirical engagements in the subsequent chapters. Within each of these, the
ideas introduced here will be built on with evidence from the Oregon Territorial
Sea Plan case study.
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodological Approaches
In the study of planning processes, there are some challenges to
understanding the motivations and perspectives of those involved in the process
fully. The planning process for the Territorial Sea Plan (TSP) involved a series of
stakeholder working groups and public advisory committees. In addition to
these groups, planners and state agency representatives were critical in shaping
and guiding the planning. The TSP became a politically charged process as it
developed. This is to be expected in a process that seeks to reallocate valuable
ocean space; however, these also translate into challenges for the researcher. All
of the key respondents in this form of research have a political or professional
stake in the outcomes of both the planning and potentially the research on the
process. In this process, most of the participants represent some form of elites.
These included locally elected officials, key leaders in the fishing or energy
industries, community organizers, and senior agency staff. While these actors
may not normally be considered elites in the national or international sense, they
do represent a key set of actors that have a different set of power, resources, or
standing in the process and larger politics than the average coastal resident. As
such, conducting research among elites requires triangulating across multiple
data sources to make causal claims (Tansey 2007). This chapter outlines the
research design and methods used to conduct the research and these methods
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apply to the following chapters that move through the three research claims of
this dissertation.
Before detailing the research methods, it is important to note the
researcher’s positionality in this planning process. Six years before this research
was conducted, I was working as a contracted private planning consultant to one
of the renewable energy stakeholders in this planning process. In this role, I had
access to and was able to attend many of the meetings analyzed in this project.
This participation provided a unique opportunity to easily engage in research
with many of the participants in the planning process but, at the same time, may
have presented a barrier for other stakeholders who could not separate my initial
engagement with the process from my subsequent shift as an academic
researcher. However, this sort of intertwined set of relationships is not unusual
in the Oregon context. Many others have moved from academic positions to
industry or community roles, and back.
However, for myself, this access did also present a second important
engagement. Before this research project began¾after I left my role in the initial
planning process¾the state planning agency approached me to contribute to a
new data source in the PGIS process. At this point, I was a graduate researcher at
Portland State University and was brought on to assist with technical GIS skills.
In this effort, I was invited to support a coastal viewshed analysis project called
the Visual Resource Inventory Assessment (VRIA). This process was designed by
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the state planning agency in partnership with one of the stakeholder’s working
groups. We used a modified version of the US Forest Service’s aesthetic
management methodology (1995) and Bureau of Land Management visual
contrast methodology (n.d.). More about this process is discussed in the next
chapter, but the visual resource mapping was a hands-on opportunity to witness
the data development for user groups in the PGIS process. This process is one of
the forms of metrics that I refer to as “leaky”¾data products that do not fully
capture meaning or value. These types of data products require adjustments and
refinements to repair the degree to which meaning is not fully captured by the
initial design. As a researcher, this was also a co-production effort, working with
the state planning agency to generate a new methodology and data product
(Manson and Lanier 2015).
This research used a single case study approach centered on the Oregon
Territorial Sea Plan Part 5 Amendment process. Single case study approaches
provide an opportunity to fully explore a single policy event and setting to
understand the process and decisions that unfolded therein, allowing for an
analysis of contemporary events (Yin 2002). Case studies also have the strength
to engage research settings where the “boundary between phenomenon and
context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2002, 13). In other words, the theoretical
processes and the substance of the case are often very much intertwined, and the
case study approach allows for these to be explored in situ. This research is
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focused on the Oregon planning process and is also a descriptive project, one
that captured the story of the planning process and provided a basis for tracking
the debates and use of the PGIS tools. This process thus uses descriptive
inference to make claims about the processes and social engagement with PGIS
(Gerring 2004). The challenge in this research that must be acknowledged is the
nature of this form of inference. Engagements with the PGIS technology are
argued to have a key role in shaping the interaction of participants in this type of
research. It is important here to point out that while this single case study
approach is primarily a descriptive inferential exercise, all descriptions in part
acknowledge comparisons even if implicitly (Gerring 2004, 345). Notably, there is
an argument here that, but for the presence of this technology, various social
dynamics would not have developed over asserting control of the ocean. Thus,
while this is a single case study it stands in comparison to a hypothetical case in
Oregon where these technologies did not emerge, and, to some degree, then
assigns causal power to the models developed to explore the technology. A key
question thus is how to understand the possible outcomes of this planning
process were it not for the presence of these technologies. This counter-factual
framing of the PGIS story is critical to assess the validity of this work.
In other research settings, this counter-factual question can be addressed
by measuring variation across cases (in small to large-N studies) or through
assessing variance in variables that are modeled to predict outcomes (Geddes
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1990; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Ragin 2008). In observational social
science, these approaches can also rely on natural experiments, natural variation,
or quasi-experimentation (Morgan and Winship 2014, 6–9). In this research, the
technology’s role and its spread across social groups provides a basis for
assessing the causal power of the technology. A single case study approach with
mixed methods has some advantages over other larger case or larger-N studies,
namely an ability to explore a richness of the empirical setting¾a richness that
reductions by codes or variables may have to sacrifice (Crasnow 2012, 2019). To
address the challenges of inference in this setting, particular attention must be
paid to how the case is selected (Geddes 1990), how sampling is conducted or
participants recruited, and finally how the internal logic of the models engage
the unique setting of single case study approaches (Allison 1969; Bendor and
Hammond 1992).
The research for this project relied on three primary sources: in-depth
semi-structured interviews of stakeholders; content analysis of public meeting
recordings from the Territorial Sea Plan (TSP) update; and review of archival
materials outside of these audiovisual recordings. The following sections detail
each of these approaches.
Interviews
Over eleven months in 2016-17, the author conducted semi-structured
interviews with key participants in the TSP process. Interview subjects included
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state and local agency representatives, elected local officials, user groups, and
science advisors. In total, 17 current and former participants in Oregon ocean
policy analysis participated in in-depth semi-structured interviews from August
2016 to June 2017. Two main groups of respondents were enrolled in the study.
The first set was elected and appointed public officials, including candidates for
local office. This set included those appointed to the Ocean Policy Advisory
Committee, the Territorial Sea Plan Advisory Committee, and state and local
elected officials involved in the policy issue. The second set were public
employees of agencies involved in the policy issue as well as stakeholders who
had become involved in the public process. The stakeholder groups in the policy
process were limited in number and saturation was achieved relatively quickly.
It is important to note that many of these participants in the planning process
had worked side-by-side for over two years. While policy differences and values
persisted, some in-group identity formation likely formed. This is captured in
part by some of the shared perspectives in the planning evaluation questions.
However, the key value differences did persist and were notable across the
normative questions in interviews about how the process finally ended and if
that represented an acceptable outcome.
The interviews included perspectives from within the planning agency,
both present and former staff and leadership. The TSP process also included a
series of ocean user-based working groups that helped to identify other potential
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participants. In addition to the state planning agency respondents, respondents
were recruited from the fishing industry, local government representatives,
environmental groups, wave energy developers and trade associations, and state
agencies participating in the management of fish and wildlife resources. These
interviews were conducted primarily in person, audio-recorded, and transcribed
for coding and analysis. Several participants requested telephonic interviews.
Interviews took approximately one hour, though several exceeded 90 minutes,
and one four-hour interview was conducted over two days.
In addition to collecting data from respondents based on what they
experienced or observed in the process, questions were also adapted to explore
how participants interpreted or made sense of the planning process. Interview
questions were designed to capture respondent experiences and explore their
interpretations of decisions on structuring the planning process, the GIS data,
and tools used in the planning as well as the ultimate outcomes of the process. A
preliminary review of public meetings suggested that many of the respondents
were framing the issues of territorial sea management via a series of narratives
that often employed plots, characters, and even morals. This pattern of narrative
structures in policy analysis has been found to provide a rigorous way to
structure policy process analysis (Jones and McBeth 2010). This initial
observation guided the development of a semi-structured interview protocol to
include. Questions are organized into several categories based on a system of
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questioning designed to explore narratives (Morrill et al. 2000). Returning to the
idea of reality being grounded in biography as presented by Berger and
Luckmann (1991), the questions here probe the way meaning is made about the
lived experience of those interviewed.
These interviews were predominantly with policy elites in the TSP process
(Tansey 2007). Non-response was notable from two key environmental natural
resource perspectives. These two potential respondents participated in the
planning process as representatives of large NGOs and continued to hold
important political roles in subsequent environmental debates within Oregon
coastal management and policy. While these two respondents did not
participate, scientists and analysts from their organizations did participate in
interviews. Perspectives from these respondents carried many of the substantive
concerns of the organization but likely lacked direct experience of interpreting
the science and data debates in the policy process. Another source for these
perspectives comes from the next data source to be discussed: hearing
recordings. In these sessions, the individuals that did not participate did
contribute frankly to the discussions in the hearings. While I was unable to ask
them direct questions, these recordings do provide a basis for understanding the
perspectives and concerns they carried and how they might have responded to
the questions.
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Video Analysis
The second key source of data was the video recordings of work sessions
and public hearings from the TSP update process. Much of the public
involvement process and stakeholder deliberation meetings were video recorded
and preserved in agency records. The state planning agency made the DVD
recordings available to the researcher. Over the course of several site visits to the
agency office, the DVDs were converted from physical media to re-encoded
digital media. This process, colloquially known as “ripping,” converted the DVD
files into mp4 or m4v, the former being a more open format used across
platforms and the latter an Apple format that allows for digital rights
management. The quality of each format is comparable and the choice of format
was largely based on trial and error to manage the quality of ripped files with the
size of the files. In all, over 45 hours of hearings were ripped from DVD.
At the same time as accessing the DVDs, the planning agency also made
available the written records for the meetings. These were primarily the meeting
agendas and at times meeting packets that accompanied them. Because these
meetings were recorded and made public record, no meeting notes or minutes
were captured (or, at least, made available.) Reviewing these agendas and
meeting packets helped narrow down videos for further analysis. Meetings in
this dataset can be organized into three types: Ocean Policy Advisory Committee
(OPAC) meetings, Territorial Sea Plan Working Group (TSPWG) meetings
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(under the auspices of the OPAC), and the Territorial Sea Plan Advisory
Committee (TSPAC). These three groups were related in their purpose, but the
OPAC is authorized in state law. The legislature created OPAC as a standing
body to review ocean policy issues and provide input on rule-making. This point
would later become important as members of OPAC argued for a greater role in
the final decision-making process. Much of the debates about data products,
analyses, and public engagement were captured in the TPSWG and TSPAC
meetings.
To begin the analysis, the author viewed these meetings to review them
for applicability. One pattern that emerged was that many of the TSPWG
meetings were both a deliberative event and a public hearing event. As such,
many of these meetings repeated their findings and discussions at multiple sites
along the Oregon coast. For example, in the spring of 2011, the TSPWG worked
its way up and down the Oregon coast meeting in different communities sharing
the outline of the planning process and the initial data products. For many of
these meetings, the messages from stakeholders in the committees were
repeated. One of the more useful sets of meetings took place during a period in
2011 when the committees met more informally to work through the
assumptions of the planning process, debate the use of the data products, and set
the process for analysis.
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Content analysis for this data involved open coding using several
interactive passes at the videos and transcripts (Given 2008; Hsieh and Shannon
2005). Coding was conducted solely by the author due to the smaller number of
interviews and meeting transcripts that required coding. Key to this idea of
interactive passes through the data is the caution not to arrive at definite codes or
conclusions too quickly (Silverman 2000, 831). To allow for this process to unfold
carefully, the process of organizing “puzzles” or challenges was used, working
back and forth through them to explore not just what is said but also what is
done or meant (Silverman 2000, 831–2). For example, in this research, the search
for “spatially explicit data” was a comment made often, and one that suggested
the appropriate nature of knowledge in planning. Exploring how comments
were made, re-made, and debated around this term constituted a puzzle to
engage.
After this initial pass at the videos, I used a multimedia-based coding
approach with the software package MAXQDA (VERBI Software 2019). Initial
coding was completed in the 2018 version and upgraded to 2020 for this final
version. MAXQDA allows for visual coding of video files while they are watched
where segments of videos are assigned a code that can later be revisited. This
provided a base set of codes to work from in the open coding approach
(Kuckartz 2019). As hearings were watched, an initial set of codes grew to
expand across several dimensions: the type of speaker that was making the
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utterance; the substance of the argument usually tied to the uses or natural
environment values; process or analysis arguments; and particular interactions
with the PGIS measurements or data.
In the MAXQDA system, the unit of analysis is usually the entire
document such as an interview transcript. While the document can be coded
down to any particular smaller level (sentences, words, even emotional
responses), the document is treated as a single respondent. Variables are
assigned to the document to allow for cross-tabulation of codes by variables. In
this application, the videos are not the unit of observation but rather an
assemblage of units which are the individual speakers at each meeting. Using the
codes for speakers was an approach to work around this design component and
to allow for the analysis of code intersections.
After initially coding for themes, the next step was to transcribe portions
of the meetings that applied. Many of the meetings included introductory or
non-pertinent speech that did not require transcription but could be loosely
noted and still have the video codes apply. However, the main area of interest
were portions of the hearings where debates centered on the development,
deployment, and use of the data products in the PGIS process. Here, I used two
approaches to transcribe. First, an initial set of videos were hand transcribed and
analyzed. After identifying patterns in the coding and meetings, a second set of
assisted transcriptions was used. Assisted transcriptions involve using artificial

78

intelligence tools to create a “rough draft” transcription using the Rev.com
service. The benefit of this approach is a very cost-effective and rapid automated
transcription. While the error rate is higher, officially 20% or lower, similar error
rates were found with some test videos transcribed by a human with the
Rev.com service. It was found to be easier and more effective to use the
automated system and make corrections as needed manually. The coding of
transcribed sections then allowed for a more detailed review of the arguments
over the various data products and the process.
Archival and Other Sources
The final set of data were the records on file at the Department of Land
Conservation and Development. The majority of these documents were the
meeting agenda and supporting packets mentioned above, along with the
documentation for the data products. These files were largely used to confirm
statements or observations from the interviews and hearing videos. One other
important set of documents used in this research are past planning documents,
rule-making reports, and final determinations or legal filings that were used at
the end of the process. These documents also captured key portions of the
Oregon Territorial Sea story and allowed for some historical reference.
As noted above, one other set of data used in this research was the
previous work on the Visual Resource Inventory Assessment (VRIA). While that
previous research culminated in older publications, the participation in that
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effort included notes from fieldwork, example data collection tools, and
participant observation opportunities. Participants in the VRIA development
were informed that I was acting both as an applied practitioner for the state and
also as a researcher with a local university. This approach allowed for applied
research and an opportunity to better understand the motivations and challenges
in the PGIS environment (Vinten 1994).
Informed Consent and Data Management
Interviews included the collection of informed consent from each
respondent. Prior to each interview, respondents were provided with an
overview of the research project, some basic prompts for the interview, and the
consent form for participation. The meetings were treated as public records and
consent was not collected for these recordings, but the protocol and approach
were reviewed and approved by the Institutional Research Board at Portland
State University. Data for this research primarily consisted of interview
recordings, transcripts, meeting recordings, meeting materials and reports, and
GIS data from the planning process. The data for each mode of analysis
(interviews and meeting analysis) were managed in two separate MAXQDA
projects as the codebooks were developed independently. All data for the project
were stored on an encrypted cloud server that allowed for local and cloud use to
be backed-up constantly. Details about the interview guides and coding
approach are included in Appendix A.
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Path Forward for Analysis
This chapter’s goal is to provide a concise description of the data and tools
brought to bear on this analysis. Each of the following chapters relies on the
products of these methods, though the use of the data and analysis varies by
topic. The next chapter, Chapter 4 documents the Oregon Territorial Sea Plan
case study. It provides the evidentiary foundation for the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 5 explores the use of the material practices of the PGIS. This relies more
heavily on the hearing analysis to understand how the measurements were
made. It also relies on the documents that were shared in public meetings to
understand the various methods used in the analysis. The VRIA example is also
shared here. Chapter 6 is largely centered on the interviews and questions
around the use of the data in the decision-making process. Chapter 7 engages a
more theoretical series of questions but draws on the interview and meeting
recordings for examples, notably in the evaluative questions asked in the
interviews and the evaluative statements captured in the hearing records. In each
of the chapters, there is a reflection on which data source is being engaged, but,
to maintain the clarity of each chapter, much of the methodological details
remain in this chapter.
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Chapter 4: The Oregon Territorial Sea Plan Amendment in Three Acts
Oregon coastal and ocean resource management in the modern era can
trace its origins to efforts in the 1980s to respond proactively to potential oil and
gas development as well as seafloor mining. Prior to the 1970s, Oregon’s coastal
and ocean policy was primarily concerned with managing beach access and
protecting public ownership of the beach as discussed in Chapter 2. Along with
broader national efforts to expand land and environmental protections, Oregon
started to forge its own path with land use and environmental law in the late
1960s. First, it became the second state to mandate local community
comprehensive planning with Senate Bill 10 in 1969, and then, the muchexpanded Senate Bill 100 (SB 100) created a more integrated and comprehensive
set of planning goals and requirements in 1973 (Seltzer 2015). SB 100 represents a
shift in which statewide requirements and oversight are added to local planning
efforts.
It was found that the previously enacted Senate Bill 10 was not structured
with enough requirements to see meaningful change in planning quality at the
local level. Part of the expansion of the state’s role in planning in SB 100 was the
creation of the Department of Land Conservation and Development (DLCD) and
the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) that review plans
and hear appeals on land use determinations (Seltzer 2015). While SB 100
focused on organizing local planning efforts for land use in Oregon, a
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subsequent amendment in 1976 added four coastal and ocean goals. One of these
goals in particular, Goal 19, outlined the conservation goals for ocean resources.
The other three goals centered on coastal margin areas¾portions of the coast that
include the beaches, estuaries, dunes, and shorelands.
This shift to statewide planning goals initiated an effort to integrate the
multiple ocean resources and values better. While SB 100 broadly deferred to
local communities to conform to statewide planning goals, allowing them to
tailor plans that respond to the goals, Goal 19 placed ocean resource planning
with the state. At times, local governments worked to assert their control over
ocean resources, resulting in ongoing disputes about the control and authority
over the ocean. To respond to these conflicts, and to implement the Goal 19
vision fully in the planning process, the State of Oregon subsequently passed a
series of laws that would eventually result in the Territorial Sea Plan (TSP) that is
at the heart of this research (Seltzer 2015, 63).
This chapter reviews this history of development and details the process
that ultimately resulted in the TSP Part 5 Amendment that specifically regulates
the development of ocean renewable energy. This chapter uses interviews and
archival resources collected in the course of this research to provide a deeper
history of the process that led to the TSP Part 5 Amendment and its use of PGIS
tools. During interviews with key stakeholders in the TSP amendment process,
several shared a common simile that the planning process was like a play with
83

distinct acts. The first act starts with SB 100 and proceeds through issue-specific
policy responses but only a limited integrated planning response. Depending on
the perspectives of those involved, Act 1 represents a period of struggling to
make sense of the ocean and planning or a period of not acting soon enough to
address looming challenges to ocean management in Oregon. A backdrop to this
act was broader national and international discussions about coastal and marine
spatial planning (CMSP), as well as Oregon’s development of a marine protected
areas program. The national and international discussions around CMSP
activated several new actors, including international non-governmental
organizations working towards ocean conservation goals. Federal policy was
also shifting during this period with the then-new Obama Administration. The
development of the Oregon Marine Reserves Program, a system of marine
protected areas, also influenced this act because it demonstrated what setting
aside portions of the ocean for a dedicated purpose could mean for coastal
communities. The act culminated with the first ocean renewable energy
developers emerging to stake a claim on the ocean. This event resulted in an
Executive Order directing the DLCD to develop a plan to accommodate these
new uses.
The second act encompasses the development of the planning process, the
development of the new mapping tools, and outreach to communities. This act is
characterized as a hopeful period, one where the promise of the digital tools to
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map and collect input is seen as a way out of conflict and acrimony over ocean
resources. However, this optimism runs out as the planning process shifts from
collecting input and data to the hard work of developing a synthesis of the
planning products. Act 2 ends with a series of planning proposals and debates
over which direction to take regarding the ocean after the planning data alone
failed to identify a solution. Act 3 documents the final push to the adoption of
the plan and its subsequent political battles. Act 2’s hopefulness is replaced with
fights between partners and interests as the planning documents become a focus
of legal arguments and process rules.
The telling of these three acts provides the basis for analysis in the
chapters that follow. Details from this history are used to explore particular
dynamics in each of the following chapters. However, the goal for this chapter is
to provide the reader with a single overarching understanding of how the
planning process was developed, how it unfolded, and how the outcomes
illustrate the need for two theoretical framings on how to make sense of the
ocean planning process. Unless attributed to other sources, much of this chapter
draws on interviews with stakeholders who shared the history of this process
back into the 1980s. The chapter is organized to follow these three acts, though it
acknowledges this is a simile drawn from those interviewed, and, at times, some
interpretive liberty is required to fit the planning events cleanly into the three
acts.
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Act One: Taking Bearings and Dead Reckoning
The first act in the Oregon ocean story begins with the expansion of US
ocean law and policy, notably with increased claims of sovereignty over ocean
areas and the passage of federal legislation to manage coastal areas
comprehensively. This act introduces these foundations and then explores the
Oregon response as shared by past participants in the development of Oregon
ocean and coastal policy. During the 1980s, US policy towards ocean
management and control shifted with the international treaty adoption of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) in 1982. This
triggered two expansions of US claims of authority over the ocean. First,
President Reagan’s proclamation claiming the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ)
for the US which extended out to 200 nautical miles from shore in 1983, and
second the extension of the US territorial sea claims out to 12 nautical miles (US
Commission on Ocean Policy 2004).1 The EEZ is a zone within which a sovereign
claims authority over resources and a limited set of human activities. Coastal
nations claim a narrower set of sovereignty within the EEZ, and they are limited
to a set of purposes including:
[E]xploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing the natural
resources, both living and nonliving, of the ocean waters, the

1 A nautical mile is tied to the measures of latitude and longitude, making it a longer measure of
distance when compared to the statute mile on land. A nautical mile is 15% longer than a mile on
land and nautical miles are a part of a measurement of speed at sea: the knot. While a small detail,
these differences in measurements matter for conversations between stakeholders that are new to
the ocean space and its own set of geographic units.
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seabed, and subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the
production of energy from the water, currents, and winds. (US
Commission on Ocean Policy 2004, 7)
Coastal nations may not prevent the traditional uses of the ocean for transport
and navigation within and above the EEZ. This includes both vessels transiting
the area, but also pipelines and cables. The expansion of the territorial sea in 1988
out to 12 nautical miles represented a full extension of US sovereignty over the
water and seafloor out to this limit. US control of activity within the territorial
sea is just as it would be on land; access, resource extraction, and fiscal and
immigration controls all apply within this area. Within the 12-mile nautical limit
is also a unique subset of the territorial sea allocated to the coastal states within
the US generally out to three nautical miles.2
In the Oregon context, the various lines of territorial control are a series of
lines where jurisdiction either overlaps or is handed off as one moves away from
shore. Within the first three nautical miles, the State of Oregon claims control
over the seafloor and has jurisdiction to regulate certain activities in and on the
water based on various authorities. From three nautical miles out to 12 nautical
miles, the ownership transfers to the US government, and full sovereign
authority applies. Past the 12 nautical miles, there is an initial buffer out to 24

2 The states along the Gulf Coast on the Gulf of Mexico have a unique history and are afforded
different rights to the territorial sea, hence this is a generalization that has some exceptions.
However, these exceptions do not apply on the US West Coast.
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nautical miles known as the contiguous zone that allows for the US government
to enforce a narrow set of fiscal and immigration controls in addition to the
claims on the EEZ. Past the contiguous zone out to 200 nautical miles is the EEZ.
Despite these clean demarcations, power and authority are shared across
these zones. Within Oregon, county governments have argued they have
jurisdiction over the three-mile state territorial sea. Federal control and
management are also shared, in part, through the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA) of 1972. The CZMA created a federal program to incent cooperation
between states and the federal government over the management of coastal areas
and the ocean. States that participate and adopt a coastal program that is
approved by the federal government can have an increased role in federal
decision-making for ocean resources (Beatley 1994).
State “programs” here include a broad set of definitions, but, in general,
programs may include planning, policy statements, mapping, or other guidance
that coordinate public and private use and development of the coastal areas.
These programs must also include enforceable actions¾more than just policy
statements or objectives. Definitions of the coastal area are also left primarily to
states to define and vary widely across the US. In Oregon, the coastal zone
includes the crest of the Coast Range down to the shore and out to the end of the
three-mile limit of the state territorial sea (Oregon Department of Land
Conservation and Development n.d.). There are some exceptions to this
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definition for watersheds that extend inland through the coast range for the
Columbia, Umpqua, and Rogue watersheds. These three watersheds have been
limited to the coastal portions and do not extend fully to the headwaters.
With these programs adopted, federal actions and policies can be
reviewed against state programs to determine if they are consistent with state
guidance. While there are some exemptions, federal actions must, then, initially
be consistent with state programs. This concept is critical in the Oregon planning
history because it encourages the state to include in its own planning possible
uses or goals not just for state waters but also out to the edge of the federal
territorial sea. As is discussed later, consistency can be used as a leverage point
for states to direct federal action, and there is an incentive to extend state
planning out to waters that would not normally be considered jurisdictional for a
state to allow for the application of this review.
Despite the creation of Goal 19 in 1976 and the flurry of federal ocean
policy development in the 1970s and early 1980s, Oregon still lacked an ocean
policy or program at the state level for almost a decade after the creation of Goal
19. The 1980s also witnessed a rapid expansion in interest to extract oil and gas as
well as mineral resources from the ocean. In the early 1980s, the DLCD had an
Outer Continental Shelf Program. Prior to the adoption of the EEZ, the US had
formally used the Continental Shelf as the basis for legal claims to seafloor
resources (Turnipseed et al. 2009; US Commission on Ocean Policy 2004, 8–9).
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The continental shelf is the extension of the continent from the terrestrial side out
to sea and ends as a geological feature where the shelf plunges to the deep ocean
seafloor. Technologically, the shelf was more accessible due to relatively shallow
depths, notably on the East Coast, and proximity to shore facilities. However, the
claim over the shelf was explicitly on the seafloor resources¾compared to the
EEZ that extends claims to the water column and notably the living resources
that reside in the column.
Oregon’s Outer Continental Shelf Program was thus a response to the
federal interest in developing oil, gas, and seafloor mining opportunities.
However, this program was not well supported, and the state struggled to
organize its interests to respond to federal actions on the shelf. In the mid-1980s,
the federal government explored a lease sale for seafloor metallic deposits some
100 miles offshore. This lease sale would have included opportunities to mine for
polymetallic nodules. These nodules were thought to be a cost-effective
opportunity to expand US production of key industrial and precious metals
including zinc, copper, and silver (Hansen 1985). These efforts to develop the
resources were also part of a broader push to expand the EEZ and its use in a
broader geopolitical initiative for the US to strengthen boundaries between the
US- and then Soviet-controlled ocean areas. In Oregon, the proposed lease sale
for these nodules, more than oil and gas, forced Oregon to realize there was no
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organized response or program to engage the proposed lease and any
subsequent development.
Following this lease sale interest, a proposal emerged to develop a
programmatic approach to ocean resources for the State of Oregon. A state
planner along with a coastal county legislative representative developed a
proposal to create an ocean resources task force to explore what might be done to
create a more comprehensive state response to these challenges. Then State
Senator Bill Bradbury worked to pass the Oregon Ocean Resources Management
Act of 1987 (Senate Bill 630), creating a task force that spent the next three years
developing the Oregon Ocean Resources Management Plan¾more commonly
known as the Oregon Ocean Plan (Hout 1990; US Office of Ocean and Coastal
Resource Management 1988, 114). The Task Force included a broad array of
stakeholders, both from the scientific and resource management community, as
well as coastal communities.
The final document, adopted in 1991, outlined the importance of
developing a single statewide vision for ocean and coastal resources noting
Oregon’s long-standing reliance and commitment to ocean resources. In the
following passage, the plan’s authors share a key driver for planning and
introduce concepts that would later become a source of conflict in the ocean
renewable energy planning process. The authors of the plan shared in the
opening:
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Oregonians care deeply that the coastal environment be protected
and traditional use of renewable resources be maintained.
Oregon’s state agencies and local governments have control over
many of the uses and resources along the coast and within the
state’s three-mile territorial sea. (Oregon Ocean Resources
Management Task Force 1991, 3) [emphasis added]
“Traditional use of renewable resources” (where the emphasis was added)
became a source of conflict later in the Oregon planning story but highlights an
important point in this immediate context. Oregon’s plan was a reaction to
outside forces and new uses and sought to protect existing communities and
ocean users. The plan goes on to state:
[N]ational and international forces outside Oregon inject new
demands for ocean and coastal resources into the present mix.
Global political and economic forces, beyond the control of the
state, affect the price and supply of oil, gas, and mineral resources
and can generate interest in exploring Oregon’s ocean for these
resources. The Oregon coast is increasingly attractive as a
recreation destination and retirement home for people from
congested urban areas with deteriorating environmental
conditions. Oregon’s ocean fisheries are intertwined with global
market demands and the industrialized nature of major
international fishing fleets which can affect the marine food chain
across vast stretches of ocean. These forces will bring change to
Oregon’s ocean and shoreline, regardless of how well the state is
prepared. (Oregon Ocean Resources Management Task Force 1991,
3) [emphasis added]
The framing of the ocean policy problem in 1991 was centered on protecting the
coast from outside threats and broader global forces. The state’s role is also
presented here as emergent or insufficient as it stood at the time.
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The plan closes this opening section with a reflection that prior to 1991,
actively managing users and ocean resources was not necessary. The plan notes
that conflict was either not an issue or was handled without a programmatic
approach. This observation was similarly shared by those interviewed for this
research as a defining element of Act 1. The plan notes that, at that time, there
was a growing need for a particular form of planning and management when the
plan states:
Until now, uses either coexisted without conflict or conflicts were
managed on a case-by-case basis. Balancing the demands created
by new uses will demand an adaptive, equitable management
program that is based on clear policies and uses an open process
involving all interested parties. (Oregon Ocean Resources
Management Task Force 1991, 3–4)
The Oregon Ocean Plan as a document leaned more towards a plan that
shares data, mapping, and information about the many resources and challenges
that face the Oregon coast and ocean (versus setting the direction or
implementing policy). For each section of the document, the plan identified a key
series of recommendations for further legislative or administrative action. The
plan itself did not create any particular enforceable actions or decisions. Rather, it
provided a policy document recommending the next steps and actions to take for
the planning of ocean resources. Many of these were not acted upon, but one
important outcome of this planning process was the institutionalization (in part)
of the task force in the Ocean Policy Advisory Council (OPAC).
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OPAC was created in 1991 after the legislature was presented with the
Oregon Ocean Plan. Under this initial design, the chair of the council was the
Governor’s Assistant for Natural Resources, and included representatives from
seven state agencies, along with coastal city and county governments, tribal
government, higher education, user groups, ports, environmental groups, and
the public-at-large (Bailey 1997, 211–12). While OPAC membership included
many of the interests and groups represented in the 1987 task force, OPAC
included state agency representatives who had a vote on the council. This feature
would later present a political challenge for ocean planning in Oregon.
After the creation of OPAC, the council took on a number of policy issues.
These included making recommendations for amendments to Goal 19 and
habitat management strategies for rocky shores, but the most important issue the
council took on was the evaluation of marine protected areas. Interviews noted
that in the late 1990s, concerns over biodiversity and resource depletion
repeatedly moved to the top of the agenda. In the broader environmental
context, the 1990s witnessed a number of environmental policy crises that
dominated the news and impacted communities. From the management of the
Spotted Owl and timber harvest (Yaffee 1994) to efforts to prevent and respond
to the Coastal Coho salmon Endangered Species Act listing (Golightly 1999) and
the repeated policy challenges that resulted in the West Coast Groundfish
Disaster (Conway and Shaw 2008), the Oregon coast and ocean was increasingly
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a focus of conservation worries. The West Coast Groundfish Disaster in
particular set a tone for future policy development, notably through the
increased regulation of the groundfish fleet in 1997 (Warlick, Steiner, and Guldin
2018). Groundfish management signaled that the traditional fishery management
lauded in the Oregon Ocean Plan was, itself, not renewable and that changes
were coming.
In 2000, Governor Kitzhaber asked OPAC to consider the creation of
marine protected areas and provide a recommendation as to whether to pursue
the creation of these protected areas. Marine protected areas (MPAs) are a
diverse set of policy tools for managing or limiting human activity on the ocean
(Hoffmann and Pérez-Ruzafa 2008). MPAs can range from no-take to limited or
modified take, meaning that the harvest of any living resource may be prohibited
entirely or limited to various harvesting methods or groups of users. MPAs are
also spatially explicit with boundaries that limit access or use. While MPAs in the
Oregon context seemed like a new policy tool, many pre-existing protections can
be classified as MPAs in US fish and wildlife law. For example, ocean area
buffers around US National Wildlife Refuge lands that prohibit human access are
a form of MPAs despite not explicitly being referred to in that way. On the
Oregon coast, this is important due to the numerous offshore rocks that have this
type of protection by virtue of being a part of the Oregon Islands National
Wildlife Refuge.
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OPAC studied MPAs for Oregon over a two-year period. Using public
hearings and comment, OPAC considered the many possible benefits and
impacts of adopting an MPA program in Oregon. Ultimately, OPAC presented a
recommendation to Governor Kitzhaber to initiate a public process establishing a
limited network of MPAs that would come to be known as the Oregon Marine
Reserves Program (MRP). This recommendation is important in the history of
OPAC and the management of Oregon ocean resources because it triggered a
political backlash from coastal communities. This culminated in a legislative
response to change the composition and structure of OPAC. While initial
legislative proposals sought to do away with OPAC entirely, the 2003 changes
approved by the legislature found a compromise where they stripped voting
status from state agency representatives and shifted them to non-voting ex officio
members.
As one respondent noted in the interviews, this change “transformed
[OPAC] into a stakeholder-driven council with the agencies as advisers.” This
created a divide and set of roles that placed agencies and the community
stakeholders at odds when it came to reviewing ocean policy for Oregon. The
Marine Reserves Program was also placed on hold at this point, only to reemerge
later in the 2000s when statewide environmental groups started to share an
interest in putting the MRP on the ballot through the initiative process.
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This shift for OPAC is important for several reasons. First, OPAC in its
previous design had become a council of state agencies allowing for coordination
across the many authorities shared throughout the territorial sea. In public
meetings, the diversity of organizations and authorities was often communicated
through the diagram seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Oregon's Territorial Sea and Ocean Shore (Source: Oregon DLCD)
This configuration of authorities was often jokingly referred to as the “Alphabet
Navy” as each of the acronyms represents a state or federal agency with a role in
managing the Oregon ocean.
Several key agencies are worth noting here for their unique role and
governance configuration. The Department of State Lands (DSL) is the agency
that manages ownership of the seafloor. For any ocean activity requiring a lease
of the seafloor, DSL would be the responsible agency. As will emerge in Act 2,
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DSL would ultimately be the party responsible for drafting, permitting, and
leasing rules for ocean renewable energy. Despite being the “owner” of the
seafloor, DSL did not have the final say in its use. This resided with the planning
processes that DLCD provided. This created tension at times between the agency
with responsibility for defining leasing and permitting versus the agency in
charge of allocating space through planning. To complicate this further, the two
agencies report to two very different commissions. In addition to DSL and
DLCD, the state fish and wildlife agency, the Oregon Department of Fish and
Wildlife (ODFW), plays a complicated role. In the context of MPA research,
ODFW would be involved in supporting the enforcement of any areas set aside
for the proposed reserves program. However, ahead of that, many noted that
ODFW was cautious on how it explored the proposal. Other state agencies that
played a key role here include: the Department of Geology and Mineral
Industries (DOGAMI) which provided key mapping and science expertise; the
Oregon Department of Parks and Recreation (OPRD) which managed the ocean
beaches; and the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) which
would have a permitting and regulatory role in any ocean use or land use
decisions OPAC might consider.
OPAC, in its design with voting agency members, could, at times, manage
these conflicts. One person interviewed noted that this was a strength of the
organizational design and allowed for staff to work out policy issues before they
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moved up to the commissions. DLCD acted as the coordinating or managing
agency for OPAC, in part because it was perceived as more neutral in the policy
debates. One former staff member noted:
So, one of the things that the [initial OPAC] legislation attempted to
do was to sort out who was going to be the driver. And it ended up
being the Department of Land Conservation and Development
because of its historic role as a coordinator among all the agencies
through the land use program. That was really the model. And that
was a model that was initially met with some resistance too. But the
legislature heard the discussion and basically agreed that no, LCDC
and DLCD does [sic] not really have a particular dog in the fight,
but it needs to make sure that all the dogs fight together or work
together. – Former Agency Staff Member
In the period immediately after the change in OPAC’s structure, then Governor
Kitzhaber worked to create an informal replacement for the agencies to meet and
coordinate, but that was a practice that did not last
A second key impact from the change in the structure of OPAC was a
question as to whether OPAC had review authority over state policy such that it
could prevent the adoption of new policies. At the time OPAC was restructured,
this was not an explicit issue, though a present-day reading of the statute reveals
a somewhat ambiguous answer to whether or not OPAC had such a direct role in
policy adoption. The changes that occurred in OPAC’s design would later play a
pivotal role in Act 3 of this story. For some time, it was interpreted that OPAC’s
advisory role was constructed to facilitate public involvement and share
information. Though, as time went on, a question emerged as to whether the
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change in the law actually created a stronger review role¾a role that, while not a
veto per se, could stop or at least required being overruled by the agencies.
As Act 1 came to a close, a number of features in the planning landscape
set the stage for the next act. First, the state had shifted from a case-by-case
reactionary model of managing ocean resources from the pre-1980s era. Outside
threats led to the organization of interests and communities to draft the Oregon
Ocean Plan. This set an example for future planning as it created a task force
model working with state agencies to map and assess uses and conflicts. The
1990s witnessed the institutionalization of this planning process through the
creation of OPAC. However, OPAC’s first major controversy as it tackled the
question of MPAs showed its tentative nature as legislative pressure shifted,
leading to a restructuring of the agency. In this era, state responses to ocean
threats still shared some of the case-by-case nature of the earlier period but there
were nascent efforts to organize and create a common framework and process for
planning. The marine reserve process reminded many that Oregon ocean
planning and management was still fragile and sector- or resource-driven. As
this Act ends, the newest challenge to the Oregon ocean order emerges: ocean
renewable energy. In the next act, we find that the response to this challenge
galvanized communities and user groups, creating a golden period of planning
where the optimism around new participation tools raised hopes that the state
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might be able to lead the nation, even the world, in coastal and marine spatial
planning.
Act 2: Finding Our Way and Making Maps
The next act begins in 2008 when the first proposals to develop ocean
renewable energy arrive off the Oregon coast. The first interest comes from a
New Jersey firm that seeks to take advantage of industrial infrastructure on the
southern Oregon coast. This location has easy access to the terrestrial power grid,
a deep-water industrial port, and even a possible existing nearshore conduit to
bring power cables ashore. The proposal immediately runs into an
administrative and regulatory thicket as the application is filed with the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). At the same time, as shared in the
previous section, the state responds, saying that any federal action requires a
consistency review under the Coastal Zone Management Act. However, ocean
renewable energy had never been a part of territorial sea planning¾as planning
for this use was novel, absent from past planning efforts. Under the CZMA
consistency review, the state can only play a role in federal decisions where the
coastal program has some enforceable set of actions that apply to the proposed
use. In effect, the proposal for ocean renewable energy had found a gap between
the federal and state planning authorities. To address this gap, FERC and the
State of Oregon developed a memorandum of understanding to place a pause on
the application and allow for the State of Oregon to amend the Territorial Sea
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Plan to add a new Part 5 Amendment for ocean renewable energy. This kicked
off the planning process that is the substantive core of this research.
Act 2 is marked by a period of optimism where DLCD builds on its
geographical information systems (GIS) capacity to craft a new participatory GIS
(PGIS) process. Much of this capacity was developed late in Act 1, as the agency
supported OPAC in its exploration of the Marine Reserves Program.
Additionally, efforts to expand marine protected areas in California had
developed new PGIS tools that Oregon staff were made aware of through
regional partnerships. The California experience also highlighted some
challenges and pitfalls to be aware of as Oregon started its process. Notably, the
California process focused quickly on developing metrics for outcomes, or
targets of various ocean uses to meet through the planning. From the Oregon
perspective, that many saw this as a source of conflict as arguments over targets
or areal allocations eclipsed the underlying data collection. The presumption in
Oregon was that an open-ended exploration of the data via PGIS without targets
would allow for a solution to emerge without setting targets that could dominate
the process.
This section shares some of the data tools and their interpretation as the
process adopted them. The goal here is to present the experience with PGIS and
the decision-making that is further explored in the following chapters through a
science and technology studies lens that relies on the idea of black boxes and, in
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particular, ones that become “leaky” as the planning process seeks to use these
black boxes and building blocks for a comprehensive plan (Callon and Latour
1981). What follows in this discussion of Act 2 are three threads. First, I introduce
the overarching vision for the planning process from the DLCD staff and OPAC
perspectives. Following this, I share examples that provide a detailed example of
the tools in action. Finally, this Act is discussed from the evaluative perspective
of those involved. Here, interviews and documents capture the general
optimistic attitude of Act 2, where the optimism of the technology was a shared
value across many of the stakeholders.
The TSP Planning Approach and Tools
At the heart of Act 2 is the development of data and visualization tools to
support the creation of the Territorial Sea Plan (TSP) Part 5 Amendment for
ocean renewable energy. This use-specific amendment was structured solely to
take on the question of how and where to locate ocean renewable energy devices.
Early on, the process was meant to be driven entirely by the idea that new data
tools would be easily engaged by the public, providing new ways for groups to
see the demands on the ocean and develop a new shared solution set that could
be developed by stakeholders. As a former DLCD senior staff member shared:
[S]uddenly you have not just GIS capacity to do data-driven
mapping, but you have the ability to visualize it in very
interesting ways.... You didn't need to have just the mapping geeks
sitting in front of a computer. People could go online and look this
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stuff up, although some of it was better than others. – Former
Senior Agency Staff [emphasis added]

Planning Grid Overlays

Started Here

Summary
Map Layers

+

Draft
Plan

OPAC
Areas of
Opportunity

Public Input

Public Input

LCDC
TSPAC

Public
Input

GIS
Data

Public Input

Goal 19
Selection Areas

TSP
Work
Group

Figure 3: DLCD Planning Schematic (Source: DLCD)
In early meetings, the DLCD staff shared a schematic that captured this dynamic
(shown in Figure 3). This diagram, initially somewhat complex to take in,
captures the stated intent for public input to be developed and filtered through
the mapping technologies. The cycle of steps surrounding OPAC in the figure are
meant to represent a clockwise progression of the planning process. With each
step showing public input via OPAC.
Heading into the data process, it was increasingly clear that while data for
many resources were available, they varied greatly in extent, quality, relevance,
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and applicability in the planning process. By developing a new PGIS process, the
state was optimistic that the entire planning process could be opened up to a
new and vigorous set of public involvement efforts that would permit
stakeholders, decision-makers, and the public to query data and visualize their
own analyses. As noted by a former senior staff member while reflecting on the
mapping process and comparing it to the previous process, the new tools had the
potential to “democratize” the planning:
In some respects, [the PGIS] really democratized in a very tangible
way the planning for ocean resources. Because, before that, even
with the Ocean Plan, and dealing with offshore oil and gas and
marine minerals back in the day, we didn’t have access to that data.
Fishermen knew what they knew about where they fished but
maybe not their fellows. Nobody really had access to water quality
data or bathymetry or sea bird colonies or kelp beds or any of that
stuff. But now, it’s all together in one place and it’s available, and to
me that’s a good thing because I will say this -- it became evident
from the very beginning in the ocean planning process in ‘91 and
‘92, and even in ‘88 and ‘89, people were so eager to get out the
colored pens and start marking up the ocean and making zoning
maps. But when it came right down to it, nobody had any basis
for making any mapping decision whatsoever. – Former Senior
Agency Staff, emphasis added.
Central to this process was the use of a tool called MarineMap. Early in
the planning process, the focus for data collection centered on the fishing
industry. The most politically important and organized user groups at the state
level are the commercial and charter fishing fleets. The use of ocean areas by
these groups is difficult to measure as it is actively protected information and
harvest data are regulated to prevent public release. To address this, a unique
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partnership developed to include fishing effort data. Supported with funding
from a philanthropic foundation, a regional non-profit conservation
organization, Ecotrust, and the University of California Santa Barbara adapted a
custom open-source mapping technology, MarineMap for use in Oregon
(Merrifield et al. 2013).
MarineMap had been previously used in a different marine planning
effort in California (Bonzon, Fujita, and Black 2005) but was altered to meet the
local needs of Oregon communities and the state agency. Key to MarineMap’s
application was the new functionality that allowed for participation in the
generation of GIS data by fishers. These data were collected through teams of
interviewers working with fishers to map areas of importance for them and then
to place relative weights of importance. Using a “one-hundred penny” process,
the fishers drew polygons on the ocean and then applied a number of tokens to
give each area its “value” weight. This was developed in such a way as to
produce new fleet- and port-specific maps of fishing importance (Steinback et al.
2010).
An example of this is shared in Figure 4, a screenshot of the Oregon
MarineMap application displaying a representation of levels of importance for
fishers. This map reveals a number of the challenges that arose as the fishers
developed their own data product. First, the map is unitless. The gradient is
simply represented as high to low, with quartile contours. Here, the underlying
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meaning is intentionally obscured by the data providers, the fishers. The second
challenge is that each port developed a map product. Ports can vary greatly by
catch levels, fisheries pursued, and the local dependence of Oregon fisheries.
Traditionally, catch levels are a key measure for management, both as it relates to
the stock of the fishery and to the value it represents on the market. Some vessels
are dedicated to just one or two fisheries, with high costs to outfit for others
(Goblirsch and Theberge 2008).

Figure 4: MarineMap: Newport Commercial Fishing Areas of Importance
(Source: DLCD, screenshot by author)
A critical issue with this mapping data was the ownership and
presentation of its results. The data were developed with the understanding that
they would be treated as the intellectual property of the fishers and controlled
for release by them. These underlying data were developed and owned by an
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association of fishers called FISHCRED.3 The choices around how to release these
data and their form of aggregation affect the results presented. The example
mapping shows levels of importance only for single ports but does not
differentiate across catch types, levels of catch, or provide a basis to compare
with other ports. This has affected how communities and interests are defined
and compared to other uses in the ocean.
Through interviews, stakeholders shared mostly positive reviews of the
technology and its role in assisting the planning process. Heading into the TSP
Part 5 Amendment process, there was a recognition that fishery effort data were
not available for several reasons. First, for fisheries where the data are required
to be collected by law, there are safeguards in place to protect the confidentiality
of these data. One example of this is that data may only be released if
confidentiality can be protected. The way this is implemented is through the
“rule of three” where no data may be released that shares the location of the
fishing effort where one or two fishers have provided information, only once
three or more fishers use an area may that location be disclosed. Another
challenge is the format by which data are collected. Many of the fisheries used
hand-written logbooks that must be digitally converted to be used in mapping
applications. Agency leaders noted that, at the time of the Marine Reserves

3 The proliferation of acronyms occurred in this planning process. FISHCRED stands for Fishermen’s
Information Service for Housing, Confidential Release, and Essential Distribution. It is made up of
local fishing representatives and is the steward for the data collected in the process.
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process as well as the TSP Amendment process, much of the data were still
unprocessed. Additionally, not all fisheries require logging of fishing efforts,
leaving some important areas undocumented. These challenges resulted in a
desire to collect the fishing effort data from scratch for this process.
More than data came from the mapping process for the commercial
fishing community. The effort to collect these data resulted in a new
collaboration across fishers that was uncommon prior to this effort and, as we see
in Act 3, may not last outside of data collection. One coastal stakeholder spoke
about the degree to which this planning challenge changed the way knowledge
about the ocean was shared and integrated:
Much of our intellectual property is spatial in nature, because we’re
hunters…. Previous to this mapping I would say … we have
techniques and lots of spatial knowledge. Lots. And, that
knowledge, that intellectual property previous to this mapping
would be stuff that is exchanged in a reciprocal trust relationship
with another fisherman. So, making it public [was] a big change. I
felt it was time to do that, I felt we were compelled to do that
because if we don’t share then it will be arbitrary what areas are
threatened. So, and that’s kind of how I communicated, you know,
to other fisherman to engage as many as possible. – Coastal Fisher
[emphasis added]
In this discussion, the previous model of knowledge sharing was via one on one
or small group exchanges based on reciprocity of information. One fisher shares
experiences in exchange for a similar sharing of experience. The TSP Part 5
Amendment process required this reciprocity to change. Instead of exchanging
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information for information, the fishers now had to exchange information for
rights to engage in planning discussions.
As the mapping process was rolled out, these exchanges also created new
relationships across the fishing sector. One stakeholder who played an early
coordinating role noted:
So, [the mapping] wasn’t always going to be able to explain every
single issue that they wanted to get across in terms of what’s
important and what’s not, but I think what it did, is it definitely …
capturing the data and making data part of the process is one thing.
Definitely, what it also does is, there’s kind of side benefits of just
making more people aware of the process and engaging them.
And not like hey, this thing is happening and here’s what it’s about
and here’s an opportunity to engage in it not just by showing up to
meetings, but actually having information that represents your
interests. So, I definitely think it helped strengthen engagement in
the fishing community in the actual process. I think it helped them
kind of coordinate as well. I mean, they actually formed groups
around [the mapping] … fisherman wanted to form a group that
actually managed that data. Because [the state] didn’t technically
own it, they owned it… – Coastal NGO Representative [emphasis
added]
Once past the initial worries or concerns about implementation, we see in
these comments that Act 2 reached a high point for the commercial fishing
industry in particular. There emerged a vision that the data could provide a new
set of tools to advocate and organize interests on the ocean. One of the coastal
NGO representatives with a key role in supporting the mapping captured this in
an assessment of the mapping technology:
To be able to go into those meetings, and not just to advocate, like
‘This is important to us’, but they were able to have kind of shared
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conversations with other people about why that place is
important. Where other people might think or understand that
place being important for their own reasons. They could go in and
have a conversation about a place with a conservation
organization or a recreational group, or even the government
about why those people think that place is important and they
could say well here’s why. And they could have kind of a shared
conversation with information that supported it on both sides of it
to try to work through conflicts and resolutions. -Regional NGO
Representative [emphasis added]
As the mapping proceeded, the planning process started to look ahead to
see how the mapping might create a unique opportunity to inform siting
decisions with live data from interests on the coast. The Marine Reserves
Program process was often compared in these interviews, with the Reserves
being framed as more rigid and unable to negotiate the assembling of data.
However, regarding the TSP Amendment process, there was a hopeful outlook.
The data would allow for more informed decisions about impacts and challenges
and allowed for interests from stakeholders to become more representative as
decisions are made, as one participant noted:
And I thought that was a really smart move from the state. [The
state] was saying, ‘Hey look, we have a wealth of data that we will
continue to use. And we can continue to add to that data and get
more and more and more of it.’ So that when this site comes up that
you think shouldn’t be on the map as a potential area, there’s a joint
agency review team. There’s a position there for your stakeholder
group to be representative. – Coastal Recreational Advocate
[emphasis added]
This starting point for the TSP mapping effort set the tone for
participation in the planning process. Subsequent to the fishing effort mapping,
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participatory GIS exercises became the method for participation by other interest
groups. Shortly after the mapping for commercial and charter fishing was
completed, other groups started to develop spatial datasets. Non-consumptive
recreation maps were developed using surveys and interviews to measure where
beach walking, surfing, boating, and kayaking occurred. The renewable energy
developers also created areas in the ocean based on estimated engineering and
construction preferences. The political battle for space moved to a GIS
environment with a participatory flavor. The last mapping effort to join the
process was an effort to capture visual and aesthetic values.
Mapping Values that Are More than the Map – Visual Resources
As the planning process unfolded, some communities occupied a more
privileged position than others. This privilege was largely defined by how well
the interests of a group could fit into a spatial data model. For fishing groups,
seafloor cable companies, recreation users, and ecologists, the information of
their interests is easily assigned to spatial data. One remaining group that
struggled to find a connection to spatial data was the residents of the coastal
communities. Without membership to a specifically defined ocean user
community, their concerns lacked a spatial reference.
Local cities and counties requested that visual resources and potential
impacts be included in the planning process as a way to address this gap. The
visual resources were argued to be a local asset and one that could fit in the
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spatial decision model. To address this, the state convened a series of committees
including local representatives to develop a visual resource inventory
methodology. This effort immediately scanned the existing governmental efforts
to measure views and settled on the Bureau of Land Management visual
resource methods developed in the 1980s (Bureau of Land Management 1980b,
1980a). The committee developed a survey instrument and method that was used
in the field to visit publicly accessible viewpoints and collect data on their visual
quality. The surveys included seven key features to evaluate on a numeric scale
from 0-5. These scales covered elements such as vegetation, geological features,
relative uniqueness of the site, human development, and even more basic
qualities such as the diversity of color hues.
In the field, these categories were reviewed by the survey team one at a
time, and then scored. The teams were composed of state planning staff and local
planning staff or elected officials. The first task for the team was to delineate the
view. The team discussed how far to the left and right (or north and south) to
include in the view. Usually, the view was limited to the top of the beach, but
sometimes it was set further inland if features attracted the eye. This created an
arc from the top of the sandy portion of the beach on one side of the viewer to
the end of the sandy portion on the other side. Only features inside of this view
arc would be considered in the scoring, with the exception of human
development in the nearby visual context.
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The features were discussed and documented in a narrative form and then
with the numeric scores. Each site was totaled up to produce a composite value.
These values were then used for discussions in the committee on how the
method worked or not to capture local ideas about the aesthetics of the site. Over
140 sites on the coast were assessed, with scores ranging from 7 to 30.5 using this
scoring system. High scoring sites tended to be high elevation locations, in
naturalized settings, and with steep relief¾often on headlands or capes. Because
water features were a separate element in the scoring, sites without freshwater
streams or lakes often scored lower, even if the view seemed otherwise iconic.
This later came up in protests over some of the sites’ scores.
During the fieldwork, the participants easily agreed on most of the scores
and how to classify what they saw. The primary area of contention was around
features that fall under the category Cultural Modifications. Cultural
Modifications included all anthropogenic items in the view, such as historic
lighthouses, jetties, signage, and automobile use on the beach. The last item
raised contention as some participants in the surveys objected strongly to the
presence of cars and trucks on the beach, while in some cases it is tied to
traditional beach uses such as surfing and boat launching for a historic dory fleet.
Another issue for this category was that it was the only one of the seven
measures that had a negative value range and a positive value range. In other
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words, a particularly detrimental cultural resource could subtract value from the
site. This usually resulted when automobile traffic was present.
Additionally, the committee asked for an emotional measure to be
included. This experiential question asked field surveyors to evaluate how they
felt on seeing the view. The group used a 10-point scale captured in Figure 5 to
evaluate the feel of a place. While this was not included in the data analysis, it
was meant to be a check for the quantitative model and provide a balance with
experience at the site. If qualitative and quantitative values diverged, the
planning team were able to review and discuss if this represented an error or a
genuine disagreement between the two valuation systems. With the site-level
data collected, the next requirement was to convert these to spatial datasets that
could interact with the rest of the planning data.

Figure 5: Experiential Response Scale for VRIA (Source: DLCD)
The state used GIS software to develop viewshed maps based on the
points surveyed and the final results. The viewshed analysis tool uses a model of
the Earth’s terrain to measure the distance from a point that is visible based on
assumptions about the curvature of the Earth, physical obstacles, and light
refraction. These features are all assumptions that require choices by the
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committee. The elevation model had a large role in determining the areas that
might be visible. The topography of the coast and the shoreline were modeled in
a digital elevation model (DEM) acquired from federal data providers. The
DEM’s available were moderately detailed, showing physical relief every 10
meters. However, this elevation model could add to the uncertainty of the views.
The viewpoints as measured with GPS in the field were captured with different
accuracy. The points could fall in between the DEM’s modeled world and create
artificial shadows or obstacles to views.
Using too coarse a model would oversimplify the world, making views
overly expansive and inclusive of areas. This was managed in the GIS by using a
random distribution of “viewers” or computer-generated points to simulate
views. Figure 6 shows an example of this effort. The inset map depicts 40 random
“viewers” near a known State Park managed viewpoint. The views calculated by
the software created 40 overlapping view areas at sea, shown in the varying
intensity of the blue area. The more intense the color, the more overlapping the
views. The magenta outline shows an example if the view is taken with a simpler
DEM and a single viewpoint.
For each of the 40 viewpoints, this process was applied, creating more
complex and overlapping representations of possible views on the Oregon Coast.
These overlapping arcs were then attached to the field-based score and ranked in
classes of importance, A, B, and C. Class A was the most important viewshed
116

value and was expected to play a veto role in decision-making for placing ocean
renewable devices on the ocean surface. Classes B and C were relatively less
valued and expected to have less of an influence on siting or permit decisions.
Figure 7 shows the results of combining these arcs into a single comprehensive
viewshed area for a county in Northern Oregon. Many multiple views all
overlap, and each has a different score. The highest score in a given place was the
one that set the value for the given patch of ocean. The scoring was developed
such that it links to a design review standard for any future energy proposals.
The higher the score, the more visually subordinate the development must be.
The highest classes were expected to prohibit any visual change on the ocean.
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Figure 6: Elevation Model and Uncertainty (Source: DLDC)
The A through C classes were also subdivided by distances from the
viewer to capture the intensity of impacts from any development in the fore,
middle, and backgrounds. As the method was developed, implications of choices
would be tested against the assumed future reality. If areas became too easily
visible from high scoring sites it could limit future development. The method
provided one negotiation track for developing what may or may not be allowed
on the ocean. As the viewshed maps were generated and assigned field data
values, the final step the committee dealt with was the assembling of the
multiple maps into a single composite statewide dataset. This was necessary to
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have the data fit with the other data types but requires flattening the complexity
of the multiple sites into a single representation¾disconnecting the data from
the reality it was meant to capture.

Figure 7: Example Composite Viewshed Analysis Output (Source: DLCD)
The committee and state agency wrestled with how to settle on modeling
the world and the views, and this effort itself became a way to debate where
energy devices may or may not go. While the effort was created to provide a
sense of objectivity and rationality, the politics of the specific assumptions were
always below the surface. Iterations of mapping results, model design, and
methodology were constantly being debated and tested. This recursive and
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iterative process was unique to the visual resource process in that it was open to
participation by non-experts, in part because no such expert existed. The fishing,
recreation, and ecological maps had scientists tied to each domain or key users
with demonstrated expertise. The visual resource process provided an
opportunity for a broader cross-section of the public and communities to weigh
in. This was confirmed as a core value in public meetings when one of the
planning staff noted:
The visual impact, and I know this has been brought up, but the
fishing ground issue and the fishing perspective has always been
the centerpiece of what we’re trying to accommodate as a historical
use. But I will say over the past couple of years, during the public
outreach that we undertook, the visual impact rose to the top as
well. And your input over the past couple of years really made us
aware of what we need to do. We now see a complete visual impact
analysis up and down the coast. We want to see that kind of
methodology. So, continue to weigh in, we’ve got to the end of
January before we’ve reached the end of our recommendations on
this process. – State Planning Agency Staff
Uniquely, the visual resource inventory became a new category to catch all the
other public values that could not find a home in another spatially explicit
dataset. The mapping methods and the results became a live issue for debate. It
was recognized that these maps were going to stand in for other values or be
used to steer development away from communities. One local elected official
noted:
Then again, when you think about it [the visual inventory results],
they were not all ideal. I think you would have a group of people
that would make visual determination scoring on every site up and
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down the coast, and you know this was one or two people that
were the same [visiting sites] … but then everyone else was
different depending on where they were, up and down the coast. I
have no problems with the way the visual scoring went. I thought
it was done actually pretty ... rather unique in the way that it was
done…. [O]ne of the reasons that was being done. It was to explore
if it was technically a high visual asset score then the lower the
odds of it being available for ocean energy development. That
was definitely on everyone’s minds as we were working through
that process. – Local Elected Official [emphasis added]
This quote captures a tension in the mapping process that applies to the visual as
well as the other resource mapping. They were, at once, a product of the locals or
the users but also jointly produced with the state and its staff. So, there was
always a kernel of confidence and doubt no matter the topic, if the results started
to go in a direction that was not desired, they could be undermined or supported
by calling on the local or private interest versus the public interest captured by
the state.
From Optimism to Challenges in Mapping
As the different uses and resource concerns were assembled into the
mapping system, the hope of an easy solution started to fade. The fishing effort
mapping had worked well for some portions of the industry. However, some
fleets or types of fishing were unable to be fully captured or they resisted
participation. The visual resource mapping created expansive and potentially
very prohibitive overlays on the ocean, generating concern from the renewable
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energy industry. As the maps were assembled, reactions shifted from optimism
to concern about how a path forward might be charted.
There aren’t a bunch of donut holes out there in the territorial sea,
at least. There’s an awful lot of fisheries. They’re going here and
they’re going there. It’s not that big ... [the territorial sea] is 1250
square nautical miles. By the time everybody does what they do,
you’re not going to find a whole bunch of places that aren’t using
[the] territorial sea because it’s kind of spoken for.- Coastal NGO
Representative
As the maps were assembled with the processed data, the participants and
stakeholders in the process started to wrestle with the reality of the different
assumptions that were used to create the layers in each map. As shared earlier,
the grid cell structure created situations where values were mapped due to the
presence of an underlying data set. The state had started including Important,
Sensitive, or Unique Areas¾or ISUs. These were areas that included various
critical habitats or resources, along with a buffer. These too created new cell grids
to be “filled” with value. A resource manager shared the challenges that arose
regarding these ISUs and other values as the maps were released:
And I think, it really depends on your perspective because when I
look at a map like that, I look at it from a state-wide, region-wide,
perspective and say, ‘Yeah, this looks about right.’ A lot of times,
when the fisherman look at it, they look at it from their single
fishery, and they’ll see, ‘Hey, wait a minute, this little quarter
square mile area is not on the map. That’s where I fish. What if
these heatmaps are wrong?’ So it really depends on the scale that
you’re getting a perspective scale…. Because the grid cells had
some issues with them that you might overprotect an area or
under protect an area, whereas, the ISUs were based on the actual
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location of the resource and not the grid cell itself. – State Resource
Manager [emphasis added]
What became clear was that with all the resources, and all the input, no
areas were going to be able to accommodate ocean renewable energy. The
negotiations began at that point to try and make sense of where space might be
made available. One of the key stakeholders shared that they sought to find a
compromise with fishers to make a space available:
So, all of a sudden you got to find one more spot guys, come on
let’s do this. And it caused such heartburn at trying to find that
other location and so ... at that point that’s where I was in terms of
trying to negotiate and support the process and we had folks who
really didn’t want anything, and so, from my perspective, being
clear that this is how I think it could and should play out, and
you got to step up to the plate and say, okay, this is the sacrifice
zone. – Conservation NGO Representative
However, by this point in the process, all the data had been collected from many
individuals, from different geographies, and for multiple different values. Each
time the data for a given use were collected and converted into a map product,
the values were “black boxed.” They went from a very detailed and even
personal set of data points into an aggregated data product with assumptions
about what and how they represented the underlying points.
As will be discussed in a later chapter, this black boxing allowed for
stability in the process. It created temporary closure on debates about a
particular resource. However, as these black boxes were stacked up in the
mapping software, they could not hold all the meaning embedded within them.
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In some cases, the definitions embedded in the black boxes allowed for other
meanings to be placed on the map layers, making the original black boxes less
authoritative. Was the heatmap a correct portrayal of the collective life histories
of fishing for a given southern Oregon port? Did the viewsheds really represent
the experience for all the individuals that visit a given beach? When these are
combined, what do they mean when it comes to locating a renewable energy
device? These questions stymied the easy identification of a solution. As will be
discussed in the next Act, new efforts emerged to force a solution.
Yet, despite these challenges, an interesting dualism persisted. The
mapping methods and approaches, while with their challenges, were seen as a
good process. It was the outcomes that were a source of worry¾how the final
maps would be produced. Here, the underlying data and mapping products
were a triumph of efforts to organize many interests and get them together to
share, for the first time, where human activities occur on the ocean. As one fisher
and community representative noted:
I stand by the process. I think it was done, and I think the mapping
was done as fair as possible, and I think there was a lot of time and
effort and a lot of sweat equity put in by a lot of people. Is
everybody happy with it? No, but that means that usually it’s a
good idea. –Fisher and Coastal Representative
Act Three: Pushing through the Fog of Data
This final act began with a series of proposed final composite maps
identifying areas for development. This act was still unfolding as data were
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collected for this research. There were adopted maps and use areas, but the
process continued through legal fights over the legitimacy of the process. The
outcomes for that legal process are shared in the final chapter, but, for the
purposes of this case, the final proposed maps are the centerpiece of Act 3. In this
act, the details of mapping became a source of contention as noted at the end of
Act 2. Notably, the renewable energy developers started to develop their own
map products to inject into the process. As one energy developer representative
noted:
[T]he state and the leadership there was more or less starting to
create a plan. We said well, no one’s actually asked us what it is
that we need in terms of space. What are the requirements for a
viable project? What are the issues that we’re thinking about?
Literally, the state was already starting to identify viable areas just
based … on what was leftover from everybody else. The concept
there was yeah, we’ll let you go forward with marine energy in
Oregon but only in those areas that more or less have no other
viable use. Of course, there ain’t a lot of that. It certainly does not
and did not result in areas that were appropriate for development
from our perspective. – Ocean Renewable Energy Representative
Throughout the planning process, almost uses or values represented by
groups or individuals were invited to map except the renewable energy
developers themselves. This was in part due to the nascent state of the industry.
The particular needs for each developer varied greatly by assumptions on the
technology design. Some proposed devices were floating buoys, and this was the
most common design. These devices needed a particular seafloor substrate for
anchoring, had preferred depths and distances from shore, and ideally had easy
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access to shoreside facilities and power grid connections. Some more innovative
devices included systems that were fully mounted on the seafloor with no sea
surface components. One example of this can be imagined as a door hinged to
the floor and, as wave trains pass, the door swings open from the seafloor and up
to an angle and back down. This opening and closing action would then pump
hydraulic fluid to spin turbines for power generation. Other more inventive
ideas included seafloor buildings that might even include human occupants. This
diversity of designs was also a competitive advantage for some; here, an
organization representing developers was able to agree on a common set of
criteria. Working with a firm from Europe that had developed similar plans for
ocean renewable energy, this organization prepared a series of maps proposing
areas for ocean energy development.
In some ways, these maps represented the first real effort to delineate
areas for potential use. The TSP mapping process up to this point had focused on
areas other uses were claiming with a hope that the “donut holes” would emerge
providing areas for development. Instead, the developers presented a map of the
territorial sea with the areas they would prefer to see set aside for development.
This immediately shifted the tone of the planning as real territory was now being
debated for use. These new ocean renewable maps created a new set of black
boxes. The maps were generated using a series of GIS tools to combine various
physical oceanographic datasets using multi-criteria suitability mapping. This
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method reclassified data based on a series of criteria into a suitability score for
each dataset. The reclassified data were then combined mathematically, normally
with either a weighted average or weighted product (cf. Triantaphyllou 2000).
This methodology allows for many different assumptions and data to be
combined into a single suitability score. This suitability score matched the logic
of the other mapping products in the planning process. However, at the same
time, these scores obscure details. In reviews of maps, one might ask why an area
scores high or low, and it requires a disassembling of the suitability algorithm.
This was not dissimilar to the challenges found in the other mapping products
when questions were asked about why some areas were coded high or low based
on underlying fishing efforts or important biological resources. This is an
example of black boxing in the mapping process where meanings are constructed
as a part of the algorithm design but become closed off as the data are processed.
The results are expected to capture the meaning fully¾or become a source of
suspicion for those reviewing the products.
The mapping for the TSP process had become built on many black boxes,
some actually stacked on top of each other where data were being synthesized to
create overlays. The ocean renewable energy maps from the developers were an
initial attempt to stack these black boxes. In response, many of the coastal
interests pushed back, claiming that none of the areas identified by renewable
energy developers were acceptable¾that conflicts with existing resources were
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too great. In response to the mapping from the developers, a series of policy
debates emerged on how to classify areas on the territorial sea with varying
levels of protection from development versus sanctioning possible development.
These classifications created six map designation codes that included titles such
as Renewable Energy Facility Suitable Study Areas (REFSSA) and Renewable
Energy Permit Area (REPA). These two designations were the most permissive of
possible development. A series of conditional designations were also created that
might allow development but only with demonstrated proof that no adverse
impacts would occur. A final set of designations outright prohibited
development.
The REFSSA and REPA designations were also given quotas for the
percentage of the ocean area within the territorial sea. This quota was a source of
debate as the state felt pressure to provide some amount of space, but the local
communities were resistant to seeing a quota that suggested development
would, in fact, occur. Developers, on the other hand, unsure of what technologies
would ultimately work, worried that their options were already locked up. As
maps were developed by OPAC and DLCD, one coastal representative shared
the following observation:
I was concerned. I began to be concerned about the end game when
the heat maps deep into Act 2, when the heat maps were there and
I knew what Goal 19 said and I said, ‘Oh boy, this is not going to be
easy.’ And I was warned, this is not going to be easy. I think things
started to go south, for me, my early stirrings about Act 3 really
came about [with] the first phone calls from [a key renewable
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energy advocate]. Because he was signaling angst and here’s why.
In retrospect, it became abundantly clear, Oregon’s Territorial
Sea Plan process in Goal 19 was being far too generous to the
communities. – Coastal Community Representative [emphasis
added]
At this point in the planning process, two competing proposals emerged:
one from the Ocean Policy Advisory Committee and another from DLCD staff.
Those interviewed for this research noted that, at this stage of the planning,
appeals for a final plan were moving up the political process from the
stakeholders to the Governor’s office and legislative representatives. In
particular, energy developers and supporters were crying foul on the outcomes
of the maps. As the prior quote from an energy representative notes, the
perspective was that the mapping only provided leftover areas for development,
regardless of the suitability of the areas for actual energy development needs.
Act 3 ends with the OPAC and DLCD staff plans at odds over the final
mapping. Disagreements centered on several key locations on the coast and
whether these locations should permit development in the future. Debates at this
point of the process centered on several narratives. The first was a perspective
arguing to protect the traditional uses and community values in coastal
communities. These narratives also characterized the development of ocean
renewable energy as an industrialization of the ocean versus the more agrarian
or traditional relationship fishing and existing uses represented. Ocean energy
developers and advocates countered, saying that the development offered a
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green and innovative way to reinvigorate the coastal economy and contribute to
a decarbonization of the power systems on the West Coast. They argued that the
development would provide a basis for new job generation and wealth for a
region struggling with past resource challenges.
Conservation and environmental representatives walked a line between
these two positions, at once supportive of the green qualities of ocean renewable
energy but also worried about the potential impacts of the technology on natural
systems. Conservation and environmental groups were also conflicted on the
traditional uses, embracing the recreational and smaller-scale fishing uses but
also concerned about the sustainability of some fisheries regarding the larger
ecosystem off the coast.
These narratives are explored further in Chapter 6 but are important to
note here as they did not provide a clear direction for the DLCD staff as they
developed their plan. Ultimately, the staff plan was adopted, allowing more
development opportunities off the Oregon coast. However, this plan was
immediately challenged in court on the grounds that the OPAC review was
required to be included in any final plan adopted. As discussed in the prologue
of the final chapter, the Oregon Court of Appeals agreed with OPAC on
procedural grounds, remanding the plan back to the state. Act 3 fizzled more
than closed. By the end of this research, decisions were still not settled and
developers did not see a way to chart a future in Oregon. By the time interviews
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were being conducted for this research, many developers had shifted interest to
other states or were looking to shift development outside of the state territorial
sea and on to federal waters past the three nautical mile line.
Reviewing the Three Acts: From Optimism to a Stalemate
This chapter described the development of the Territorial Sea Plan Part 5
Amendment process using the idea of three acts of a play¾a concept borrowed
from those interviewed for this research. The first act captured the early phases
of planning where the State of Oregon worked to structure a shared
understanding of the ocean and prepared to respond to outside threats, namely
oil and gas as well as seafloor mining. This act covers a period where the
management and planning for the ocean was increasingly organized and
institutionalized. The second act captures an optimistic period where the
emergence of ocean renewable energy spurred an energetic effort to collect,
aggregate, and make sense of data across many human and ecological values.
Act 2 represented an exciting moment where collaboration and PGIS progress
created a new vision of how the Oregon territorial sea might be structured to
balance competing needs. However, the tools of this process were not sufficient
to find solutions that could overcome the politics of tradeoffs for space allocation
on the ocean. This resulted in Act 3 where collaborative PGIS is replaced with
battling maps and narratives seeking to find a political solution. Where Act 2
captured a period in which conflict was hoped to be addressed through shared
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data dialogues, Act 3 returned to classic political struggles over natural
resources, using rhetoric and appeals to power bases to develop policy solutions.
What follows in the next three chapters are deeper dives into three
concepts built on the evidence from this case study. These chapters primarily
reflect on the shifts and changes that occurred between Act 2 and Act 3. This
transition in the acts represents a rupture that allows for several arguments to be
explored. First, Chapter 5 develops further the idea of black boxes and the
particular mechanisms that can make PGIS problematic when black boxes begin
to leak meaning¾or are no longer able to hold back other meanings. Second,
Chapter 6 reviews the narratives and storylines that assemble out of Act 3 as the
final mapping is evaluated. Finally, Chapter 7 shifts to contribute to the theory of
the state and how a particular conceptualization of the state is evidenced in this
case. Namely, that more than being an organization with power and resources,
the state is a meaning-making institution and is more expansive than the formal
components or staff that make up the “state.” These three chapters include more
data from the interviews, public meetings, and archival materials that build on
the foundation constructed in this chapter.
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Chapter 5: Construction of the Public through Spatial Technology
Internationally, over the past decade, there has been an increased drive to
actively manage and conserve the oceans and seas. Key among these efforts are
motivations to expand protections for marine biodiversity. Calls have been made
to protect the health of the ocean and to manage the rate of various extractive
industries, as well as make room for new industries. In this, the ocean has been
framed as a largely unregulated space in need of some new system of control.
International agreements such as the Convention on the Law of the Seas as well
as the United Nations Rio +20 conference on sustainable development have
spurred nations to act. These international efforts have created a growth in
coastal and marine spatial planning (CMSP). International non-governmental
organizations have also played a large role in the expansion of CMSP by funding
and supporting local efforts to develop planning capacity. CMSP as a practice
has been distinguished by a normative push to expand public participation and,
in particular, to deploy new technologies for participation.
The planning for the Oregon Territorial Sea immediately turned to
developing new technologies to solicit, manage, and analyze the many claims on
ocean uses and space. Internationally, two key efforts had shaped the concepts of
how coastal and marine spatial planning (CMSP) should, or could, be conducted.
The first included a set of algorithm-based conservation planning tools that
relied on the computation of optimized outcomes for resources. This effort
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centered on CMSP as a tool for ocean biodiversity conservation and protection.
Comprehensive planning represented an opportunity for new algorithm-based
approaches to managing ocean resources. In the Oregon case, one of the
immediate discussions turned to the example of Marxan, an open-source
optimization tool often called upon for the development of marine protected
areas (MPA). This software utilized a series of conservation targets and policy
tools, along with user constraints to calculate the optimal distribution of
conservation zones to be placed under protected status (Ball, Possingham, and
Watts 2009; Watts et al. 2009). This tool came to Oregon via a prominent
environmental nongovernmental organization active in resource management
and one which later played an active role in the development of data products in
Oregon for the planning process.
The second international drive in CMSP centered on expanding the public
involvement and engagement tools for planning. Here, communities were placed
at the forefront of the process with a focus on the need to include local and
affected communities both to learn from them and to protect their traditional
access (Ehler and Douvere 2009; Pomeroy and Douvere 2008; Stojanovic, Green,
and Lymbery 2010). Unlike the algorithmic approach noted above, this process
perspective starts with communication and information sharing with local
stakeholders. Key to this approach is the idea of building first upon outreach and
then developing reciprocal data or information flows between communities and
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planners, followed by goal setting and policy development integrating these
efforts (Pomeroy and Douvere 2008).
This chapter explores the development of this second model in practice
with a focus on the data and information flows that were developed via the
production of new PGIS tools. The first model, the one based on algorithms, was
in the wings of this policy process in Oregon. Decision-makers and stakeholders
were aware of it and, particularly, the state planners worked to distance
themselves from the optimization model. The use of algorithm-based planning
tools was perceived as removing transparency from the process. The motivation
for this pushback was a desire to stay agnostic to goals and outcomes during the
data collection process¾a concern that if goals were set, values or data products
would adjust around these.
The algorithm-based approach was often supported by those that viewed
the planning process as one that technical tools could resolve, but this
perspective also failed to recognize the deep institutional structures within ocean
management. Using algorithm-based approaches creates the potential for
changing positions among parties if the goals and objectives were placed ahead
of the data collection. These algorithm-based tools relied on an underlying logic
of developing commensurate values, either economic or negotiated, that allowed
for tradeoffs and comparisons across resource types. Critiques of the algorithm
process echoed past concerns over the underappreciation of the influence of
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institutional contexts on environmental economic approaches where the
assumptions of that tradeoffs will balance in the end are violated by underlying
power or distributional dynamics (Bromley 1982). Algorithm-based tools also
arose out of a logic of ecosystem services, or the idea that there are valuation
techniques that have the potential to resolve environmental decisions (Daily et al.
2009). In particular, Marxan, one of these algorithm-based tools, represented a
techno-optimism that valuation or assessment tools such as ecosystem services
could alleviate intractable environmental policy debates (Granek et al. 2010;
White, Halpern, and Kappel 2012).
What follows is a description of the planning process in Oregon and how
the data products were developed. In particular, this chapter follows several
particular data products that were key to the decision-making process. The
tension shared above between setting targets for planning at the outset versus
working from the community level toward a goal played out in this process. As
time unfolded, the data products moved from being taken at face value, and
slowly their complexity and assumptions started to influence the interpretation
of the meanings of these data products. The significance of data products was
hashed out as a part of the design and deployment of the data products
(development of protocols, data pre-processing, aggregation) became implicit
and shifted into a black box. By black box, I mean that these products became
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taken for granted. This concept borrows from the framing of black boxes by
Callon and Latour:
A black box contains that which no longer needs to be
reconsidered, those things whose contents have become a matter of
indifference. The more elements one can place in black boxes modes of thought, habits, forces and objects - the broader the
construction one can raise. Of course, black boxes never remain
fully closed or properly fastened… (Callon and Latour 1981, 285)
Callon and Latour introduce this term in their exploration of how to
understand the shared political values of a community via the specific meanings
or actions of individual actors. They argue that to know a broader political or
public value requires piecing together individual values or representations. In
other words, they seek to understand how the diversity of thought and actions of
many actors in society translate into a single outcome or political direction (thus
invoking Hobbes’s Leviathan in their text.) The argument they present is that we
can better understand macro and micro actors¾or participants in the political
process versus the state¾by following how black boxes are deployed to create
allies and agreements. By exploring the failures of technological adoption in their
case study on electric vehicles, they argue that society assembles agreements by
building up many black-boxes that mean some interpretations are closed to
debate, allowing for progress on decision making. But, as they hint, black boxes
are actually “leaky,” where the things or ideas society or actors seek to make
indifferent continue to resist being contained (1981, 285–6). What we see in this
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chapter is a version of this leakiness at work, as the data products are developed
and meaning is stashed away within the products only to bubble over again later
as the alliances between people and data become unstable.
Public Involvement, Ocean Planning, and Making Meaning
The tension between participatory and expert-driven approaches is not a
new concern for GIS. GIS as a tool for planning has been recognized as a
potential reformulation of expertise in a new medium (Duncan 2006; Lejano
2008; Pickles 1995). These critiques suggest that the expertise of the GIS
technician or analyst is used to convert the values and concerns of the public into
a rational object for inclusion in scientific analysis. This process raises the
concern that the underlying politics of ocean uses and values are removed from
deliberation in an effort to make CMSP “post-political” (Tafon 2017). This
critique suggests that PGIS or similar public involvement processes avoid
questions of power and often are ahistorical. This stance can then leave key
conflicts or disagreements unaddressed in a push towards a collaborative or
consensus-driven outcome, which is undermined from the start by the avoidance
of political considerations and the potential conflict that might arise.
This chapter takes these observations as a starting point to explore a case
study from the Western United States, off the coast of Oregon, and the
development of the Territorial Sea Plan. By looking at the interactions around
PGIS in this case, this chapter asks how PGIS technologies and techniques
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reshape the politics of ocean management. In particular, it is argued that these
technologies are an example of ecological modernization that seeks to pull in not
just the environment but also human activity at sea to make space for new
industrial development on the ocean. This is a process that uses public
involvement technologies as a “political sorting device” to facilitate the
management of populations, territories, and values (Mukerji 2003). This sorting
seeks to remove the political charge from planning to make planning a more
technical exercise. Yet these efforts do not remove underlying storylines or
narratives that stakeholders or groups hold. These come into conflict with the
technical exercise but in a unique way as often stakeholders are also supportive
of a depoliticized environment¾until it impedes their interests. The Oregon case
study represents an effort to extend state planning authority over a fragmented
commons with the goal of optimizing the ecological and human relationships at
sea.
Environmental and natural resource policy and management have seen a
shift over the past half-century from a model of centralized control relying on the
“decide-announce-defend” model as a new set of practices focused on increasing
participation or levels of engagement (Hajer 1993). The new era of environmental
policy-making has multiplied into a series of methods that have been explored
through models including ecosystem-based management (Cortner and Moote
1998), alternative dispute resolution and environmental governance (O’Leary,
139

Nabatchi, and Bingham 2004), and public engagement or involvement (National
Research Council 2008). Several shared themes exist across these new
approaches. They include expanding the types and number of participants in
environmental decision-making. These approaches also attempt to shift the
dynamics of environmental conflict from adversarial to collaborative or
consensus-based approaches. Examples of this include negotiated rule-making or
facilitated decision-making. Proponents of these approaches claim that they
provide more durable agreements without the costs of conflict or litigation
(O’Leary, Nabatchi, and Bingham 2004).
Research on public involvement finds there is no single rationale for
public involvement. In reviewing both the theory and practice of public
involvement, three general arguments are made for public involvement:
substantive, normative, and instrumental (Fiorino 1990). Substantive arguments
for public involvement are based on expanding the types of information and
knowledge considered in decision-making. Perspectives of local communities or
affected groups are included to expand input and to broaden both the
knowledge and criteria considered. Normative arguments for public
involvement urge that democratic principles require broad participation in
decisions. This relies on an image of decision-making where all parties share a
role in the process. Finally, the instrumental perspective on public involvement
argues that public involvement develops legitimacy for decisions. This
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perspective can be framed in a more cynical light where processes are designed
to build support versus solicit new information. Alternatively, instrumental
public involvement can be understood as an effort to develop social capital or
cooperative capacity within contentious settings (Abelson et al. 2003). These
three arguments are not rigid; often, in practice, there is overlap as public
involvement might try to solicit new viewpoints, with the intent to be democratic
and the hope to build new support for decisions.
CMSP efforts have largely started from a substantive perspective, with a
goal to better understand who uses the ocean and how these uses interact. This
sits in tension with the other drive for CMSP, to reduce impacts from human
uses and to increase ecological considerations in planning through science-based
policy choices (Halpern et al. 2012). At the center of this tension sit state agencies
and planners managing these claims on the ocean. CMSP in these instances
frames public involvement as a scientific process that can “know” the public, or
create a better data product that represents the public.
In CMSP applications internationally, the drive to make public involvement
“scientific” manifests in heavily structured processes meant to make the public
knowable as an entity. Examining CMSP in Scotland, Smith and Brennan (2012)
have noted that an essentializing process unfolds in analyzing the public in the
use of PGIS, notably when mapping becomes a process of reducing the perspective
of a simple spatial representation. Through expert mediated processes, certain
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problems are focused on for planning and these become “obligatory passage
points” where all other interests or information must conform to fit the particular
world view of these problems (Callon 1986). The broad inclusion of public
involvement inevitably adds more values and politics to the process. Those that
seek to maintain a purer science model suggest limiting or structuring
involvement based on the public capacity to contribute (Collins and Evans 2002).
Critics of this perspective argue that values and culture are already structuring the
science and experts involved in decisions. Here, to claim the public is more
problematic is to ignore this institutional structuring (Wynne 1992). This valueladen perspective on science and expertise urges public involvement to
understand the public meaning-making processes and engage them better.
Approaching public involvement as a value-laden and political exercise
requires understanding the planning problem as one of social construction.
Environmental controversies are often about conditions that are still evolving,
especially issues that involve uncertainties or planning around new activities.
Freudenburg and Grambling (1994), in their study of oil and gas exploration
attitudes on the Gulf Coast and California coast, noted that perspectives on risk
and acceptance of development followed historically institutionalized pathways.
In their analysis, the acceptance of or opposition to new development in the
ocean was not so much about physical, economic, or environmental threats as it
was about the story of past developments that the communities shared. This

142

conception of how the past worked channeled ideas about how future
development might provide either benefits or unwelcome impacts. For proposed
developments that have not been deployed elsewhere, the process of defining
impacts and who should bear them becomes heavily influenced by ideas of
worth, rights, value, and moral terms (Schneider and Ingram 1993). These
examples of environmental policy problems as social construction underscore a
challenge for public involvement technologies: they tend to be ahistorical or are
simply representations of a snapshot in time for the public. The question that
arises is what happens when these two systems collide?
Developing Meaning on the Ocean with PGIS
In 2008, a series of ocean renewable energy developers started the process
of staking claim to the Oregon ocean for installing wave buoys. This triggered
uncoordinated federal and state responses. The state and federal regulators
developed an agreement to pause claims so the state could amend its Territorial
Sea Plan (TSP). However, this plan revealed many competing claims for
Oregon’s ocean. The opportunity to develop renewable energy was a priority for
the state to address climate change policy goals. Further, the new industry also
presented an opportunity for the state to become a leader in a new renewables
industry and hopefully lure the nascent industry to put down roots in Oregon.
Simultaneously, the strong fishing sector was very concerned about losing access
to the ocean, including the very high-value Dungeness crab fishery. Among these
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concerns were the state’s conservation and ecological priorities. The ocean
energy technology was, and remains, untested; its impacts are unknown and the
public concerns over the potential local impacts from devices complicate a clear
policy vision for the industry.
The growth of marine renewable energy was not the first time that fishers
had faced limits on their access to the ocean. The groundfish disaster in the 1990s
resulted in a series of fishing area closures by federal managers. These closures
demarcated large areas of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) as off-limits to
trawling. Other portions of the ocean had also been closed but with more
informal rules. A network of fiber optic cables comes ashore in Oregon from
across the Pacific. These cables include buffered exclusion areas around the
cables to protect this high-value infrastructure. Additionally, barge tow
operators have negotiated closures of shipping lanes within the Territorial Sea.
Both cables and the tow lane exclusions are not strongly enforced¾they are more
important if actual issues occur such as collisions or damaged cabling.
Furthermore, just before the introduction of wave devices, the state¾through its
wildlife agency¾had created new marine protected areas for the benefit of
biodiversity conservation limiting all human uses.
The planning of Oregon’s ocean was tasked to the state planning agency:
the Department of Land Conservation and Development (DLCD). DLCD
administers Oregon’s land-use system, regulating both local and state planning
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efforts. Oregon’s land-use system is based on a series of land use goals organized
by theme or resource. Several of these land-use goals focus on marine and coastal
resources, but, for the ocean, decision-making is guided by Goal 19¾Ocean
Resources. The land use goals were initially adopted in 1973 and the ocean and
coastal goals were refined in the 1980s. During the 1980s, the primary concern for
ocean and coastal management was offshore oil and gas exploration and the
protection of biodiversity and fishing. This resulted in the following language
being adopted for Goal 19:
[A]ll actions by local, state, and federal agencies that are likely to
affect the ocean resources and uses of Oregon’s territorial sea shall
be developed and conducted to conserve marine resources and
ecological functions for the purpose of providing long-term
ecological, economic, and social values and benefits and to give
higher priority to the protection of renewable marine resources—
i.e., living marine organisms—than to the development of nonrenewable ocean resources. (Goal 19: Ocean Resources. OAR 660015-0010(4))
When the first wave energy proposals emerged for the Oregon ocean, a
question immediately was raised as to whether wave energy constituted a
“renewable marine resource” as defined in the Goal 19 language. This was not
immediately settled and was left open to interpretation by many regarding the
guidance for supporting ocean renewable energy. Energy proponents pursued
requesting to set aside portions of the ocean for wave energy testing and
development. The lack of clear guidance from any state regulatory system
resulted in what some respondents referred to as a “gold rush on the ocean.”
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With no clear authority, and no federal guidance, energy proponents
believed there was great latitude to start requesting access to the ocean and
seafloor for project development. One respondent noted:
The other main observation was that the state was absent and to the
extent that it was present, I should say it was largely absent and to
the extent it was present, it seemed to be equally antagonistic… –
Ocean Renewable Energy Representative
The initial responses by the state and federal agencies revealed there was
no clear regulatory plan; essentially the state had exerted specific authority over
the ocean but had not anticipated this particular use. To return to the gold rush
metaphor, another respondent likened the energy interest to the historic
homesteaders coming across the US West to settle. For its part, the federal
response was also emergent. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
claimed authority as wave energy was classified as similar to hydroelectric
power and thus under their review. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(BOEM, formerly the Minerals Management Service) also claimed a role as the
lessor of federal ocean resources in federal waters three nautical miles seaward of
the shoreline. However, neither response was clear and, in practice, energy
developers were able to stake claims relatively easily without having immediate
plans to develop. In response to this, the State of Oregon negotiated a
moratorium with federal agencies and stakeholders until a plan to assess permit
requests methodically could be adopted. This paused development and set the
stage for the participatory planning process. The first goal in Oregon’s land-use
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system is public involvement, and this focused efforts on immediately expanding
how interests were captured and included in the decision-making.
To coordinate the CMSP effort on the Oregon ocean, the state planning
agency chose to use a comprehensive GIS approach. This first involved collecting
all of the existing data on ocean uses and values and then overlaying them to
explore the potential degree of conflict. Once this first step was taken, it was
determined that there was not sufficient data from the right interest groups to
make a decision. Here, I need to note that in some cases the data might have
existed but its production or status was politically unacceptable. For example,
commercial fishers must report locations of catches to state regulators; but these
logbook datasets are protected from release, and any reporting of the data was
aggregated in ways that the fishers were suspicious of. This is the classic problem
where there is not too little data, just not the correctly produced or stewarded
data. This kicked off an effort to collect data to fill the gaps.
The first group to participate in data collection was the fishing
community. The state itself could not collect the data nor even afford to fund it.
The data was ultimately collected by a local NGO supported by a large
philanthropic donor. The NGO developed the digital technology needed and
went into the field to collect data about areas of importance¾primarily through
a “bag of coins” exercise. Fishers delineated important areas and were then given
a set number of coins, which they assigned to each area they outlined. The
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process was not strictly about one’s own data. One respondent noted that there
was some gamesmanship in mapping areas¾placing values in places to get back
at other interests or regulators.
This use of GIS and user-developed data became a dominant tool for the
political discourse around management decisions in this case. Shortly after the
mapping for commercial and charter fishing was completed, other groups started
to develop spatial datasets. Non-consumptive recreation maps were developed
using surveys and interviews to measure where beach walking, surfing, boating,
and kayaking occurred. The renewable energy developers also demarcated areas
in the ocean based on estimated engineering and construction preferences. The
political battle for space moved to a GIS environment, and with a participatory
flavor. One planner involved in the process explained that, to have a seat at the
table, a group must map.
This deployment of GIS in coastal and marine spatial planning process
struggled to fit the many values, perspectives, and forms of knowledge into a
common framework for deliberation. At the end of this planning process, the
state did start a negotiation using the data to create a modified zoning system. I
say modified because it is largely a zoning system based on one use¾ocean
renewable energy and it focuses on how hard it is for the use to be located there.
Ambiguities in the ability to place devices were introduced, making it harder to
say there is a strict zoning per se. For example, much of the water off the state
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shore could be zoned for use but with a very unclear permitting path managed
by another agency.
At the end of the planning process, PGIS data were collected and
managed in a variety of ways depending on the user group. The first set of
data¾the fishing data¾ was held by a new organization known as FISHCRED
(Fishermen’s Information Service for Housing, Confidential Release, and
Essential Distribution). FISHCRED sees its data as a private set of intellectual
property holdings. As a group, they manage data releases, and also the methods
for aggregating or reporting data. However, they are reliant on the NGO that
helped collect the data for technical services to do this.
The other datasets largely reside with the state or a consortium of West
Coast states. This has resulted in the state being able to set the tone for further
negotiations with the federal government. By having this repository of data, they
are able to highlight their relative expertise when other entities seek to make
requests for space in the ocean. At the same time, the agencies and data
producers continue to work together as their Oregon-based knowledge provides
a basis for the State to resist federal or other interests in the ocean territory.
People in the Pixels
The planning process in Oregon relied on several stakeholder advisory
groups. The first was the Ocean Policy Advisory Committee (OPAC). OPAC was
created by statute in Oregon to advise state agencies on rule-making and to
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participate in marine resource decision-making. During the planning process, the
authority of OPAC was debated, but its role was largely to advise and comment
on proposals. Agencies were expected to respond to comments but not
necessarily adhere to them. The second body involved, and more important for
this current research, is the Territorial Sea Policy Advisory Committee (TSPAC).
TSPAC was created as an ad-hoc body for this planning process and was
composed of interest group representatives of the Oregon coast. These
participants involved local city and county planners and representatives,
environmental groups, fishing industry representatives, recreational groups, and
science and research advisors. As the state agency developed the PGIS approach,
TSPAC oversaw and reviewed the approach. This involved vetting assumptions
about data collection and usage as well as proposing new avenues for data
collection. Notably among these recommendations was a request to add
viewsheds and aesthetic data (concerns that were not initially included in the
planning process). This request emerged because local cities found they were
unable to represent themselves geographically out into the ocean where
decisions were being made. By using viewshed, new polygons of influence could
be extended based on terrestrial concerns. This resulted in a new assessment
methodology being developed and deployed in the field to add a new set of data
to the debates (Manson and Lanier 2015).
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In the interviews with TSPAC and OPAC members, the evaluative
questions asked of respondents sought to understand their perceived value of
the mapping tools as a way to organize interests. At an abstract level,
respondents were largely supportive of the mapping efforts. For many
stakeholders, there was a concern that the public and managers perceived the
ocean as a largely unoccupied space. From their perspectives, the ocean was, in
fact, a very busy space with a series of historic and ongoing space-use conflicts.
By employing PGIS, there was a hopeful belief that this perspective could be
overcome. However, specific concerns were raised once the data was explored at
a granular or use-specific level.
As the data were being processed and visualized, it quickly became clear
there were many competing claims for Oregon’s ocean¾maybe more so than
many participants expected at first. Initial conversations about planning and
mapping seemed to suggest a hope that once all the data was mapped, the areas
of opportunity would emerge on their own. This “Swiss-cheese” model imagined
consolidating all the layers of data and hoping enough holes overlapped to
create a path through all of the uses and values.
The resulting data generated a series of “heat maps” by fishery and by
port. Figure 2 shares one of these data products with the orange and red
polygons representing the highest importance areas for a coastal fleet. The
meandering grey line represents a current and ongoing research area that was
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included as a key ocean use. The grid cells in Figure 2 are the primary planning
units for the process. Some of the squares in Figure 2 have been filled with green
or brown color; these are examples of how point data from the recreational users
were aggregated into a larger spatial unit for planning. Within each of these cells
was potentially some form of existing use, but the entire one nautical mile by one
nautical mile area becomes marked for that use.

Figure 8: Example of PGIS Outputs - Fishing, Recreation and Research Uses
There were immediate criticisms about how the process of collecting and
interpreting this data unfolded. There was a concern that the process was rushed
or that it incompletely captured the fishing experience. Some respondents shared
that there was pressure from the state to push participation into the data
collection and that the implications of converting a lifetime of experience into a
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map were not fully appreciated by the planners. For example, when asked to
map areas of importance, should respondents think about historical value,
current use, or anticipated areas of importance based on how the resource
moves, becomes regulated, or is impacted by shifting market forces?
Similar concerns emerged from other data products. Earlier, it was
mentioned that an aesthetic and viewshed effort collected data on the coast.
Residents were conflicted about this effort. On one hand, it allowed for the
representation of their community values at sea, but it also essentialized the
views into numerical scores. Essentializing in this context represents the
reduction of the human experience on the water or coast into a single spatially
explicit representation. This introduced the potential for error or
mischaracterization of the resource. Capturing this tension, a local representative
shared:
I think a lot of the other examples [other methods for collecting
data] out there are more technically driven so there’s not
community members involved [in scoring], [they] tend to be more
mathematical. Then again, when you think about it, they were not
all ideal. I think you would have a group [of] people that would
make visual determination scoring on every site up and down the
coast, and you know this was one or two people that were the
same… I have no problems with the way the visual scoring went. I
thought it was done actually pretty [well], rather unique in the way
that it was done. – Local Community Representative
This quote captures a common sentiment in the planning process: the
particulars of a given data product were criticized or of concern, but the general
approach was lauded. These various data elements, as they emerged, became a
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building block for various claims on the ocean. These claims were often driven
by how they represented an interest in particular or in general for the public. As
the datasets were assembled, the discussion shifted in the planning meetings to
address what was the best outcome. Here the process shifted from a series of
user groups or interest groups to more collective debates about for whom and by
whom the ocean should be managed.
Debates on the Values and Interpretation of Data
To put these challenges into focus, it is helpful to visit the data review
process itself. As shared earlier, as a part of the planning process a number of
workshops were hosted with key stakeholders. These meetings were
opportunities to explore the data products in real-time with the data producers,
state planning staff, key community representatives, and user group
representatives sitting around the table. The following vignette captures one of
the many debates that appeared in the public meeting records.
In a wood-paneled conference room on the Oregon Coast, stakeholders
participating in the planning process sit around a large square table. Along one
side of the table, DLCD staff have arranged their team and binders of documents.
At the head of the table are projectors and materials for the meeting to explore
the spatial data collected in this process. The projector is connected to a laptop
operated by the lead data analyst for the DLCD team. In the back, the camera
that captured this meeting is set up next to another DLCD staffer who attends to
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the logistics of the meeting. In the middle along the side of the table sits the lead
planner for the agency; alongside him sits the stakeholder chair of the meeting, a
community representative appointed to help lead the session. Around the other
sides of the table, individuals settle in with binders and materials.
Aiming onto a whiteboard mounted on the wall, the projector displays a
website for the meeting to review. This website is a proposed data interface tool
to collect, visualize, and explore the PGIS from the planning process. The task for
this meeting is to understand how the data had been collected, how it would be
assembled, and how it might start to inform options for the planning process.
One of the first images projected shows this challenge: a series of blocks are
colored yellow and green and sit on top of a map displaying ocean bathymetry
and aerial imagery of the Oregon Coast. These blocks are clustered along the
coastline, while two other sets of blocks snake out into the ocean and another set
parallel the coast. These snaking lines are a mix of seafloor cable locations and
barge towing lanes¾two uses that are historic sources of conflict for commercial
fishing.
The discussion turns to these maps immediately, with the DLCD team
discussing how the line on the seafloor interacts with the planning grid.
Throughout the planning process, the data inputs are converted into an
aggregated cell, with one nautical mile by one nautical mile dimensions. With
this planning grid, the entire ocean space is thus divided into a series of square
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cells. These cells allow for the data sources to be protected; they obscure the exact
location of some sensitive data but also serve to make finer-grained data visible
at a state-level scale. However, they also represent uncertainty about how close
each value can or should be to the proposed ocean energy efforts.
In the meeting, the participants start with an appreciation of the
standalone values in each dataset, which represented the location of an
important human or ecological use. The intersection with the planning grid
produces a new aggregated map acting as a “short-cut” in analysis. The DLCD
staff defend this in the meeting by noting that the map is only a filter, not a
determinate designation for where ocean renewable energy may or may not be
located. Yet, this immediately catches the attention of the energy proponents
who note that if a cell is “lit up” by underlying data layers, the grid cell will be
removed from the list of possible “areas of opportunity” where developers can
apply for new ocean projects to be sited. At this point, the staff toggles a setting
on the map to show the extent of existing uses that are assumed to conflict with
potential energy developments.
The room reacts audibly, with one participant saying that without even
adding further data it appears that, “70% of the territorial sea is
mapped¾designated [to exclude renewable energy development]”. Here, the
DLCD team that designed the analysis pushes back to suggest that a finergrained analysis later can reveal opportunities to develop the locations. There
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was a pause and some accept this, but the data challenges continued. As the
meeting proceeded, other resources were asked about, biodiversity values in
particular. It was noted that some of the particular species data are not available.
In a telling comment, it is shared that there are enough other data layers that will
generate a conflict in the grid cell and that the data are not really needed. In
essence, this exchange suggests that if your particular worry is not mapped, do
not be concerned as there is enough other data to generate a protection.
This vignette illustrates the challenges of “leaky black boxes.” The initial
black boxing is the data collection on a specific human or natural use value. The
goal is to take a complex set of user data and translate it into a unit that can be
overlayed with other values but without having to open the black box each time
to ask if it intersects the grid cell in a certain way or if it has a particular quality.
The goal is to make it simple: an area with direct conflict or an area with some
opportunity to be developed. Further, the black boxing of human or natural uses
also depends on how well the existing uses fit on a grid. Data collection efforts
varied across the different values on the ocean. The ability to capture the nature
of a given resource depended often on the social and resource constraints of that
resource. For example, some human uses such as commercial fishing and
scientific research were more easily captured in mapping. Both were organized
social groups with relationships that researchers could use to access data and
mapping. These groups also engaged in more routinized spatial use of the ocean.
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Navigation routes, fishing grounds, research transects, and other common
practices were able to be mapped¾albeit with some challenges.
In contrast, other groups were harder to capture in spatial units.
Recreational users were a persistent example. Unlike the commercial fishing
example, recreational users are dispersed individuals with somewhat flexible use
patterns. However, maybe more importantly, the public recreation uses also
could be framed as a diverse set of uses. From beach walking to picnicking and
simply taking in the view at a high point on the coast, these users were a
challenge to capture in the same grid cell format that the participants in the
fishing effort were able to be captured in.
With these examples, we see how the black box coerces some meaning or
definitions to fit the bounds of the grid cell. The idea of leakiness emerges when
these black boxes are combined. Here, leakiness does not mean that they spill
something out but that they fail to exclude other meanings. They start to take on
meanings that were not originally intended. What they are meant to represent
shifts as they are assembled in the map product. Or, they are actively
manipulated to mean something else¾such as the stand-in for a missing
ecological value that is not available for mapping. As this process unfolds, the
planning process seeks to identify a shared common value for the ocean, but the
data as black boxes start to allow other meanings in, and the assembled
agreement becomes too unstable.
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For Oregon, these knowledge claims were battled out in a digital or
virtual space created by the state planning agency. Because the state set the terms
of debate, the participants were expected to ground claims both in knowledge
but also in public interest. Claims had to be developed spatially and test as
public values based on statewide planning goals. Here, the planning process
funneled interests into pixels to create a quantity of public interest or public
good. The goal throughout the planning process was to develop a model to
assemble all of the interests into a composite model built on data. Then, the hope
was that this composite model, a balancing of interests through GIS, could
“daylight” new opportunities. However, the process instead appeared to fill the
ocean landscape with data to block new uses. The real shift for the Oregon ocean
was not this outcome but rather how the terms of debate shifted. Where
previously management choices were made in sector- or use-specific debates,
wave energy enabled the state planning agency, with a particular form of
technology, to exert its control and expand authority over the ocean. In this case,
the expansion of authority was more than just a claim for control, it was
authority based on the knowledge claims for management of the ocean and how
to order those claims.
As shared in Chapter 4, these black boxes of data and meaning became
problematic at the end of Act 2. Act 3 began with a series of competing proposals
that sought to close the process and come to a final adopted plan. What is found
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in Act 2 and this chapter is that the optimism of the data products and their
assembly into a final outcome was dependent on the meanings around each data
product staying stable. Instead, the data were diverse in both sources and
meaning. While within the data collection period and the initial visualization
they were able to hold agreement (or at least evade questioning). However, as
the data were assembled the meanings they were meant to convey, or the
representations they were supposed to make, started to fall apart. Fishers
questioned their own data products, visual resource data were re-examined and
argued about, and suddenly there was both no clear space for ocean renewable
energy, nor agreement on what the maps really meant. In the next chapter, the
transition between Acts 2 and 3 are captured in the negotiations for control over
the territorial sea. The process here shifts to one of narratives assembled to build
agreements and coalitions around the new mapping. The planning focus shifts
from the data products to the stories that can be told about the ocean and its
management.
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Chapter 6: Dynamics of Participatory GIS and Marine Spatial Planning
As the optimistic period of Act 2 came to a close, the debates over how to
develop a final map for the Oregon territorial sea shifted from data to claims
about the rights of groups to access or claim space on the ocean. As shared in
Chapter 4, the emergence of planning sought to find a solution through data
products. However, no “donut holes” emerged as the data were assembled –
meaning no space was found without some preexisting use that could allow for
ocean renewable energy. The technology alone could not address the multiple
claims on the ocean for uses. This chapter turns to the narratives that were then
used to marshal support for different planning outcomes in the process.
Central to coastal and marine spatial planning (CMSP) is a focus on
increasing public participation and engaging in science-based planning (Bonzon,
Fujita, and Black 2005). These two thrusts of increasing engagement and
rationalizing environmental planning create a tension in claims on common
spaces and goods (Cortner and Moote 1998; Gilliland and Laffoley 2008; Halpern
2012). On the one hand, the calls for increased engagement broaden the set of
stakeholders and interests involved in the planning process. However, this can
also complicate the other stated goal of science-based planning where expertise
and knowledge claims are privileged from a smaller set of actors in the planning.
Empirically, these collaborative approaches are also not guaranteed to create
improved environmental outcomes compared to traditional political decision161

making (Layzer 2008). One effort to bridge this tension has been through the
development of mapping tools to visualize, collect, and query datasets from
different sources. Both internationally and within the US, CMSP as a practice has
focused on the potential of geographical information systems (GIS)
developments, including participatory mapping tools.
The development of PGIS both terrestrially and for CMSP in other cases
has raised important questions about the role of the technology and its influence
on how groups or interests are engaged. This question is addressed in part by
narrative discourse analyses in environmental planning cases examined by Hajer
(1995) in acid rain debates. Hajer starts his examination of environmental debates
in the late 20th century by noting the rise of ecological modernization in both
policy and research communities. In particular, Hajer characterizes ecological
modernization as a dominant frame of thinking among policy-making where
there is a perception that win-win scenarios can be developed with better
technological or institutional adjustments (Hajer 1995, 25–27). This is in
opposition to a perspective that suggests win-win is not possible due to deeper
conflicts within debates over the economy and the environment. Ecological
modernization seeks to shift environmental problems from political issues to
technical issues. Using the language of Ulrich Beck (1992), Hajer notes there is a
“displacement of important political decisions to other, formally non-political
realms” (1995, 39).
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The deployment of GIS in a coastal and marine spatial planning process
struggled to fit the many values, perspectives, and forms of knowledge into a
common framework for deliberation. At the end of this planning process, the
state did start a negotiation using the data to create a modified zoning system. As
I have mentioned, I qualify this as modified because it was created as a zoning
system focused on one use¾ocean renewable energy. The zoning primarily
defined the procedural steps required in each location for leasing to energy
companies. To compare this to a terrestrial example, the ocean was zoned with
varying degrees of conditional use permit zones. These conditions created
ambiguity regarding how easy or certain it might be to place devices, making the
zoning much less definite for critics and proponents of ocean renewable energy.
For example, large areas of the state waters were zoned for potential use but with
a very unclear permitting path managed by another agency.
The planning process unfolded with a series of public work sessions
spanning two years. Two primary advisory groups consulted on the planning
with the state planning agency. The first was the Ocean Policy Advisory
Committee (OPAC) which is chartered by a statute with membership selected by
the Governor’s office. The second was the Territorial Sea Plan Advisory
Committee (TSPAC), a group created for the planning process and facilitated by
the state planning agency. As the process drew to a close, various maps were
developed to locate potential areas for ocean energy development. The two
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advisory groups developed a common set of levels of regulatory scrutiny for any
development and mapped the locations of these areas.
However, no single agreement emerged on a final map. As the process
proceeded, there was pressure to settle the issue based on a concern that the lack
of a plan could result in a lifting of the moratorium on ocean leases by federal
agencies. If this were to occur, it was feared that it would represent their giving
up of control over the ocean. A final staff plan was recommended by the state
planning agency to the Land Conservation and Development Commission
(LCDC)¾the political commission that has the final say on planning decisions in
Oregon and oversees DLCD. The LCDC adopted the staff plan despite objections
from OPAC over some small areas included for potential development. While
the plan was adopted in 2013, it was immediately challenged in the Oregon
Court of Appeals by members of OPAC in early 2014.
Stories on the Ocean, Pixels at the Table
The original hopes for the PGIS for the Oregon TSP planning process
revealed an ecological modernization thrust: that the problem was a technical
issue that could be solved with better data and that there existed a solution to
meet all interests. In conversations with planners and those collecting data, there
was a hope that as all of the data was stacked in GIS it would reveal a “donut
hole” that would emerge across all interests allowing for the new use to be
located on-site; but this did not emerge and, if anything happened, the data
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collection expanded the extent of how and where users showed up on the ocean.
Once the spatial medium became the political currency for debates, ocean space
was quickly spoken for.
As Hajer (1995, 58–68) notes in his exploration of environmental debates,
the issue that matters is less material or interest-based coalitions, but rather
discourse coalitions. These coalitions are formed by the shared presentation of
storylines that seeks to dominate the argument with a definition of the policy
problem and thus the solutions that can be applied. This is a perspective that is
contrasted with other coalition models of policy change such as the advocacy
coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). Hajer (1995) seeks to shift
the focus for policy analysis away from a model of interest-based and
individualistic actors to one where discourses are shared as a binding resource
for policy arguments.
For Hajer, interests in the policy process use emblems and storylines to
build narratives in support of their framing of problems and solutions.
Environmental issues are "discursively created" - storylines craft how events
become issues and then policy foci (Hajer 1995, 20-21). Ways of knowing these
issues through new technologies or reports are part of a discursive process.
Problems are connected through emblems and storylines and become
representational of larger problems. A note on terminology at this point.
Following Hajer, storylines are particular examples or events that are
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characterized in policy debates. These combine with other storylines to create
narratives. In Hajer’s model, storylines are argued to join interests together to
define problems and solutions in the policy context.
The benefit of approaching this from the discourse perspective is that it
captures a multitude of values that participants in the planning effort carried
with them but could not map effectively. In interviews with participants of the
planning process, there were often two threads of discussion that emerged: the
first was a sharing of the long history of how the respondents came to hold their
views¾often with a narrative trope to characterize it¾and second, the generally
high regard for the mapping technology. I want to first address the first
observation and then engage in the interesting durability of the regard for the
technology.
Several narratives emerged in interviews with participants in the planning
process. These storylines were approximately distributed across three groups of
stakeholders or interests in the process: coastal communities and fishers; energy
developers and proponents; and environmental and recreational groups. Two
primary narratives emerged in this process: the protection of traditional coastal
uses and the emerging innovation of clean energy. Within each of these
narratives several storylines were used, and at times shared between the two
narratives.
Storylines

Traditional
Narrative
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Innovation
Narrative

Agrarian/Traditional Uses
Defending Local Communities
Economic Revitalization
Industrialization
Leading Innovation
Renewable Resources

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

Table 1: Narratives and Storylines
Traditional Narrative
For local community leaders and fishers, the concern they share is that
new energy development represented an industrialization of the ocean. For this
group the traditional narrative centered on storylines about past use, protecting
local traditional values, preventing industrialization, and a particular
characterization of the sustainable fisheries. As shown in the table above, many
storylines overlap with the ocean energy centered innovation narrative, but as is
shown here, adapt to fit the larger narrative goals. What follows in this section is
a presentation of these storylines, and roughly in the order presented in Table 1.
The first part of this narrative that was often heard in meetings or public
events was a story of coastal fishers set apart from modern society. This framing
at times used the idea of that fishers were “hunter-gathers” seeking out “wild
protein.” In a public meeting, one fisher representative framed the challenges of
ocean renewable energy as thus:
For our livelihood we know we're giving up something. Hopefully
it's for the better, but we need to protect it and we know we are
going to lose some crab grounds. I'm also on the crab commission, I
understand it totally. But we have a tremendous future and to me
this is the best protein on the planet and I think we need to look
seriously at our seafood industry. And I urge you ... You've
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probably gotten a lot of talk from fishermen, I would listen to them,
I would listen to what they have to say. – Local Fisher [emphasis
added]
In interviews a similar framing was shared, and set in such a way as to even try
and link up with the climate change benefits associated with renewable energy:
We understand how much to take and how not damage the garden
and not to damage the environment. We produce the best animal
protein in the world - this wild protein with a carbon footprint that
is a fraction of cows, pigs, chickens. A tiny fraction. So here we are
doing this ancient activity - this primitive activity - successfully. It
would be a shame to alter this opportunity … It would be missed. –
Local Fisher [emphasis added]
In some public meetings, this primitive or traditional storyline was
reframed as a worry about an invasion. Multiple comments heard in this
research included a problematic characterization of energy development as a
new wave of homesteaders displacing traditional users (and hinting that fishers
shared the plight of indigenous communities.) This storyline of outside
intervention in many ways flows all the way back to the Oregon Ocean Plan, and
its efforts to protect Oregon from offshore development. The concern was that
control over the ocean resources would be determined by perspectives that do
not understand the coastal experience. One official noted:
[Our] county traditionally has been a natural resource based
economy; timber, agriculture, commercial fishing. All three of those
have been under severe attack over many decades and yet the
industry continues to change. Continues to get better at what it
does to resolve of the issues that prompted a lot of these calls for a
cessation of timber harvest …. Things have gotten so much better.
It's an educational process people don't understand current
168

practices in commercial fishing and in timber and in agriculture.
… People come to the beach and they build their mansions, and
that's great but when they come from the valley, or wherever else
they came from, they don't understand timber or agriculture or
fishing. They come with their own preconceived ideas of what it is,
at least what it used to be. They don't like it, but if they would
become educated as to what we're doing and how we're utilizing
our resources today. – Coastal Elected Official [emphasis added]
This statement also captures part of the storyline that centers on the rural and
urban divide between Portland and the Willamette Valley, and the coastal
communities. This quote also shares a sentiment that pushes back on a storyline
that will be examined next from the renewable energy perspective: that the
coastal economies need revitalization.
This storyline was concerned with the energy industry as an outside
economic interest looking to take advantage of the ocean and the communities
near it. Industrialization also represented a need to commodify the ocean with
territories that exclude some areas over others. This taps into a deep fear among
many fishers about a shift of the ocean from a highly self-regulated set of
commons to a modern territory system (McCay and Acheson 1987). Discussion
about the use of the ocean by fishers also relied on a series of agrarian metaphors
around management and stewardship of the natural resource.
The traditional use and outsider imagery were used in opposition to the
idea of modernization or innovation presented by renewable energy proponents.
This narrative also developed storylines to oppose the new use, primarily
focusing on the cost of proposed power development and using examples from
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other energy projects to show the possible harm. This included aligning new
renewable energy devices with the past hard of hydroelectric dams in the region.
And that camp [renewable energy proponents] says, “Climate
change - need clean energy - dam the torpedo. If we ruin a little
ground…” They have kind of an industrial view. “We ruin a little
of their ground, impact species, we don’t want to do that but we’re
all, the planet is addicted to energy we are going to work on clean
energy.” And not even a real sincere concern about some of the
things - I depend on that ecosystem. And we are the same, not me
because I am first generation fisherman, but many fisherman fishing families were impacted by what happened with the dams.
-Coastal Fisher [emphasis added]
Those interviewed noted that the new technology only seemed viable with
federal or state subsidies. For them, this was a scandal in its own right, especially
for a region with very low-cost hydropower production from the Columbia River
system. As one local elected official noted:
But a number of companies that wanted to cash in on grant
funding, primarily from the federal government, they set up wind
and wave energy facilities on a test basis, and then if it worked out,
to develop the sites. – Local Elected Official
One storyline that began to overlap between the narrative centered on the
idea of research and development versus industrial level development. Those in
the traditional narrative often noted there was a middle ground possible if the
process only allowed research and development, and ideally through the state
university system. Building on the previous storyline about the suitability of
energy production, the following statement captures this sentiment well:
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The production doesn’t make sense and its going to be very costly
to us. We’ve been proactive about working with the research and
testing. You know wave energy - there are parts of the world that
can really use it. Those are primarily where they use diesel for
electricity. The Pacific Islands, maybe in the Arctic, although ice is
another issue. We’re takin’ care of that, we’re cooking it off for
better or worse. Those communities are ready and that technology
can be developed here. We want to export knowledge - not
electrons. Most of which would go to California. – Coastal Fisher
[emphasis added]
This sentiment captures the idea that the region might be able to lead innovation,
but only through smaller scale research. This storyline also unites with the
industrialization storyline by reframing development for research versus
development for the benefit of outside investors.
A final storyline key to this narrative centered on sustainability. In
previous chapters, Goal 19 was discussed. Goal 19 specifically calls out
protecting “traditional use of renewable resources.” This terminology was a
constant source of conflict between the narratives. As previous quotes share, the
fisher perspective was one framed as in balance with nature. The fishing industry
in this narrative fit the Goal 19 language as the only both traditional and
renewable activity. As will be discussed next, this was a point that renewable
energy developers challenged.
Innovation Narrative
For the advocates of energy development, the storylines were centered on
addressing climate change, innovation and progress and, to varying degrees,
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revitalization of local economies. Energy proponents noted the state of climate
change and the need to shift from traditional power generation sources. Ocean
renewable energy represented a chance to develop a powerful and reliable new
source of clean energy. Oregon in particular was seen as a rich resource with its
large wave heights with long-term forecasting potential.
At the same time, this progress story also wanted to share its riches with
the local coastal communities. The development advocates shared that the job
and revenue potential for coastal communities could help these relatively poorer
areas recover from past natural resource crises such as the spotted owl closure
for logging and the groundfish collapse. The economic revitalization storyline at
was at times set against the traditional community needs. One proponent of
ocean renewable energy noted:
There's a lack of a willingness to talk about the future and what the
coast can look like or would look like or how you're going to keep
new jobs there, as if the only thing anybody's kid is ever going to
do in the coast is process logs for shipment to China, run a kite
shop, or fish. They're complaining that they don't have
opportunities. Yet they seem to do everything they can to more or
less ensure that those are the only opportunities that are going to be
available. – Renewable Energy Proponent
This storyline also contested a sense that existing users had the power to
veto the entry of new ocean uses. They felt that there was a disconnect for the
public between the goals and policy of the state as a whole versus local exercise
of control over a public resource. The proponents, like the local fishers, also
developed their own storylines opposing the traditional use of the ocean. They
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argued that the sustainability of the fisheries was being taken as a given, when
the health of the ocean was, in fact, threatened by fishing. This challenged the
renewable storyline. One individual shared with some colorful language:
I can go on all day about this, but you know there's this underlying
reality that ocean energy is a relatively new use of the ocean. We
had to play by the new consciousness around the ocean. It's the
right consciousness. …the ocean needs even greater protection and
regulation, but relative to the industrialization and the use of the
ocean that we've experienced to date, wave energy and offshore
wind energy is at a serious disadvantage. To this day, you can still
drag metal grates across the bottom of the ocean, scooping up all
living organisms and just leaving a desert behind you. You can do
that all day long and you can belch diesel fuel and gasoline and
dead organic matter and crap over the side of your boat, but if you
want to float a wave energy device out and put an anchor down on
the bottom… you're going to need a lot of permits for that." –
Renewable Energy Proponent
This is a challenge to the renewable nature of fisheries was one that was raised
in meetings but was quickly pushed to the side as politically unacceptable to
raise. However, conservation and recreational groups carefully worked with this
storyline to try and bolster the renewable storyline for ocean energy. Several
noted that in the context of climate change, these new technologies should be
included in the definition. For these groups, this position was not automatically
decided upon. Members of these groups shared fears over loss of recreational
space or impacts to ecosystems from new developments.
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Managing Narratives for Decisions
The planners at the state agency level wrestled with these two storylines.
There was a desire to shift the debate from larger claims on the ocean to a focus
on the present needs of each group to try and accommodate them. There was
also a series of efforts to frame the issues on behalf of the public in the state. One
former planner interviewed hinted that a “Frankenstein” had emerged from
earlier efforts to provide local input and inclusion in the public process. By
granting that authority¾or at least the appearance of authority¾other claims for
the ocean were dismissed. Planners regularly raised the issue that the ocean was
a public trust to be managed for all of Oregon. However, this is a difficult
storyline to manage by itself. Here, the agency and planners tried to use the GIS
representations of the storyline groups to settle or negotiate the problem
spatially, as opposed to directly address the underlying conflict in the two
storylines. This was done by digitizing or redefining the spatial extent of some
uses or resources to accommodate concerns but not to directly address issues.
For example, if fishers were concerned that certain areas might be made available
for development, the planning staff occasionally suggested some other ecological
or economic use will likely emerge within the data to prohibit ocean energy use.
It is possible that there is no tool that the planners could have deployed to
address the gap between the storylines. In particular, the use of GIS technology
appeared to complicate the process. In work meetings between the different

174

groups, the planners facilitated the exploration of the GIS data that had been
collected. As new data was presented on the digital projection on the wall, the
different groups would introduce cases that supported or refuted how the data
should be interpreted. Because the GIS system needed a common unit of
analysis, all of the data was standardized to a grid cell system. This allowed for
some data to “grow” as the cell may have only had a small percent of the use
present, but it “lit up the cell” entirely for that use. Users argued over how to
interpret this and it added ambiguity to arguments over the best place for the
new ocean use. In the end, the application of PGIS in this exercise did not
increase the shared understandings of the storyline, instead reflecting the
dominant logic of ecological modernization to push the politics out of the process
by using technical tools. This pre-empted a discussion about the underlying
values that drove public input and thus staved off the political conflict to the
very end.
Interestingly, as I noted in the opening to this section, almost all of the
groups interviewed in this process approved the mapping technology and the
use of PGIS. It was referred to as groundbreaking, innovative, and the best
approach with the challenging issues at play. The strong support for the
mapping but the disapproval of the outcome can be understood in a variety of
ways. In part, the mapping should be separated from the outcome. Some claimed
that the mapping was great, it was just that the final decision failed to use the
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data from the mapping properly. Here, the process was evaluated as “great,”
despite the outcome being a failure. Second, the mapping itself captures a shared
storyline that possibly explains the acceptance itself. As Hajer (1995) notes,
ecological modernization has become a dominant model inside and outside of
agencies. It is not only the agencies that believe in the potential of the technology
but the public as well. In this, the blame falls on the user, not the tool. It speaks to
the possibility that this process could easily be repeated because the technology
is so readily accepted by planners, stakeholders, and the public. There is a shared
belief that there is a way to use mapping and data tools to craft a solution out of
the problem, but neither side recognizes the root difference in values as a barrier
to the solution.
The drive to disregard politics from a decision and focus on the issue as a
technical one is an active social construction within the case studied here. The
hope was to minimize conflict that can undermine such a process and to create a
decision that stands on evidence the agency can martial with its resources. Key to
this effort is defending the state’s role as a steward of public interest¾a claim
that it needs to maintain legitimacy within its political institutions. However,
relying on PGIS and data products to understand the public is a challenging task.
Catlaw (2007, 43–44) explores this problem of representation in modern politics
by noting that we see a heightened number of groups represented and more
pathways provided into governance, yet we also have a loss of faith in
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government. These multiple perspectives have created a problem for modern
democracy.
The representation of the public suffers from a tension of being
general¾to claim authority for the whole¾but also needing to be particular¾so
its claims resonate with individuals. The older model of representation is based
on working towards a single public, but this public has proliferated into many.
The emergence of more groups makes the ability to link the general and the
particular a difficult project, one that requires exclusion to reduce the noise in the
system. To address these multiple claims, Catlaw (2007, 63–68) notes that modern
states work to find equivalences to balance them. Examples of these are costbenefit analyses and economic models of comparisons¾all tools seen in the
ecological modernization shift. For the DLCD, the claims had to be filtered to
control the noise and that filter was found in applying PGIS technology to order
and assemble the public into a dataset for shared deliberation.
This case suggests that there needs to be caution in applying PGIS in
CMSP or other settings. The underlying storylines are likely to create the political
coalitions that drive outcomes, but these storylines are not easily translated from
story to pixel. The users and interests engaged, even if co-producing the data, are
just as likely to adopt a techno-optimism about the tools (Wynne 1992). They
may allow their own storylines to be silenced temporarily in exchange for a datadriven seat at the table. It is not quite a hegemonic power that these technologies
177

hold, but they do represent a powerful redirection of focus for public
involvement that can obscure conflict as a process approaches a decision point.
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Chapter 7: The State as we Think It
In this chapter, I argue that the development of this PGIS technology as a
public involvement tool is an example of expanding state authority over a new
territory, the ocean. To understand this expansion of state authority¾and with a
social constructivist perspective, I focus on the ways participants in the Oregon
process came to think of what represented the proper authority over the ocean.
This involved not just the creation of categories (such as the public, the state, and
uses) but how they are identified and included data for decisions. The use of
technology to “know” the public is an active construction process to assemble,
understand, and manage the public interest and represents an expansion of
authority. This expansion occurs through the desire to better represent the public
by both state actors and stakeholders involved in the process. To understand this
process, I rely on a three-part model that first defines the state as a cognitive
category as opposed to a realist conception of the state. This cognitive category is
a socially constructed concept that is coproduced by participants in the policy
process, seeking to advance their claims on the ocean. I conceptualize the state as
a cognitive entity, borrowing from Peter Bratsis’s (2006) formulation. Here, we
see that the state is not a category external to stakeholders or interests but rather
a shared social concept internalized and jointly held by those involved in the
process and impacted by its final outcomes. Bratsis’s concept focuses on
quotidian actions and communities within and around a state.
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The second part of the model focuses on representation, and how the
work of the administrative state structures debates about public interests and
needs. By this, the state seeks to develop, manage, and lead the claim of what the
“public” is and is not. To understand how this cognitive category idea can be
used to understand the state, I turn to Thomas Catlaw’s (2007) work on the
construction of the public where the source of power and problems for the
administrative state is the effort to create the more perfect representations that
support the legitimacy of the state to represent the people.
Catlaw argues that our liberal democratic models of representation are at
once trying to generalize a whole but also derive authority from the particular.
This creates a paradox where some meanings or groups must be excluded to
make the representation work. Additionally, this echoes Bratsis’s application of
Mary Douglas’s purity and pollution model (Douglas 2002)¾the state strives to
purify the public as a category to further its role as representations and ideas
become leaky. Catlaw (2007, 76–82) argues that the work of stopping these leaks
is the defining role of the state. So, the first two parts of this model are that of a
state as a cognitive category and, in particular, one charged with making sense of
conflicting ideas of interests and representation. This charges the state with then
working to fix the shortcomings inherent in this representation.
Finally, I argue that these ideas of the state and its management of the
public become fixed or institutionalized in a particular technological set of tools
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and practices using PGIS. This portion argues that there is something about the
specific technology used in PGIS that allows the state to expand its claim on
territory but, more importantly, meaning. This technology enables a particular
form of state growth which I term “technogovernance”¾intentionally borrowed
from Patrick Carroll’s (2012) technoscientific state concept. Here, PGIS acts like
engineering science but, instead, is representation science. While PGIS is a coproduction of certain representations with groups interested in the ocean, it also
tries to include ecological or conservation values along with physical
oceanography. These systems work together and, at times, in opposition to each
other, or just noisily.
This effort represents a drive to re-order the management of the marine
commons. CMSP is an endeavor that seeks to resolve competing claims on ocean
space that have been managed through informal institutions or individual
resource-specific management regimes. The introduction of CMSP is a project to
manage these previous modes of control rationally and modernize the ocean
with new goals. The ecological concepts embedded in CMSP rely on a model of
science as the representative of nature and, by extension, society, where science
is neutral and provides a “mirror to nature” (Brown 2009). These models of
knowing the natural system are extended to social systems and politics. The
challenges for the role of science in democracy are well explored in STS
literature, science is not value-free but rather a product of many competing
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interests, institutional structures, and economic forces (Gieryn 1999; Kleinman
2003; Latour 1999). The drive for modernization is also something could be
viewed through Scott’s work on the state, framing the planning in Oregon as an
example of “state legibility” efforts (Scott 1999). However, there is something
more here as the general acceptance of the data collection and visualization
became a relatively settled tool for planning.
Earlier, I had introduced this idea of the state as a cognitive category and
its task as the management of representations and meanings. Further, I
suggested that a particular form of technology enables its growth into new areas
such as the authority over ocean territory. The first part of the model works to
provide an accessible concept of the state, the last component to introduce a
particular materiality into it via the spatial technologies and their digital
products. For Bratsis (2006), the key to understanding the state is to capture a
series of social facts that move the state from a social science category to a lived
experience. Bratsis argues that the Weberian approach falls short in that it fails to
explain fully how legitimacy becomes internalized by those included in the state.
He refers to this as a “fetishization” of the rationality in research on the
state¾but it is a fetish that is never fully explained. How is it reproduced, how is
it enforced? Bratsis settles on a definition of the state as an entity or category
based on opposing meanings in society, namely distinctions between private and
public, as well as domestic versus foreign. These distinctions and the struggle to
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demarcate the boundaries between them enable the state. In particular, the
maintenance of the public and private distinction is necessary for the state to
continue in existence¾the state needs the public as a category for it (the state) to
exist¾the state finds its legitimacy in the idea of the public and needs to
cultivate this public (Bratsis 2006, 48–50). In the Oregon case, we see this as the
PGIS takes private inputs (e.g., personal fishing experience, preferred
recreational areas, important viewpoints) and seeks to define a new “publicness”
out of these inputs. This new publicness is something only the state can lay claim
to knowing based on its own outreach and involvement. Furthermore, this
publicness is the basis for authority to make determinations between various
interests. However, this is a messy process to manage at a more micro or
interactional level.
Making sense of these interactions can be done by understanding how
representation can be modeled as a process. Catlaw (2007, 43–44) focuses on the
problem of representation with a starting observation that, in modern politics,
we have a heightened number of groups represented and more pathways into
governance. The problem here is that, in many cases, this has created a loss of
faith in government. These proliferating perspectives have created a problem for
modern democracy. The older model of representation is based on building a
single public but now this public has multiplied into many. Representation needs
to be authoritative by speaking for the entire public but its power is harnessed
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through particular stories that reflect reality. The increasing number of groups
makes the ability to link the general and the particular a difficult project¾one
that requires exclusion to reduce the noise in the system. This critique of
representation suggests that public administration has relied on a mirror
metaphor for representation for too long¾representation is not instrumental it is
substantive. The commitment to finding a single public is a shared belief in the
state and society¾to add to Bratsis’s examples of beliefs that enable the state.
“We the People” in the case of the United States is not solely a state project but a
mass public opinion one as well.
To address these multiple representative inputs and the need to make
them a singular public, Catlaw (2007, 63–68) notes that modern states work to
find equivalencies to balance them. An example of this are cost-benefit analyses,
economic models of comparisons, which also show our reliance on a neoliberal
model. This broader role for political economy is recognized in other similar
studies of the state. Kevin Dunn’s examination of species conservation in postcolonial Africa shows a similar set of logics¾often enabled by NGOs such as the
ones involved in Oregon (Dunn 2008). Here, Dunn also echoes a model of the
state based on representations, where the media for debates over the state are,
themselves, constitutive of the state. For Dunn, by working with NGOs, states
occupy a more fragile position but one dependent on states’ ability to make
spatial representations.
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Our story from Oregon is similar, the diverse inputs are translated into
fixed time and space to create a public aggregate of ocean value. As groups
witnessed other representations being developed and incorporated, the response
was not to resist, oppose, or undermine the spatial systems but to engage them in
the search for a comprehensive representation for all. Why and how this
happened requires the final part of my model that introduces
“technogovernance.” In his study of the role of water resource engineering in the
creation of the modern California state, Carroll (2012) extends his idea of “engine
science” as a key part of state formation through the systems for measuring and
controlling water in California. This particular application is mechanized
knowledge production that unites science and society in constituting each other
and, in this case, the state. Water becomes the object for governing; the engine
science quality allows it to be deployed and for the governance via science to be
reproduced broadly.
There is a similarity here with the PGIS. Just as the water for Carroll has
meters, graphs, and scopes, PGIS seeks to measure, capture, and intertwine
information about people and their actions¾with their own production of data
about themselves. One point of difference between Carroll’s example and the
Oregon story is that much of the non-human world is fully mediated in the
Oregon experience. PGIS is mostly about human representations; even the
ecological data are model-based, not observational. This is a unique feature of
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working on the ocean where the perceptions and interactions are far more
difficult. However, I argue that there is one important place where the nonhuman applied: the pixel. Here, the GIS systems, their desires to maintain
particular coordinate systems, resolutions, and scales all become new
participants. More than once in the planning process these issues confounded
groups as they realized that the Cartesian grid drove the analyses results, in
addition to the data inputs. However, these systems worked so quickly and
efficiently; they spread across the groups, interests, and spaces of the ocean. The
state planning agency became the primary arbiter of spatial values, thus,
defining the public and managing the leaky representations by adding new
technologies.
This idea of technogovernance suggests that there is a particular set of
public involvement technologies that can expand and enroll more areas and
interests under the administration of the state. These technologies can take
advantage of a legitimacy of meaning (the visualization of space) and become
calculable, thus, requiring and fitting the state’s model for balancing interests.
However, because of the dynamics of the process, the state plays a tenuous role.
Therefore, actors or groups must self-translate into x and y points to participate
politically. The state then handles the leaky-ness of this process by resolving the
meaning of these datasets and using the idea of the public to reinforce its claims.
However, replicating the paradoxical problems of representation as outlined by
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Catlaw (2007), the state constantly has to encourage participation while
simultaneously and strategically excluding as ideas, views, or meanings become
problematic as they move from the particular to the general.
States as Models
More recently, new efforts to engage the state in science and technology
studies and political sociology provide tools to explore states in a way that
reconnects with the pragmatism perspective introduced from Dewey earlier.
Science and technology studies provide a series of concepts and theories that
introduce materiality into understandings of the state¾importantly, how
techniques, objects, tools, and practices are part of the social life of states. By
engaging this materiality, the state can be explored as an entity that integrates
people and the natural world to create a base for power. Looking at the
development of the modern French state, Mukerji notes that the state uses
“material intelligence and stewardship over nature” to develop the legitimacy to
rule (Mukerji 2003, 655). For Mukerji, the state’s legitimacy is tied to
performative aspects of engineering the landscape and the people in it. By taking
a noisy environment and cultivating it through engineering, the state forms itself
through projects and civil works. At the same time, the state seeks to make things
knowable, and thus engages in a sorting project to make territories and people
that it can exert power over. Therefore, state tools other than the traditional ones
of violence are required¾tools such as hydrology, civil engineering, and
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medicine are part of the statecraft. In this sense, Mukerji argues that the state
engages in a form of “mesnagement” or a particular form of orderly gardening
(Mukerji 2003, 664). The contribution of this framing of the state is to remember
that mesnagement started as a moral project on ordering relationships and
rational techniques have potentially distanced the state and politics from openly
engaging moral questions.
Another effort in science and technology studies that follows a similar
dedication to exploring the materiality of states is the work of Carroll (2006) on
the creation of the modern Irish state and the state formation of the US state of
California through water resource projects (2012). In his historical research on
Ireland, Carroll develops the idea of “engine science” as a key part of state
formation. This is a form of technoscience¾or mechanized knowledge
production¾that unites science and society in constituting each other (Jasanoff
2005). These ideas are narrower and more focused ideas building on
technonatures where the contest between voices from society and nature
emerges through a technologically mediated system (White and Wilber 2009).
Carroll takes these concepts and applies them to explore the development
of water resources in California as an example of technologically mediated state
formation (Carroll 2012). Using California as an example of state formation is
unique in the scholarly literature, exploring a political subdivision of a larger
state, unique to the US experience. By engaging the subdivisions of a state as part
188

of a network and understanding the state as an actor network system, it is
possible to study California within a larger state formation process (Carroll 2012,
490). This shift also pays attention to reifying sovereigns or absolute state models
and acknowledges their assemblages. As California grew, water resources
became more contested; the control over water moved from local improvement
districts to the state engineer. In this way, water developed into a primary object
for governing, leading to what Carroll labels “engineering governmentality.”
This form of governmentality, borrowing from Foucault, is a particular mode not
just of rationality but of practice. Engineering governmentality is not only
concerned with thinking but is a mode of doing with particular ways of thinking
and technologies¾such as the pumps and meters required to understand the
water resource system. This form of governmentality differs from the normal
framing of rationality. Engineering governmentality is more pragmatic¾it is not
seeking an ideal future but, instead, is working to solve problems (Carroll 2012,
510). Thus, Carroll’s framing is a unique mix of actor-network theory approaches
that attribute a critical role to material objects with the Foucauldian concept of
governmentality to understand how states extend influence into new territories.
Developments in political sociology have also reintroduced the
Durkehemian approach to the state a perspective that was seemingly diminished
in the 20th century in comparison to Marxist or Weberian approaches. In
particular, the engagement of Durkheim’s role of symbols, collective
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understandings, and a focus on identity and meaning all provide new tools with
which to approach the state (Alexander 2006). An application of this
Durkheimian return to the state is provided by Bratsis (2006) in his examination
of the state as an everyday experience. For Bratsis, the key to understanding the
state is to capture a series of social facts that move the state from a social science
category to a lived experience. Bratsis posits that Weberian approaches fall short
in that they fail to explain fully how legitimacy becomes internalized by those
included in the state. He calls this a “fetishization” of the rationality in research
on the state; however, he does little to explain how this fetish is reproduced and
upheld. Similarly, Marxist approaches simplify the state and relegate it too often
as an adjunct to other social forces. These distinctions and the struggle to
demarcate the boundaries between them enable the state. In particular, the
maintenance of the public and private distinction is necessary for the state to
continue in existence¾it allows for the movement of actors from private to
public roles and to engage in claims for action on behalf of the public (Bratsis
2006, 48–50). This boundary requires constant action through rules that work to
purify public and private realms by strictly separating them from mixing¾a
model of taboos and pollution borrowed from anthropology (Douglas 2002). This
work leads to a definition of the state that is at once based on ideas but also rules
to purify and manage the public.
Thus, the state exists when people view themselves as members of
a political community that is concurrent with the formal national
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territorial markers of what constitutes the “inside” and “outside” of
society and when people view their society as divided into two
registers, the public and the private, with the political apparatus
belonging to the “public” side of this split as an abstract
embodiment of the political community and its interests and will.
(Bratsis 2006, 114)
This definition recognizes the need to manage territoriality but also to ensure it is
recognized by those it covers. The state becomes dependent on managing
meanings of what is public and what is private to support its claims to work for
the public. It is a process that is cognitive and performative as individuals
encounter problems and ideas and work to understand their fit in public or
private life.
This conception of the state is an important contribution for further
research as it opens avenues to address the challenges of seeing the state as an
autonomous entity or a reified category outside of society. Moreover, it allows
for an acknowledgment of a joint social project that creates a unique set of values
but not ones that can be explained solely in terms of economic conflict or
authoritarian control. Rather, the state is an entity that exists because of collective
beliefs around public and private lives¾it is motivated to recursively continue
the division. Taking this conception of the state also connects to other efforts to
reengage the state in public administration. Public administration has not
directly engaged the idea of the state in part because of its tradition of seeing
politics and administration¾or state and society¾as realms that should remain
apart. As the discussion of Bratsis above notes, this is a project of purifying each
191

to avoid contamination of ideas between the private and the public. However,
for public administration, the purification happens between politics and
management where the impulse is to keep politics separate from good
management.
Yet there it has long been recognized that there is an embedded political
model in public administration. As Spicer (2001) explores, the state as a
“purposive association” remains a long-held perspective (Spicer 2001). This
purposive association is a model of the state as a joint activity of individuals to
accomplish something. This represents an implicit model of the state acted upon
by administrators and politicians alike. The problem of not critically exploring
this perspective on the state is that it is embedded with assumptions about
defining purposes, outcomes, and means of any purposive activity. It also fails to
include other values of association and therefore can undermine civil association
because of the lack of measurable outcomes. Spicer raises these concerns to
explore the implicit models at work in administration.
This observation is vital for this research. The reason it is valuable to
explore the state is not to discover some new entity or better define grand
political theory, rather, it is because individuals involved in policy processes,
administrators, concerned citizens, and those involved in public matters carry
with them implicit models of states and act on these. The resistance to investigate
the state is to be expected though¾the state might be one of the most taken for
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granted values in modern society. Examining its dimensions is unsettling and
unique opportunities are required to explore it. As argued here, the development
of new territoriality on the ocean, the deployment of new public involvement
technologies, and the expansion of legitimate uses of the ocean reveal a moment
where the cognitive and institutional dimensions of the state are available for
research. The following section reviews the necessary concepts to explore the
state as this unique institution and provides foundations for the Oregon planning
story in this research.
Governance technologies are the tools, methods, and efforts to develop the
knowledge to support state activities. Governance technologies are the practices
and material activities that make up the efforts of bureaucratic rationality (Weber
1997a). Framed in this rationality model, these tools provide a way to develop
legitimate control. This legitimacy is derived by mimicking democratic
representation or by replicating economic modes of knowledge. In the first case,
the technologies may be seen as legitimate as the technologies are argued to be
more accurate representations of interests. Surveys or public involvement seek to
create a virtual plebiscite. Alternatively, the data collected with these
technologies support cost and benefit type analyses that work to replicate market
logics. Both of these modes are incomplete. The technologies and knowledge
they produce are incomplete. These limits on the knowledge they produce are a
problem that may also be restricted politically. Furthermore, the limits on the
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state to act are limits on its knowledge, especially in the US tradition where limits
are a defining element of liberal democracy. The economic system provides
another model to draw on for legitimacy, but, again, the state stumbles here as
well. The rationality of the economic system is not reproducible in public
systems leaving the state constantly reformulating systems to reassert its position
(Porter 1996).
These efforts toward reason in political affairs try to parallel reason in
economic affairs, but a crisis emerges. Foucault presented this crisis as one that
ultimately results in the state seeking to exert security over other activities
(Foucault 1995; Foucault, Senellart, and Burchell 2009). The tension stems from
limits to what knowledge the state can successfully develop. The shortcoming in
this knowledge results in the state shifting to ordering all subjects, not based on
the knowledge of their interests but on their ability to control and implement
self-control. Security becomes a process of regulating the actors by making them
subjects to be managed. In other words, the state’s failure to know what is
desired is replaced by knowing how to control. Governance technologies
represent a democratic or economic rationality to resolve conflict, but it is a
unique rationality, one that borrows in part from the engineering
governmentality of Carroll (2012), as well as from Bratsis’s (2006) cognitive and
social fact of the nature of the state. These technogovernance tools, when
examined, are anticipated to explore the way the state is thought of in practice,
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providing access to the dimensions of the institutionalizations that support the
state in society.
This research tests these claims of technogovernance by examining an
application of coastal and marine spatial planning (CMSP) in the United States.
The State of Oregon initiated a comprehensive update of the management plans
of the coast and ocean environment to evaluate the inclusion of ocean renewable
energy. This setting allows for an exploring of how state and federal agencies,
local government, ocean users, and marine resource scientists used these
technogovernance tools to understand the public and resources they sought to
manage and regulate.
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Chapter 8: Authority Everywhere, but not a State to Use?
At the end of the planning process in Oregon, the Territorial Sea Plan Part
5 Amendment faced an anticlimactic ending. In the final months of the planning
process, two dueling plans remained on the table¾the first one advanced by
OPAC and the second one emerging from a staff report by the DLCD Coastal
Program team. The OPAC plan was more restrictive, allowing fewer potential
areas for the development of ocean renewable energy. The staff plan, in contrast,
included more opportunities though many of these were viewed as essentially
infeasible from an energy development perspective. As the final mapping
products were assembled, debates centered around who should have the final
authority to decide. While the debates were in part about the data products and
the substantive outcomes of the mapping, the tension between OPAC and DLCD
was over who had the authority to review and approve the decision-making for
the plan.
OPAC had originally been created as an advisory committee by the
Oregon legislature to provide stakeholders and communities an opportunity to
review and weigh in on proposed planning and resource management decisions.
Some ambiguity appeared in statute as to whether OPAC was required to review
and approve planning decisions or if they were simply afforded the right to
review and comment. The staff report and plan moved ahead with OPAC
approval and, in the end, was adopted by the Land Conservation and
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Development Commission (LCDC) through a 5-1 vote. The plan was
immediately challenged in a lawsuit that was filed by parties including some
members of the OPAC and working group charged with the development of the
plan. The key legal question hinged on whether OPAC had been granted
appropriate opportunities to review, comment, and even prevent the adoption of
the plan. The Oregon Appellate Court sided with OPAC, remanding the plan to
the agency instructing them to engage OPAC for any future plan amendments.
Quite some time elapsed between the planning process initiation, the data
collection, the final plan development, and the ill-fated adoption. In a memo to
the LCDC, staff noted that the options included doing nothing, adopting the
OPAC plan that had initially lost out, or making revisions to the staff plan and
seeking OPAC’s approval. By this point in the process, following the appellate
decision, the plan was quickly approaching the middle of its theoretical life¾the
goal had been for there to be a 10 year period within which it would be reviewed
again. The planning process had started in 2008, gaining speed and development
from 2010-2012, and was finally adopted in 2013. Ten years after the process
began, and five years after plan adoptions, the lawsuits and appellate decision
were reached in 2018. Ultimately, the substantive difference between OPAC and
the staff plan was over the total area potentially to be allocated to ocean
renewable energy development. The 2013 OPAC recommendations identified 2%
of the territorial sea for potential development, while the staff plan identified 3%.
197

The difference between these two numbers from an energy perspective was a
source of frustration, but from the local communities’ perspective, the difference
represented protecting certain key locations from future development.
How does this conclusion to the planning process reflect on the findings
of this research? The failure, or at least seemingly underwhelming outcome of
the planning process, is less of a measure of the processes that played out over
the ocean, rather, the argument here is that the process, in fact, created a new
system of control over the ocean¾one that identified the rational planning
expertise and technology both within the DLCD and outside of it as the
appropriate model for managing the ocean. This differs from the previous
system of management that was less integrated and less comprehensive. The
contents or organization of the maps of the Oregon territorial sea are less
important than the fact that they emerged as the accepted way to control and
structure human and natural uses of the ocean.
The dedication to the technologies of public involvement as a way to
know who and what interests are present on the sea did not stop with this
process. Subsequent to the final adoption of the plan after remand from the
courts, the DLCD shifted to the next topic for planning on the Oregon coast: the
rocky shorelines program. Rocky shorelines are identified as critical habitat for a
broad suite of species. The proposed plan amendment for this habitat would
limit human activity and development in these habitat zones. The definition of
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what counts as these habitat areas is also something to be negotiated in this
process.
As DLCD initiated this process to revise a new section of the Territorial
Sea Plan, a key tool that was re-launched was the use of PGIS to solicit public
comment and interest regarding the uses of these habitats. The deployment of
these tools in the Part 5 process for ocean renewable energy had put into motion
a series of technologies that now are accepted as ways of knowing the ocean and
coastal areas. These processes are also forming patterned interactions across
users and stakeholders that create a space for debates over the future of these
resources.
This research has worked to move the ideas of this public involvement
and analysis outside of a governance or policy context, suggesting public
involvement represents a more fundamental shift in social activity, that these
technological tools¾technogovernance tools¾are elements of expanding state
authority. In his critique of modern planning and management, Scott (1999)
noted that the state seeks to make the illegible legible to exert control over the
landscape and its inhabitants¾a legibility project. These efforts, Scott argues, are
often too narrow and set themselves up for failure as the state oversimplifies or
triggers resistance to the standardization of human activity through
measurements or rules. I argue in the Oregon case that something a little less
totalizing has occurred. Here, the state has sought, painfully so at times, to make
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the ocean environment and the people working there legible. However, it has
done this in a way that the participants of this legibility project have accepted,
and, in doing so, those governed and those governing here have jointly extended
the state. This extension is less about a way of doing things (or a way of conduct
to borrow from Foucault), but rather a way of thinking and organizing the public
and private interests that struggle for their proper place in the ocean. The
concept of the state emerges from the joint project to negotiate a way of
representing and expanding the public interest and carve out space for private
and parochial interests. Both are served by the existence of the state in this use of
technology.
These findings suggest that future efforts to employ technology to
measure and analyze interests for planning need to be aware of this constitutive
force. It is not novel to suggest that planning is more than a technical exercise, it
is a political exercise (Hoch 1994). However, this research suggests going
further¾it is more than just a political exercise¾planning with these tools can be
generative of the state authority itself in places where it may not have existed.
This generative power also speaks to the community’s shared (or contested)
sense of what is appropriate for public interest and what should be reserved for
private interest. However, as these tools grow, more areas that have been
informally managed through traditional practices may find themselves codified
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in data products that more than reorganize uses, altering their relationship to
society.
The case study presented here shared some key challenges in the
technology. Despite the desire to work from communication to information to
goal setting as argued in other settings (Pomeroy and Douvere 2008), the Oregon
story struggled with how to allow for goal setting and reciprocal flows of
information meaningfully. Yet, despite these challenges, the process and the
technology were assessed highly by those involved. A concerning observation
here is the potential for this level of acceptance of technology to define state
relations is one that could lead to a form of “info-liberalism” where interests and
stakeholders become entangled in systems that must know them in a certain way
and they feel compelled to share in this system (Catlaw and Sandberg 2014).
This, in turn, allows for decisions seemingly to represent the public interest but
can only understand it as far as the tools of technology allow them to.
In a more optimistic turn, this case study might also suggest the potential
for a nascent set of relations. Here, the expansion of the state over the traditional
and informal is simply a maturing of a system that is moving from serving only
local interests to one that does fully engage the public. Oregon’s ocean and
coastal resources are meant to be protected for all of Oregon. Past informal or
traditional modes of management were highly focused on the proximate
communities and their users. Acknowledging this, opening up the knowledge
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claims on the ocean may also represent a positive example of state
expansion¾one that better balances the local economic interests and gives a seat
at the table to other values and goals. The question moving ahead is how best to
track the deployment of these technologies and evaluate if they are normatively
providing better relationships between public and private interests. While the
Oregon technogovernance story might be the starting point for state expansion,
the evaluative question to return to later is if it serves to create a new political
environment that better represents values that are expected to have a role in
planning processes.
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol

Interview Questions
I.

Respondent Information and Context Questions
a. What is your name, position and organization [if already known,
confirm]?
b. How did you become involved in the Territorial Sea Plan (TSP)
amendment process?
c. What is your role or relationship with marine policy issues? How long
have you been in this role? [Craft for specific settings – for fishers,
tailor to fishing questions, for policy makers tailor to their work.]

II.

Territorial Sea Plan and Oregon Marine Management Substantive
Questions
a. Have you engaged other marine or ocean policy issues before the
Territorial Sea Plan?
b. Did you take part in the participatory mapping? (e.g. fishing effort
mapping, recreational mapping, visual resource mapping)
c. [If the participant mapped] When you took part in the mapping who
helped you? Did the exercise make sense? Was mapping this
information new or a repeat of previous effort?
d. Did you see the maps or products from those mapping efforts? Did
any of the maps impact your work, or your use of the ocean? How or
in what way? [Bring sample maps as prompts if needed.]

III.

Networks and Social History
a. Before and during the TSP process, who did you look to for
information or science on the issues at stake?
b. During the TSP process, if you felt you needed to share information of
your own or concerns of your own, where did you go or who did you
contact?
c. Have you made new connections or found new sources of information
because of the TSP process?
d. How do you rate the mapping and data used to create the Territorial
Sea Plan?
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IV.

Evaluative Questions
a. Looking back over the TSP process, how would you describe the
process overall?
b. The TSP process created a series of new areas for different possible
future energy use. Do you think the outcomes achieved this, or were
useful?
c. What were the key issues in the TSP process?
d. Who benefited or lost because of the new TSP amendment?
e. Was anything left out of the process that should have been there? Or
was anything over emphasized?
f. The Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development led
the process, were they a group you had worked with and trusted
before the TSP process? How do you see DLCD now after the plan
adoption?
g. Who do you think should ultimately have control or say over the
management of the ocean?
h. The Oregon ocean and coastal areas have seen an increase in attention
from state and federal agencies over the past decades, also interest
from different interest groups seeking different management
priorities – why has this happened in your opinion? What is new or
what is changing on the Oregon ocean?
i.

If you had the power to redesign the process and do it over, what
would you do differently?
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Appendix B: Codebook
The following codebook summarizes key codes used in the research. Some
codes were excluded if they might identify participants or were not central to
analysis. Due to this the sum of codes may be less than the total reported at the
head of the report.
Code System

Frequency

Code System

1379

Storylines

234

Outside Pressure on Coast

41

Rural Communities

12

"Gold Rush"

11

Pioneers/Cowboy

2

Sustainable Fisheries

4

Acts of the Play

29

Data vs. Story

4

Economic Development

16

Energy Modernization

12

Environmentalism

14

Groundfish/Salmon Disaster

4

Hunter/Gatherer

3

Industrialization

18

Industrialization

3

Intellectual Property

7

Marine Reserves

11

Ocean Health

5

Oregon Leading Innovation - R&D

17

Power Cost

11

218

Public Interest

10

Fisherman Wealth

5

Small Independent Fishermen

17

Public Involvement Process

186

Roadshow

1

DLCD

5

Coastal Caucus

10

DoE

2

Ecotrust

9

FERC

7

Governor's Office

10

Involvement Recruitment

3

LCDC

5

NOAA

4

OCZMA

3

OPAC

79

OWET

18

Sea Grant - OSU

8

TSPAC

12

Mapping

221

Data Products

13

MARXAN

3

Democratization

1

Representation

11

Buffering

2

Digitization

2

Fishing Effort

28

Mapping

33

Mapping Design

33

Mapping Tactics

24

219

Metrics - Quotas

9

Other Mapping Approaches

6

Site Selections

24

Spatial Negotiation

11

Static vs Dynamic

4

Use Conflicts

14

OPAC

1

Conflict and Negotiation

13

Recommended Respondents

21

Data

68
Leaky Black Boxes

32

Polling and Surveys

4

Ecological

11

Peer review

1

Review

1

Science

10

Risks/Threats

18

Whales

3

Salmon

1

Pollution

1

Testing and Risk

3

Energy Development Risk

9

Fishing Risk

1

Planning History

70

Federal CMSP Efforts

8

State Policy

34

Federal Policy

28

Intersecting Policy Issues

46

TSP

2

FERC MOU

1

220

Goal 19

6

Oregon Ocean Plan (1980s)

5

Marine Sanctuary

4

Oregon Solutions

1

Marine Reserves

26

Traditional/User Knowledge

8

Uses

155
Recreational Fishing

3

Charter Fishing

5

Whale Watch

2

Oil and Gas

2

Shipping/Barge

0

Aesthetic

13

Cables

1

Ecological

13

Fishing

53

Recreation

8

Energy Development

40

R&D Use - Ocean energy

14

Science/Knowledge

4

Study Request

1

Planning Evaluation

144

Appeal

3

Recommendations

3

Process

57

Outcome

56

Facilitation

11

Timeline

2

Organizations and Interests

43

Organizing

23

221

Power Utilities

1

Interests/Views

8

NGO Funding

11

State Role

50

Decision Making

17

Negotiation

8
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